Why has the once fallen star of income bonds started to rise after spending over seventy years below the financial horizon? Is it because income bonds provide many of the advantages of debt financing with the non-fixed payments feature of equity financing? Could it be caused by the high yields they carry considering the risk involved? Is it the result of the large tax savings created in many cases? All of these questions are important. Eighteen years ago income bonds were one of the least respected and most disliked types of securities that a company could issue. Today they have a limited but growing use and an ever increasing acceptance. This study is an attempt to determine and give reasons for the development and use of income bonds in the past, present, and future. It traces the development of income bonds, explains the advantages and disadvantages associated with them, and prognosticates about their future.

acase@tulane.edu / 1 / HyunJun Na

Small businesses significantly rely on debt financing. However, it is challenging for them to convince the lenders on their creditworthiness because of the agency problems rooted in information asymmetry. Professionalization, as one of the signal devices, may carry positive information about a small firm since it helps enhance the firm value by aligning owner and managers interests. If firm value goes up, the financial leverage drops without any new external debt financing. Thus, it is safer for the lenders to provide the capital. Unfortunately, whether professionalization helps mitigate the lender-borrower conflict of interest has not been investigated in the previous literature. This study intends to help fill in this gap by investigating the influence of professionalization on small business debt financing. Our empirical results show that professionalization tends to increase the use and the amount of new venture debt financing. Findings also indicate that the solution to owner-manager agency problem can also help alleviate the creditor-shareholder conflict of interests in new venture debt financing.

Small businesses significantly rely on debt financing. However, it is challenging for them to convince the lenders on their creditworthiness because of the agency problems rooted in information asymmetry. Professionalization, as one of the signal devices, may carry positive information about a small firm since it helps enhance the firm value by aligning owner and managers interests. If firm value goes up, the financial leverage drops without any new external debt financing. Thus, it is safer for the lenders to provide the capital. Unfortunately, whether professionalization helps mitigate the lender-borrower conflict of interest has not been investigated in the previous literature. This study intends to help fill in this gap by investigating the influence of professionalization on small business debt financing. Our empirical results show that professionalization tends to increase the use and the amount of new venture debt financing. Findings also indicate that the solution to owner-manager agency problem can also help alleviate the creditor-shareholder conflict of interests in new venture debt financing.

The business corporation is an important engine for the creation of wealth and it plays a vital role in promoting economic development and social progress in both domestic and international economies. Hence companies must operate within a governance framework that keeps them focused on their objectives and accountable for their actions. There is the need to establish adequate and credible governance arrangements. The degree of observance to the basic principles of good corporate governance is an important factor for investment decisions. / Traditional corporate doctrine has taken the separation of ownership from control as the core problem of corporate governance. On this view, the principal function of corporate law is to devise strategies and mechanisms to ensure that corporate decision-making is based only on shareholders' interests. However, corporate managers are subject to influence from many other sources. Thus, the study of corporate governance must take account of all factors that affect managerial decision-making. / In this thesis, I examine the influence that debt financing brings to bear on corporate governance and examine whether debt-holders should be beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary duties. I conclude that any such duty should be narrowly cast.

This dissertation assesses the importance of a specific debt instrument, the Certifi- cate of Obligation in the state of Texas. It conceptualizes the Certificate of Obligation as a type of contractual debt that enables local governments to finance their capital projects. This dissertation is guided by three research questions: (1) What are the various types of debt instruments employed by local governments and what are their relative advantages? (2) How prevalent is the use of a specific debt instrument such as Certificates of Obligation? And why would some local governments prefer to issue them while others do not? (3) To what extent does the local institutional environment, e.g., the executive authority of city managers in the council-manager form of government, affect debt financing behaviors of local governments? To examine the first research question, we created a typology to represent four ideal types of borrowing methods: (1) Contractual Debt, (2) Voter Approval/Special Tax Debt, (3) Guaranteed, and (4) Non-Guaranteed Debts. The typology examines whether or not the state mandates the referendum requirement for the use of each of these debt instruments, and at the same time determines whether each debt instrument is secured by multiple or single revenue sources. Using data we collected among municipal governments in Texas, we conducted two empirical analyses. The first analysis tests the hypothesis that Certificates of Obligation have higher borrowing costs compared to GO bonds, since a GO bond is often issued under the pledge of the bond issuers’ full-faith credit and taxing authority. We employed a two-stage least square analysis to test the general proposition in the state of Texas. Based on 741 Certificates of Obligation and GO bonds issued between 2008 and 2011, our analyses show that Certificates of Obligation are likely to incur True Interest Costs (TIC) similar to those of GO bonds. The second analysis explores factors explaining the use of Certificates of Obligation in 225 Texas charter cities. Based on Heckman’s two-stage, we found that a local government’s decision to issue Certificates of Obligation to be partly explained by the characteristics of local population, i.e., median household income, population growth, and the percentage of senior citizens living in the jurisdiction. In the case of GO bonds, we found that population size, property tax rate, debt burden, and the percentage of population with at least a college education, to be an important determinant of GO bonds. The volume of GO issuance by local governments was also related to the level of regional competition, i.e., government density. Additionally, we found that local political institutions matter and that they affect debt financing behaviors of local governments.

No description available.

In East Asian economies, about 2/3 listed firms are controlled by family shareholders. In the US and West European, the proportions of family firms are about 33% and 44%, respectively. Thus, family-controlled listed firms are common in almost every nation. In Taiwan, nearly 70% of listed firms are family-controlled. Many previous studies have pointed out that family firms are playing an important role in global economic activities. The equity structures and management ideas of family firms are different from those of common firms. For instance, family members possess decisive equities and will usually take positions of directors or top managers. They may usually view their firms as an asset inherited from forefathers, and they should pass it on to their next generations. The impact of these differences on firm¡¦s financial decisions has become a main research focus in recent years. Previous studies of family firms mainly placed the focus on the impact of family factors on corporate performance, but this study would attempt to investigate the impact of family factors on debt decisions from the perspectives of debt-financing decision and cost of debt-financing. First of all, this study probed into whether family and non-family firms have differences debt-financing decisions. Empirical findings indicated that family firms have a lower debt ratio and a 0.2813% lower cost of debt than non-family firms. A further comparison on the factors of debt decisions showed that the difference in the impact of family and non-family firms on debt levels lies in mainly three aspects, including depreciation tax shield, operational risk, and firm size. In the aspect of cost of debt-financing, family firms are relatively more sensitive to firm size, debt ratio, and credit risk. Previous studies that applied the agent theory to investigate debt decisions focused more on the problems of debt agency problem and seldom used the inter-relationship between equity agency problem and debt agency problem to discuss the impact of equity agency problem on debt decisions. The problems of equity agency of family firms encompass the traditional equity agency between the manager and shareholders and core equity agency between controlling shareholders and external shareholders. Besides, family ownership and management can reduce the problems of traditional equity agency, and controlling shareholders using the pyramid structure of equities and cross-holding to enhance control right will increase the problems of core equity agency. Thus, based on the problems of equity agency problem, the family factors can be divided into family ownership, enhancement of control, and family management to investigate the respective impact on debt-financing decisions. In the aspect of debt-financing, it was empirically discovered that higher family ownership would lead to a closer relationship between firm value and the wealth of family shareholders. Debt financing would be avoided to reduce financial risks and maintain the wealth of family shareholders. A positive correlation existed between debt ratio and the difference between family control and family ownership, implying when the difference between family control and family ownership is higher, the problems of core equity agency between controlling shareholders and small shareholders will be more serious, and the company will be inclined to adopt debt-financing to acquire long-term capitals. The estimate coefficient of the effect of family management on debt ratio is not significance. Thus, whether the CEO is taken by a family member will not affect debt-financing decisions. In the analysis of control level, when the control level is low, firms are inclined to adopt debt-financing decisions to reduce the effect of equity dilution. On the contrary, when the control level is high, in order to avoid the loss of control benefit caused by debt monitoring, firms will be inclined to avoid debts. As a result, control and debt ratio are in an inverted U-shaped relationship. In addition, for family firms, the maintenance of control and risk control are important factors affecting their debt-financing decision. In the aspect of cost of debt, family ownership can reduce the cost of debt-financing. If the non-linear relationship of family ownership is considered, the impact of family ownership on the cost of debt-financing is non-linear and in an inverted U shape. The maximum value is 8.64%. When the family ownership exceeds 17.9%, the effect of family ownership on the cost of debt financing is negative. As the minimum family ownership was defined as 10% in this study, and the average family ownership among the samples was 21%, it could be inferred that higher family ownership would lead to a lower cost of debt-financing. In a comparison with Anderson et al. (2003), it was discovered that the average family ownership has negative influence on the cost of debt, but for the family firms in the US, higher family ownership would reduce its negative influence on cost of debt, and for domestic family firms, higher family ownership would increase its negative influence on the cost of debt. The Control-enhancing mechanisms will increase core equity problem and cost of debt, and the relationship between control enhancement and cost of debt are not in a non-linear relationship. Creditors conceive that their mortgage will be more secured if family members take the position of CEO. Thus, family CEO can reduce the cost of debt-financing.

This thesis comprises an introduction and four distinct chapters. Its central theme is the role played by the allocation of asset ownership rights in motivating asset-specific investment, when contracts are incomplete. Chapter 1 considers the debt financing of an entrepreneurial project. To encourage asset-specific investment and loan repayment, debt structure should minimise both (voluntary) strategic default and liquidation following (unavoidable) liquidity default. Liquidation incentives are critical and shown to depend crucially on creditor characteristics. In general, borrowing from multiple creditors with contrasting attributes is found optimal. The benefits of borrowing from a creditor also undertaking project trade are explored. In Chapter 2 the relationship between asset ownership and investment specificity is examined. Asset control encourages efficient, asset-specific investment by owners. However, lock-in fears lead non-owners to choose widely applicable but less effective investment. The interactions between asset ownership, firms' technology choices and workers' investments are considered. In particular, it is found that the costs and benefits of individual integration decisions are sensitive to overall industry structure. The specificity framework is extended in Chapter 3 to model a retailer's product choice. Vertical merger encourages investment in integrated supply and foreclosure of non-integrated manufacturers. An anti-competitive as opposed to an efficiency interpretation depends delicately on the trade-off between the benefits of supplier-specific investment and multi-product retailing. Where retailers compete, it is shown that vertical integration implements effective competition-reducing differentiation strategies. In Chapter 4 vertical integration, through the incentive effects of asset ownership, is shown to amount to a specialisation decision. The attractions of encouraging investment in input as opposed to final good production depend on the effectiveness of investment at each manufacturing stage, and the scale benefits of input sales to generally rivalrous downstream firms. These benefits are sensitive to downstream competitive pressures, yielding a potentially non-monotonic relationship between competition and integration.

This dissertation comprises three essays. In the first essay, I develop a contingent-claims model to investigate the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate policies and security valuation. The model emphasizes the role that managerial agency issues play in determining both a firm's dividend payout and capital structure. I show quantitatively that self-interested managers' leverage choices deviate from those ex ante maximize firm values. The results suggest that dividend yields are negatively affected by both leverage ratios and managerial entrenchment. They provide implications for empirical research attempting to relate dividend policy to capital structure. In addition, the model offers a new framework to measure managerial entrenchment using observed leverage and dividend payout. / In the second essay, we use a set of structural models to evaluate the price of default protection for a sample of US corporations. In contrast to previous evidence from corporate bond data, CDS premia are not systematically underestimated. In fact, one of our studied models has little difficulty on average in predicting their level. For robustness, we perform the same exercise for bond spreads by the same issuers on the same trading date. As expected, bond spreads relative to the Treasury curve are systematically underestimated, consistent with their being driven by significant non-default components. This is not the case when the swap curve is used as a benchmark, suggesting that previously documented underestimation results may be sensitive to the choice of risk free rate. / In the third essay, we develop a valuation model that simultaneously captures credit risk and interest rate risk, and apply it to study the valuation of putable corporate bonds. We ask what risks put features provide insurance against in practice - credit risk, liquidity risk or interest rate risk - and to what degree? We find that they reduce the components of all three risks in bond spreads. The most important, perhaps surprisingly is default or spread risk, followed by term structure risk. The reduction in the liquidity component is present but rather small.