Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed June 26, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-117).

Financial crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have caused some to wonder if there is something inherently unstable about financial markets that thwarts their ability to allocate capital appropriate^- and ultimately causes these crises. I build a multi-period, industry-level credit model in which debt-financed entrepreneurs develop homogeneous projects with long gestation periods, sequential investment requirements, and no intermediate cash flows. Entrepreneurs accumulate private signals about terminal demand, and if the signals are bad enough, may decide to halt project development before completion. The prevalence of project suspensions aggregates information and permits the industry size to adjust to the true state of terminal demand. Debt contracts depend upon the pricing power of the creditor; these contracts impact the size of the industry and the timing of the information aggregation. When demand realisations are poor, some investors will be disappointed ex post; aggregate disappointment will depend upon how long the investment behaviour has carried on before suspensions occur, and how large the industry is. I interpret situations of substantial aggregate disappointment as a 'crisis'. Principal results relate to the impact of debt finance on the timing and likelihood of project suspensions. With all equity (self) financing, suspensions will typically be observed, but they may occur relatively late in the game. In contrast, debt finance may lead to very rapid suspensions, depending upon the tools allocated to the creditor. When creditors exercise monopoly control over credit allocation and pricing, profit-maximising creditors can and will force suspensions. This may involve reducing the entrepreneurs' equity contribution and / or subsidizing credit in order to ensure entrepreneurial participation. When credit markets are competitive, creditors lack the pricing power that can be used to structure credit policies that force early suspensions. As debt accumulates and the entrepreneurs' share of liquidation proceeds dwindles, entrepreneurs may not voluntarily suspend operations as this will lead to loss of private benefits. Therefore, there may be no suspensions observed in equilibrium. This problem will be particularly acute when the entrepreneurs' initial equit)' stake is small. / Business, Sauder School of / Finance, Division of / Graduate

Investment in hospitality firms is perceived to be riskier than investments in other types of industries. Based on literature linking good corporate governance to lower default risks and higher credit ratings, this quantitative study is designed to identify the effects of corporate governance on credit ratings in the hospitality industry. After exploring the various factors influencing the characteristics of corporate governance, as well as the specific risks for capital financing in hospitality firms, this research provides empirical evidence to show that hospitality firms with stronger shareholder influence tend to have higher credit ratings. In a related finding, this investigation confirms that hospitality stakeholders are able to evaluate their potential risks by determining a firm's credit ratings and can protect their long-term interest by increasing their power versus management in the corporate governance of the firm. / Master of Science

A Research Report submitted to the Facultv of Commerce, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Commerce. / This Research Report examines the determinants of South African industrial firms' capital structures. The report attempts to evaluate if a firm's preference for equity or debt capital can be attributed to specific variables which may reflect its industry profile or operating structure. A literature review, discussing both perfect and imperfect capital market conditions, is included in order to determine if the premise of "variable influence" has academic support. The variables found to have an influence on (non South African company) capital structure by authors examined in the review, are / Andrew Chakane 2018

This dissertation examines several research questions relating to securitization by non-financial firms. Finance theories suggest securitization is most beneficial when there is high demand for liquidity. On the other hand, empirical studies have shown that firms engage in securitization to manage earnings. I find that liquidity demand, not the incentive for earnings management motivates securitization transactions by non-financial firms. I also evaluate whether earnings management in securitization is indeed undesirable from a shareholder's perspective by examining the economic consequences of the practice. Because securitization creates a large infusion of cash, one way to evaluate the economic consequences of earnings management is to examine whether securitization proceeds encourage overinvestment. I find that earnings management in securitization (i.e., recording non-zero securitization income) is unrelated to firms' suboptimal) overinvestment in the post-securitization period. Thus, it appears that earning management in securitization has no negative economic consequence in terms of generating excess securitization proceeds that encourage overinvestment. I also examine the market's valuation of securitizable assets in the accrual components of earnings and the use of securitization proceeds. Because securitizable assets can be converted into cash through securitization, I test whether the market valuation reflects the source of liquidity in securitizable assets that is similar to the cash component of earnings. I find that, for securitization firms, the market valuation of securitizable assets is similar to that of the cash component of earnings. / Lastly, I find some evidence supporting the assertion that firms' liquidity prior to securitization influences the market valuation on securitization proceeds retained on the balance sheet, in that the market assigns a discount to retained proceeds for firms with excess liquidity prior to securitiaztion. / by Qianyun Huang. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2011. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2011. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

We investigate the impact of cash reserves upon the optimal behaviour of a modelled firm that has uncertain future revenues. To achieve this, we build up a corporate financing model of a firm from a Real Options foundation, with the option to close as a core business decision maintained throughout. We model the firm by employing an optimal stochastic control mathematical approach, which is based upon a partial differential equations perspective. In so doing, we are able to assess the incremental impacts upon the optimal operation of the cash constrained firm, by sequentially including: an optimal dividend distribution; optimal equity financing; and optimal debt financing (conducted in a novel equilibrium setting between firm and creditor). We present efficient numerical schemes to solve these models, which are generally built from the Projected Successive Over Relaxation (PSOR) method, and the Semi-Lagrangian approach. Using these numerical tools, and our gained economic insights, we then allow the firm the option to also expand the operation, so they may also take advantage of favourable economic conditions.

I investigate the impacts that information production, information asymmetry have on firms financing choices 3/4 equity financing or debt financing. I find that equity issue announcements encourage more information production than debt issue announcements, which in turn raises the probability of equity financing. In addition, the post-issue stock market performance is positively associated with information production. The results are robust after controlling for investor optimism. I also apply the Heckmans two-step procedure to jointly investigate firms financing choices and offering costs. I find that security-issuing firms choose the less-costly financing type.

If enterprise is human, capital just like blood. No matter what healthy or falling ill, blood may not stop flowing. Each enterprise may face financial question. If enterprise want to get enough money. To handle the loan with the bank is the most common way. Enterprise must accord its own actual situation to choose financial way. There¡¦s no rule can follow, only depends on shareholder rights and interests, or financial efficiency. In general, the company has the good future or in debt ratio quite low condition, almost will choose direct loan to bank. In contrary, business is in highdebt ratio , or its operation faces transformation, choose equity financing must be the easy way. In other way, economic indicators is also important parameter in getting financial support. If interest rates will get higher in the next few months or next year, issue bonds must be the smart way. In addition to, stock exchange-listed or OTC, is also feasible way. After stock exchange-listing , stock can be traded freely. Therefore, Companies can obtain financing at reasonable prices, also can Improve financial transparency and company credit rating In future, after China and Taiwan signed a cross-strait financial supervision Memorandum ¡]MOU¡^and ECFA¡ACompanies have more choice to issue stock in mainland China, Taiwan or Hong-Kong. According to the study, select different markets Listed, have different benefit. Stock in China, company can get higher PE ratio, also can raise funds in hard currency. The most important is, can establish enterprise brand and domestic access in mainland China. Stock in Taiwan, the greatest advantage is familiar with the market. Application must be efficiency. Stock in Hong Kong, the greatest advantage is the internationalization of securities markets. Each stock market has its own advantage, also have its own weakness. How to choose, only depends on the purpose of stocking and their own conditions.

Standard and Poor¡¦s (S & P), a global leading corporation in providing credit rating, published the sovereign rating outlook of Taiwan which was ¡§negative sign¡¨ at the end of 2007. The main reason was that the situation of public finance continued worsening. Based on traditional economic theory, the increased deficits or debts led to higher interest rates, and the increasing burden on enterprises for paying more loan cost, would have more adverse effects on the domestic investment activities. Therefore, this study is intended to explore the relationships among the long-term interest rates of public bonds, the outstanding debts, fiscal deficits, and government expenditure in Taiwan by analyzing 53 seasonal data from 1994:4 to 2007:4 as the samples. The findings indicate that no structure breaking points exist in every variable by using CUSUM test, and almost every variable is integrated of order one in unit root test. The results also reveal that there is no long-term relationship among the deficits, government expenditure, and interest rates using the cointegration analysis. There are probably two reasons for explanation: one is that people will increase saving automatically, and another is that the increased interest rates in the tax cut may be offset by the decreased interest rates in debts financing. Moreover, the outstanding debts and interest rates exist a significant negative relationship of long-term equivalence, and further variance decomposition shows that the effect of debts on interest rates is higher than the effect of interest rates on debts in the variable¡¦s explanatory ability. To explain the significant negative relationship, the possible main causes are liquidity factor, and the psychological anticipation of saving in public bond form directly or indirectly; the secondary cause is the fluctuation of interest rates affects the willingness of government financing.

This thesis presents various dynamic models of corporate decisions to address two main issues: investment distortions caused by debt financing and cash flow sensitivities. In the first chapter, four measures of investment distortion are computed. First, the effect of financing frictions is examined. The tax benefit of debt induces firms to increase their debt capacity and to invest beyond the first-best level on average. The cost of this investment distortion outweighs the tax benefit of debt. Second, Myers's (1977) debt overhang problem is examined in a dynamic framework. Debt overhang obtains on average, but not in low technology states. Third, there is no debt overhang problem in all technology states when debt is optimally put in place prior to the investment decision. Finally, the cost of choosing investment after the debt policy is examined. Equity claimants lose value by choosing to invest after their debt is optimally put in place because they do not consider the interaction between their investment choice and the debt financing conditions. The second chapter explores the impact of financial constraints on firms' cash flow sensitivities. In contrast to Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), cash flow sensitivities are found to be larger, rather than smaller, for unconstrained firms than for constrained firms. Then, why is investment sensitive to cash flow? In the two models examined in the second chapter, the underlying source of investment opportunities is highly correlated with cash flows. Investment may be sensitive to cash flow fluctuations simply because cash flows proxy for investment opportunities. This leaves two important questions. Can this chapter suggest a better measure of investment opportunities than Tobin's Q? Not a single measure for both the unconstrained and constrained firm models. Can this chapter suggest an easily observable measure of financial constraint? Yes: large and volatile dividend-to-income ratios.