This thesis explores the effects of institutions on macroeconomic performance. It does so in two main chapters, a summary of each of which is given below. In the first main chapter of the thesis, the interactions between government spending, government borrowing, political corruption and political turnover were examined. Incorporating these factors in a sovereign default model, we show how sovereign default decisions and business cycle fluctuations are affected by the level of corruption. In particular, we show that when there is turnover, corruption can generate higher risks of default and higher credit spreads when there is enough stability. Intuitively, we establish that a change in power from a less corrupt to a more corrupt government is more likely to cause default than the reverse. The results also shows that households suffer welfare losses as a result of corruption. As regards business cycles, the general effect of corruption is to alter business cycle statistics. Further, we estimate an empirical model using data on sovereign default, corruption, political stability and other macroeconomic variables for a sample of emerging economies. The results of this provide strong evidence of a positive relationship between both corruption and political stability and sovereign default. The second main chapter of the thesis looks at the effects of limited financial contract enforcement in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework where firms have access to both internal and external means of finance. The results shows how limited enforceability affects fluctuations in key macroeconomic variables (e.g., output, employment and price) through its impact on key financial variables (e.g., interest rates, risk premium, default risk and leverage). In particular, we find that weaker enforcement tends to amplify the effects of shocks, creating greater volatility, as well as lowering small firm funding. We provide some empirical evidence to support our results. Using cross-country data on measures of financial market imperfections, we find that limited enforcement has a negative effect on output and that this effect is exacerbated by poor credit information. We also find that weaker contract enforcement is associated with higher output volatility.

No description available.

In this dissertation, I study three economic issues in the field of entrepreneurship and a fourth that looks at the network structure of financial markets. Chapter 1, titled "Patenting and Nascent Firm Performance", examines how patents interact with nascent firm outcomes. The primary motivation follows a puzzle present in the data and discussed in the literature. Patents are prized possessions for business owners but the value that they confer is dubious. In this sample, patenting firms have no better survival rates and have significantly worse profit outcomes. A Oaxaca decomposition demonstrates the reason for this lies with patents' attraction of equity financing. The burden of the equity relationship proves to be a strain on the young firms. Chapter 2, titled "Signal vs Appropriation Value in Patenting" provides insight into the causal connection between patents and equity financing. This chapter also weighs in on the source of the equity firms' attraction to patents. Controlling for unobservable influences via fixed effects regression, the value measured by the coefficient on patent, demonstrates the appropriative value of the patent, rather than the signal value. Further examination reveals that equity firms are very sensitive to the legal status of the firm, eschewing general partnerships. Chapter 3, titled "Peer Effects in Entrepreneurship", studies gender differences in firm financing as a function of response to peers. This research borrows from the social interaction modeling pioneered by Charles Manski by adopting methods to include peer variables. The main finding is that males are positively and significantly affected by peer financing levels but females are not. This result is robust to industry, experience, credit risk, and other financing sources. Chapter 4, "Network Analysis of the S\&P 500", examines the financial market as a network. The literature takes two approaches to performing this analysis but no study has compared the two approaches. This chapter is the first study to compare them and provide insight as to which provides the more descriptive model. The threshold correlation approach provides much more useful results for any kind of analysis involving market connectedness and shock transition dynamics. / Economics