This thesis is the first of three sections in what will be a book-long project of creative nonfiction essays. The book will parallel the author's diary with three other family diaries, spanning four generations. This thesis deals with the first of those diaries, written by Antonio Bonetti's, the author's great-grandfather. The narrative traces the author's struggle with clinical depression, juxtaposing this with his great-grandfather's political struggles in the city of Trieste during the nineteenth century (then under the Austro-Hungarian empire). Both the author's and Bonetti's diaries are excerpted and commented on by the author, comparing the author's experiences as a psychiatric patient with those of his great-grandfather as a political prisoner. This is the "conversation" of diaries. The irreverent tone of the Antonio Bonetti's prison diary confounds many of the author's expectations, leading the author to discover more commonalities than anticipated, namely a sense of humor in the face of severe diversity (the punchline as life boat). / Graduation date: 1999

This is a dissertation on how certain cognitive limitations inform a theory of knowledge. Explanations in terms of the pure indexical "I" indicate a class of cognitive limitations. "I" cannot be completely eliminated from any successful explanation of how the world is intelligible to me and only I can refer to myself with the indexical "I." This raises the possibility that there are thoughts that I can think that cannot be thought by anyone else. Given what an epistemological theory must say about the definition, structure, and instances of knowledge and epistemic merit in general, such limits to cognitive access must arise both in its explanations of ordinary cases and its specialized theoretical concepts. The main contention of this dissertation is that it must be possible for an epistemological theory to plausibly account for these limitations.

In the first section of the critical part of this thesis, we study the phenomenon of simultaneous narration in first-person singular prose fiction. In the second section of the critical part, we outline the defining traits of the omniscient "I"; by proposing this figure, we fill in a gap in current narratological theory. / The second part of this thesis, a short piece of prose fiction, is written in the first-person singular and uses simultaneous narration. The "I" is omniscient and occasionally exercises this power. The text begins when the heroine, Sarah, decides to tell the story of the rest of her life. No particular event justifies that she begin her story where she does, other than a sudden impulse to communicate what will be the story, that she still doesn't know, of her life.

Anthony Powell's A Dance to the Music of Time is a "fictional memoir" in which the narrator, Nick Jenkins, describes the events and characters he has observed throughout his life. As such, the primary focus of the novel would seem to be those characters and events, but the way in which Nick relates his story has a considerable impact on the narrative, and, therefore, on that primary focus. Powell has not only chosen to employ a first-person narrator, thereby establishing a specific, and individual, narrative voice, or point of view, but he also has that narrator consume much of novel by describing his perceptions of the world he observes, and this brings into focus the nature of that perspective. Hence, this paper examines the nature of Nick's role in the novel, both as character and narrator, and attempts to delineate the effect that that role has on the novel as a whole. Essentially, Nick can be characterized as a "reader" who, in effect, "interprets" the characters and events he describes, thereby contributing his imagination to their "construction". Whether he reads actual texts or observes human behaviour, Nick engages in an interpretative process which is analogous to that in which a reader interprets a text: interpreting "signs", constructing "causes", translating texts into images and "meaning-bearing" ideas, and subjecting his own "reading" to scrutiny, thereby effectively "rereading" previous "interpretations". As a "reader", Nick is interested in more than mere description: he not only desires to understand the nature of the people with whom he is involved, but also to appreciate the significance of the events he witnesses, so as to form a kind of pattern which would reveal the central themes of an age. In so doing, he does not merely relate "what happens", thereby "putting up a mirror" to his past; he also describes his experience of that past, so that the narrative does not so much present "reality", as it presents Nick’s perception of reality. Nick's characterization as a "reader" is founded on specific theories regarding the nature of the reading process, especially as they apply to the relationship between reader and text, and, therefore, the products of his "interpretations" are considered in relation to the creation of fiction. In essence, Nick's "reading" results in the construction of the characters and events he observes, so that ultimately he creates "fictions". In other words, because he does not present "reality", nor even a "reconstruction" of reality, but a "reconstruction" of his perception of that reality, Nick, in fact, "creates" his narrative, thereby constructing fiction. Hence, just as a reader creates the fiction of a novel by interpreting its text, so too does Nick produce fiction by "interpreting" the world he is portraying. Thus, in his "search for knowledge", in his efforts to understand the world around him, Nick "creates" that world, so that knowledge would seem to be the product of the observer's, or "reader's", construction - in essence; a fiction. / Arts, Faculty of / English, Department of / Graduate

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2003. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 465-484). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2003. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 465-484). Also available on the Internet.

Edmund Gettier' s article Is justified true belief knowledge? raised substantial interest in the concept of epistemic justification, especially in Anglo-American epistemology. Discussions of the concept of epistemic justification form a large and varied field of study, covering a large number of related aspects. Not all these aspects are dealt with in this study. The distinction between 'structural' and 'perspectival' aspects is introduced as a theoretical tool to limit the scope of the study to covering only 'perspectival' aspects. These refer to aspects related to the perspective from which justification is carried out, i.e. whether it be from a first-person or from a third-person perspective. The first chapter gives a brief characterisation of the nature of epistemic justification, describing how it is related to the aim of maximising truth and minimising falsity. The concept of epistemic justification also has a normative character, defining justification in terms of blameworthiness. In the second chapter a concept of justification defined in terms of blameworthiness is discussed. A conception of justification construed along normative lines is properly termed 'deontological'. Criticism against such a conception centres around the problem of the voluntariness of belief. Two varieties of control over belief-formation, direct and indirect control, are discussed. A deontological conception of justification makes it possible for someone to be justified in holding a belief, even though the belief is false. For this reason some epistemologists reject justification defined in deontological terms. The discussion of the deontological conception of justification brings the main problem of first-person justification to the fore, i.e. how to determine, from such a perspective, whether one's belief-formation will lead to truth. Chapter 3 discusses the merit and problems of first-person justification in general. The matter of intersubjective principles as a means to achieve objective truth from a subjective perspective is investigated. The existence and nature of such principles are much-contested matters. Many epistemologists deny that such principles exist innately. However, without intersubjective, truthconducive rules that someone can appeal to, the possibility exists that someone's beliefs may constitute mere belief, in whatever way they are supported by the person's other beliefs. This compels some to reject subjective justification as a valid conception of epistemic justification. In chapter 4 'internalism', the most recent term for subjective justification, is discussed in comparison with internalism's main contemporary rival, 'externalism'. The different levels of internalism that result from different requirements set for someone's awareness of his justifiers are also discussed, as well as the relationship between internalism and deontology, and between internalism and truth. Chapter 5 deals with the main criticism that externalists level against internalism, i.e. that it creates an infinite justificational regress. Analysis of the structure of the internalist regress shows that a vicious regress is not involved. It is concluded that the notion of justificational perspective has to be incorporated into a theory of epistemic justification in order for such a theory to be able to deal with first-person epistemic situations. This also provides a strategy for accommodating immediate justifiers in an 'internalist' conception of justification without creating an infinite justificational regress. Furthermore it lays foundations for an internalismjexternalism integration theory. AFRIKAANS : Edmund Gettier se artikel getiteld Is justified true belief knowledge?, epistemiese het ongekende regverdiging belangstelling in veroorsaak, veral die in kwessie van die Engels- Amerikaanse kennisleer. Die bespreking van die begrip 'epistemiese regverdiging' vorm 'n bre~ studieveld wat 'n groat verskeidenheid verwante aspekte insluit. Al hierdie aspekte kon onmoontlik bespreek word in dié studie, daarom is 'n onderskeid getref tussen 'strukturele' aspekte en 'perspektiwiese' aspekte. Die omvang van die studie is daarvolgens beperk tot die bespreking van aspekte wat verband hou met die gesigspunt waaruit regverdiging plaasvind, dit wil se, hetsy dit uit 'n eerstepersoonsgesigspunt of uit 'n derdepersoonsgesigspunt plaasvind. In die eerste hoofstuk word 'n kort oorsig gegee van die aard van epistemiese regverdiging. Epistemiese regverdiging het die verkryging van waarheid en die vermyding van vals oortuigings as doelwit. Epistemiese regverdiging is ook normatief van aard, en dit maak 'n definisie daarvan in terme van blaam en aanspreeklikheid moontlik. In die tweede hoofstuk word só 'n definisie, wat bekend staan as 'n deontologiese opvatting van epistemiese regverdiging, bespreek. Die hoofbeswaar teen so 'n opvatting raak die vraagstuk of dit moontlik is om na willekeur beheer uit te oefen oor die verwerwing van oortuigings. Twee soorte beheer, direkte beheer en indirekte beheer, word bespreek. 'n Deontologiese opvatting van epistemiese regverdiging maak dit A moontlik vir iemand om geregverdig te wees om 'n oortuiging te he, selfs al is die oortuiging vals. Party epistemoloë verwerp die deontologiese opvatting vir hierdie rede. Die bespreking van die deontologiese opvatting bring die hoofprobleem van eerstepersoonsregverdiging na vore. Dit is hoe om uit 'n eerstepersoonsgesigspunt vas te stel of die manier waarvolgens 'n mens se oortuigings gevorm word, na waarheid sal lei. Hoofstuk 3 bespreek die probleme omtrent, en die meriete van, eerstepersoonsregverdiging in die algemeen. Die kwessie van intersubjektiewe beginsels, wat na veronderstelling 1 n persoon wat uit 'n subjektiewe gesigspunt te werk gaan, sal lei na waarheid, word ondersoek. Dat sulke beginsels bestaan en wat hulle aard mag wees, is sake wat baie bespreking uitlok. Baie epistemoloë ontken dat sulke aangebore beginsels bestaan. Sonder intersubjektiewe beginsels wat ook na waarheid lei, bestaan die moontlikheid egter dat iemand se oortuigings niks meer mag wees nie as blote oortuigings, ongeag hoe hulle ook al onderling saamhang. Op grond hiervan verwerp sommige epistemoloë die moontlike definisie van epistemiese regverdiging in terme van blaam en aanspreeklikheid. In hoofstuk 4 word 'internalismé , wat die jongste benaming vir subjektiewe regverdiging is, bespreek in vergelyking met 'eksternal1sme', wat internal1sme se kontemporêre teëvoeter is. Die verskillende vlakke van internalisme word bespreek. Hierdie vlakke ontstaan as gevolg van verskillende vereistes waaraan 'n persoon se bewustheid van die gronde van sy oortuigings gemeet word. Internalisme word ook bespreek in verwantskap met die deontologiese opvatting en in verwantskap met waarheid. In hoofstuk 5 kom eksternaliste se hoofbeswaar teen internalisme onder bespreking. Dit behels die bewering dat internalisme 'n oneindige regressie tot gevolg het. 'n Ontleding van die internalistiese regressie laat egter blyk dat die beswaar op 'n foutiewe veronderstelling rus. Die gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat dit noodsaaklik is om die kwessie van die gesigspunt waaruit regverdiging plaasvind in te sluit in 'n teorie van epistemiese regverdiging. Dit is noodsaaklik ten einde vir so 'n teorie om by vermoë te wees om ook eerstepersoons epistemiese situasies aan te spreek. Sodoende word 'n strategie daargestel waarvolgens direkte gronde van regverdiging in 'n internalistiese opvatting van epistemiese regverdiging ingesluit kan word, sonder om 'n oneindige regressie te veroorsaak. So 'n werkwyse lê ook grondslae vir die ontwikkeling van 'n teorie waarin internalisme en eksternalisme verenig kan word. Copyright / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Philosophy / unrestricted

This study develops a theoretical paradigm of narrative relations. The study posits the first-person narrator as a figure of authority within the text, a problematic figuration which implicates the text in issues of social relations and ideology with reference to questions of the narrator's empowerment. The study analyzes the first-person narrator's progressive engagement in the narrative relations of time and language as a means to assess the relative empowerment of the narrator by his narrating activity. The study argues for a Puritan legacy by which language retains its ability to empower and to enact a progression which, over time, has become a paradoxical diminishment of spiritual fulfillment. The first-person narrator thus stands as inheritor of the Puritan ministers whose status as the first American narrators confers on them an authority of origination to be acknowledged and supplanted by their successors. The form of this study seeks to unfold a progressive engagement of narrative relations, and models a movement toward a narrator fully engaged in progression, in mimicry of the Puritan doctrine of progression toward spiritual fulfillment. Using textual examples from among first-person narratives credited as the canon of American literature, the study associates characteristic narrative relations and empowerment with narrators it characterizes as impotent, including Ernest Hemingway's narrator, Jake Barnes, in The Sun Also Rises, and the unnamed narrators of Edgar Allen Poe's "The Fall of the House of Usher," Henry James's The Sacred Fount and Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man. Characteristics of bachelor narrators are exemplified by Herman Melville's narrator, Ishmael, in Moby-Dick, and by Nathaniel Hawthorne's narrator, Miles Coverdale, in The Blithedale Romance. Affiliated narrators are discussed in terms of their textual enactment by F. Scott Fitzgerald's narrator of The Great Gatsby, Nick Carraway, Tennessee Williams's narrator of the reading edition of his play The Glass Menagerie, Tom Wingfield, and Walt Whitman's narrator of his poem, "Starting from Paumanock."

Detta examensarbete undersöker frågeställningen “Hur kan diegetisk ljudsättning användas för att vägleda spelare i first-person shooters?”. Detta görs med hjälp av teorier från bl.a. Michel Chion, Christine Jørgensen och Karen Collins som sedan tillämpats i analyser av spelen “Half-Life 2” (Valve Corporation 2004) och “Shadow Warrior” (Flying Wild Hog 2013) för att ta reda på vilka tekniker dessa spel använder sig av ljud. Dessa tekniker har vi sedan använt oss av i vårt eget first-person shooter spel, ett spel utan någon som helst visuell feedback, för att sedan speltesta spelet och komma fram till slutsatser angående vägledande ljudsättning. Resultaten visar att det går att spela ett spel utan visuell feedback så länge ljudläggningen följer specifika regler. / This bachelor’s thesis examines the question “How can diegetic sound design be used to guide players in first-person shooters?”. This is done with theories from authors including Michel Chion, Christine Jørgensen and Karen Collins, which are then applied in two analyzes of the games “Half-Life 2” (Valve Corporation 2004) and Shadow Warrior” (Flying Wild Hog 2013) to find out which techniques they use when working with sound. We then used these techniques in our own first-person shooter, a game without any form of visual feedback, in order to performe a game test and draw our own conclusions concerning guiding sound design. The results show that it’s possible to play a game without any visual feedback, as long as the sound design follows a set of specific rules.