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Korean fishing communities in transition : institutional change and coastal development /Cheong, So-Min. January 2001 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-167).
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Critical evaluation of the role of artificial reefs in fisheries management in Hong Kong /Lee, Ching-yee, Elsa. January 2001 (has links)
Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-79).
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Prospects for sub-regional cooperation in the management and conservation of shared fishery resources in the Gulf of Thailand /Thummachua, Smith. January 2003 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 173-195).
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Essays on the management of fisheries in the presence of strategic interactionsRuseski, Gorazd 05 1900 (has links)
The following three essays present an analysis that combines well-known models of fisheries
management with contemporary theories of international trade and industrial organization.
The general theme of the thesis is that countries' fisheries management policies
can affect the strategic interaction between their fishing industries. The first essay examines
the problem of noncooperative management of international fisheries by analyzing
the strategic rent-shifting roles for such well-known national management policies as fleet
licensing and effort subsidies. It is shown that the noncooperative equilibrium in each
policy takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma with dissipated rents in the fishery. It is
also shown that strategic effort subsidies can only lead to incomplete rent dissipation but
strategic fleet licensing can lead to complete rent dissipation.
The second essay develops a theory of cooperative management of international fisheries
by considering negotiation between countries over the same fleet licensing and effort
subsidy policies considered in the first essay. The outcomes of negotiation over these policies
are compared to the corresponding noncooperative outcomes, on the one hand, and
to the efficient outcome on the other. It is shown that negotiation over effort subsidies in
the absence of side payments is efficient, but negotiation over fleet sizes in the absence of
side payments is inefficient.
The third essay develops a two-stage two-period model of a 'domestic' country and
a 'foreign' country whose respective fishing industries harvest from separate fisheries for
the same international market. The domestic country uses a harvest policy to regulate
the harvest by its fishing industry, but the harvest by the foreign fishing industry is
unregulated. Two types of fisheries are considered. In the case of schooling fisheries,
the domestic country may choose a conservative harvest policy in the first period if it
can induce the biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period. In the case
of search fisheries, the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in
the first period in order to induce the economic degradation of the foreign fishery in the
second period. The results suggest that international fisheries trade in the presence of
divergent national fisheries management regimes could have unexpected consequences for
world fisheries.
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Managing a harvestable resource : individual transferable harvest quotas in the Lake Huron commercial fisheryJaffray, Beverley Ann 11 1900 (has links)
Much has been written on the theoretical implications and postulated impacts of
individual transferable harvest quotas (ITHQ), but there have been few empirical studies
of the development and implementation process, the impacts of this process and the
impacts of ITHQ in a Great Lakes fishery. In 1984, Ontario implemented ITHQ for
selected commercial fish species. The objectives of this study are: (1) to identify and
understand the impacts of ITHQ; (2) to detail the linkages between these impacts and the
application of fisheries management interventions derived from the bioeconomic model
(which is the theoretical origin of ITHQ); and (3) to further our understanding of the
process of ITHQ development and implementation and the impacts of this process of
development and implementation, by utilizing theoretical perspectives in the co
management theory of resource management and in three policy process models.
The study area was the Canadian portion of the Lake Huron commercial fishery.
Data were obtained from annual harvest reports filed by commercial fishers over the
1980-1985 time period and through interviews with commercial fishers, fisheries
managers and scientists. Data on 1986-1989 harvest amounts and values was also
obtained from the provincial data base.
In the two years following ITHQ implementation, there was little traceable impact
on either the harvest amounts or values of the two principal commercial species, but
there was a trend toward a reduction in capacity of the fishery. ITHQ’s most important
effects appears to have been on the organization of labour and capital in the fishery.
Commercial fishing activities have not generated major instabilities; it is the ecological
phenomena that most affect harvest amounts, species and values.
Other policy impacts, however, are complex and difficult to identify and analyze.
Future administrative costs are not easy to estimate; the social impacts from changes in
the structure of the industry are intricate; and some aspects of policy implementation may be too inflexible. Analysis of qualitative data suggests several conclusive linkages
between the process of ITHQ development and implementation and its effectiveness. In
this regard, adequacy of stock assessment information, effectiveness of consultation and
level of attention to social context were found to be of importance.
The co-management model was found to provide a strong basis for explanation
and understanding of the impacts of the process of ITHQ development and
implementation in the community of resource users because the relationships it
incorporates overtly address decision-making processes related to the adaptation of new
ideas, arbitration of power relationships, and the rate, timing and extent of change. The
co-management model suggests that incorporation of resource users’ collective strengths
and organization in an arrangement wherein regulatory interventions are developed and
implemented cooperatively with resource users would lead to more efficient, effective
and sustainable management regimes. Transaction costs, in particular, may be
significantly reduced in a co-managed fishery where specified community characteristics
exist.
Development and implementation processes for ITHQ in Lake Huron were viewed
as the interaction of rational, incremental and interest group decision-making processes.
Findings suggest that social issues of autonomy, equity and a broad basis of
understanding are as important as those of economic efficiency, and that if not dealt with,
these issues can significantly impact the efficacy of management interventions.
This study is significant because it addresses analysis of common property
problems through utilizing the analytical powers derived from models dealing with
biological, economic and political relationships to examine a regulatory policy application
in a field situation (after Ostrom 1992).
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Integrating fishermen and their knowledge in the science policy process case studies of cooperative research in the northeastern U.S.Johnson, Teresa R. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2007. / "Graduate Program in Ecology and Evolution." Includes bibliographical references (p. 411-428).
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A new approach to access and allocation in the Atlantic Canadian fishery /Dooley, Thomas, January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (M.M.S.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2004. / Restricted until May 2005. Bibliography: leaves 45-50.
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Managing a harvestable resource : individual transferable harvest quotas in the Lake Huron commercial fisheryJaffray, Beverley Ann 11 1900 (has links)
Much has been written on the theoretical implications and postulated impacts of
individual transferable harvest quotas (ITHQ), but there have been few empirical studies
of the development and implementation process, the impacts of this process and the
impacts of ITHQ in a Great Lakes fishery. In 1984, Ontario implemented ITHQ for
selected commercial fish species. The objectives of this study are: (1) to identify and
understand the impacts of ITHQ; (2) to detail the linkages between these impacts and the
application of fisheries management interventions derived from the bioeconomic model
(which is the theoretical origin of ITHQ); and (3) to further our understanding of the
process of ITHQ development and implementation and the impacts of this process of
development and implementation, by utilizing theoretical perspectives in the co
management theory of resource management and in three policy process models.
The study area was the Canadian portion of the Lake Huron commercial fishery.
Data were obtained from annual harvest reports filed by commercial fishers over the
1980-1985 time period and through interviews with commercial fishers, fisheries
managers and scientists. Data on 1986-1989 harvest amounts and values was also
obtained from the provincial data base.
In the two years following ITHQ implementation, there was little traceable impact
on either the harvest amounts or values of the two principal commercial species, but
there was a trend toward a reduction in capacity of the fishery. ITHQ’s most important
effects appears to have been on the organization of labour and capital in the fishery.
Commercial fishing activities have not generated major instabilities; it is the ecological
phenomena that most affect harvest amounts, species and values.
Other policy impacts, however, are complex and difficult to identify and analyze.
Future administrative costs are not easy to estimate; the social impacts from changes in
the structure of the industry are intricate; and some aspects of policy implementation may be too inflexible. Analysis of qualitative data suggests several conclusive linkages
between the process of ITHQ development and implementation and its effectiveness. In
this regard, adequacy of stock assessment information, effectiveness of consultation and
level of attention to social context were found to be of importance.
The co-management model was found to provide a strong basis for explanation
and understanding of the impacts of the process of ITHQ development and
implementation in the community of resource users because the relationships it
incorporates overtly address decision-making processes related to the adaptation of new
ideas, arbitration of power relationships, and the rate, timing and extent of change. The
co-management model suggests that incorporation of resource users’ collective strengths
and organization in an arrangement wherein regulatory interventions are developed and
implemented cooperatively with resource users would lead to more efficient, effective
and sustainable management regimes. Transaction costs, in particular, may be
significantly reduced in a co-managed fishery where specified community characteristics
exist.
Development and implementation processes for ITHQ in Lake Huron were viewed
as the interaction of rational, incremental and interest group decision-making processes.
Findings suggest that social issues of autonomy, equity and a broad basis of
understanding are as important as those of economic efficiency, and that if not dealt with,
these issues can significantly impact the efficacy of management interventions.
This study is significant because it addresses analysis of common property
problems through utilizing the analytical powers derived from models dealing with
biological, economic and political relationships to examine a regulatory policy application
in a field situation (after Ostrom 1992). / Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies / Graduate
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Essays on the management of fisheries in the presence of strategic interactionsRuseski, Gorazd 05 1900 (has links)
The following three essays present an analysis that combines well-known models of fisheries
management with contemporary theories of international trade and industrial organization.
The general theme of the thesis is that countries' fisheries management policies
can affect the strategic interaction between their fishing industries. The first essay examines
the problem of noncooperative management of international fisheries by analyzing
the strategic rent-shifting roles for such well-known national management policies as fleet
licensing and effort subsidies. It is shown that the noncooperative equilibrium in each
policy takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma with dissipated rents in the fishery. It is
also shown that strategic effort subsidies can only lead to incomplete rent dissipation but
strategic fleet licensing can lead to complete rent dissipation.
The second essay develops a theory of cooperative management of international fisheries
by considering negotiation between countries over the same fleet licensing and effort
subsidy policies considered in the first essay. The outcomes of negotiation over these policies
are compared to the corresponding noncooperative outcomes, on the one hand, and
to the efficient outcome on the other. It is shown that negotiation over effort subsidies in
the absence of side payments is efficient, but negotiation over fleet sizes in the absence of
side payments is inefficient.
The third essay develops a two-stage two-period model of a 'domestic' country and
a 'foreign' country whose respective fishing industries harvest from separate fisheries for
the same international market. The domestic country uses a harvest policy to regulate
the harvest by its fishing industry, but the harvest by the foreign fishing industry is
unregulated. Two types of fisheries are considered. In the case of schooling fisheries,
the domestic country may choose a conservative harvest policy in the first period if it
can induce the biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period. In the case
of search fisheries, the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in
the first period in order to induce the economic degradation of the foreign fishery in the
second period. The results suggest that international fisheries trade in the presence of
divergent national fisheries management regimes could have unexpected consequences for
world fisheries. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate
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International markets and interstate cooperation U.S.-Japanese efforts to conserve ocean life, 1950-1995 /Walsh, Virginia M. January 1996 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Southern California, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 219-228).
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