Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-167).

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-79).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 173-195).

The following three essays present an analysis that combines well-known models of fisheries management with contemporary theories of international trade and industrial organization. The general theme of the thesis is that countries' fisheries management policies can affect the strategic interaction between their fishing industries. The first essay examines the problem of noncooperative management of international fisheries by analyzing the strategic rent-shifting roles for such well-known national management policies as fleet licensing and effort subsidies. It is shown that the noncooperative equilibrium in each policy takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma with dissipated rents in the fishery. It is also shown that strategic effort subsidies can only lead to incomplete rent dissipation but strategic fleet licensing can lead to complete rent dissipation. The second essay develops a theory of cooperative management of international fisheries by considering negotiation between countries over the same fleet licensing and effort subsidy policies considered in the first essay. The outcomes of negotiation over these policies are compared to the corresponding noncooperative outcomes, on the one hand, and to the efficient outcome on the other. It is shown that negotiation over effort subsidies in the absence of side payments is efficient, but negotiation over fleet sizes in the absence of side payments is inefficient. The third essay develops a two-stage two-period model of a 'domestic' country and a 'foreign' country whose respective fishing industries harvest from separate fisheries for the same international market. The domestic country uses a harvest policy to regulate the harvest by its fishing industry, but the harvest by the foreign fishing industry is unregulated. Two types of fisheries are considered. In the case of schooling fisheries, the domestic country may choose a conservative harvest policy in the first period if it can induce the biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period. In the case of search fisheries, the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in the first period in order to induce the economic degradation of the foreign fishery in the second period. The results suggest that international fisheries trade in the presence of divergent national fisheries management regimes could have unexpected consequences for world fisheries.

Much has been written on the theoretical implications and postulated impacts of individual transferable harvest quotas (ITHQ), but there have been few empirical studies of the development and implementation process, the impacts of this process and the impacts of ITHQ in a Great Lakes fishery. In 1984, Ontario implemented ITHQ for selected commercial fish species. The objectives of this study are: (1) to identify and understand the impacts of ITHQ; (2) to detail the linkages between these impacts and the application of fisheries management interventions derived from the bioeconomic model (which is the theoretical origin of ITHQ); and (3) to further our understanding of the process of ITHQ development and implementation and the impacts of this process of development and implementation, by utilizing theoretical perspectives in the co management theory of resource management and in three policy process models. The study area was the Canadian portion of the Lake Huron commercial fishery. Data were obtained from annual harvest reports filed by commercial fishers over the 1980-1985 time period and through interviews with commercial fishers, fisheries managers and scientists. Data on 1986-1989 harvest amounts and values was also obtained from the provincial data base. In the two years following ITHQ implementation, there was little traceable impact on either the harvest amounts or values of the two principal commercial species, but there was a trend toward a reduction in capacity of the fishery. ITHQ’s most important effects appears to have been on the organization of labour and capital in the fishery. Commercial fishing activities have not generated major instabilities; it is the ecological phenomena that most affect harvest amounts, species and values. Other policy impacts, however, are complex and difficult to identify and analyze. Future administrative costs are not easy to estimate; the social impacts from changes in the structure of the industry are intricate; and some aspects of policy implementation may be too inflexible. Analysis of qualitative data suggests several conclusive linkages between the process of ITHQ development and implementation and its effectiveness. In this regard, adequacy of stock assessment information, effectiveness of consultation and level of attention to social context were found to be of importance. The co-management model was found to provide a strong basis for explanation and understanding of the impacts of the process of ITHQ development and implementation in the community of resource users because the relationships it incorporates overtly address decision-making processes related to the adaptation of new ideas, arbitration of power relationships, and the rate, timing and extent of change. The co-management model suggests that incorporation of resource users’ collective strengths and organization in an arrangement wherein regulatory interventions are developed and implemented cooperatively with resource users would lead to more efficient, effective and sustainable management regimes. Transaction costs, in particular, may be significantly reduced in a co-managed fishery where specified community characteristics exist. Development and implementation processes for ITHQ in Lake Huron were viewed as the interaction of rational, incremental and interest group decision-making processes. Findings suggest that social issues of autonomy, equity and a broad basis of understanding are as important as those of economic efficiency, and that if not dealt with, these issues can significantly impact the efficacy of management interventions. This study is significant because it addresses analysis of common property problems through utilizing the analytical powers derived from models dealing with biological, economic and political relationships to examine a regulatory policy application in a field situation (after Ostrom 1992).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2007. / "Graduate Program in Ecology and Evolution." Includes bibliographical references (p. 411-428).

Thesis (M.M.S.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2004. / Restricted until May 2005. Bibliography: leaves 45-50.

Much has been written on the theoretical implications and postulated impacts of individual transferable harvest quotas (ITHQ), but there have been few empirical studies of the development and implementation process, the impacts of this process and the impacts of ITHQ in a Great Lakes fishery. In 1984, Ontario implemented ITHQ for selected commercial fish species. The objectives of this study are: (1) to identify and understand the impacts of ITHQ; (2) to detail the linkages between these impacts and the application of fisheries management interventions derived from the bioeconomic model (which is the theoretical origin of ITHQ); and (3) to further our understanding of the process of ITHQ development and implementation and the impacts of this process of development and implementation, by utilizing theoretical perspectives in the co management theory of resource management and in three policy process models. The study area was the Canadian portion of the Lake Huron commercial fishery. Data were obtained from annual harvest reports filed by commercial fishers over the 1980-1985 time period and through interviews with commercial fishers, fisheries managers and scientists. Data on 1986-1989 harvest amounts and values was also obtained from the provincial data base. In the two years following ITHQ implementation, there was little traceable impact on either the harvest amounts or values of the two principal commercial species, but there was a trend toward a reduction in capacity of the fishery. ITHQ’s most important effects appears to have been on the organization of labour and capital in the fishery. Commercial fishing activities have not generated major instabilities; it is the ecological phenomena that most affect harvest amounts, species and values. Other policy impacts, however, are complex and difficult to identify and analyze. Future administrative costs are not easy to estimate; the social impacts from changes in the structure of the industry are intricate; and some aspects of policy implementation may be too inflexible. Analysis of qualitative data suggests several conclusive linkages between the process of ITHQ development and implementation and its effectiveness. In this regard, adequacy of stock assessment information, effectiveness of consultation and level of attention to social context were found to be of importance. The co-management model was found to provide a strong basis for explanation and understanding of the impacts of the process of ITHQ development and implementation in the community of resource users because the relationships it incorporates overtly address decision-making processes related to the adaptation of new ideas, arbitration of power relationships, and the rate, timing and extent of change. The co-management model suggests that incorporation of resource users’ collective strengths and organization in an arrangement wherein regulatory interventions are developed and implemented cooperatively with resource users would lead to more efficient, effective and sustainable management regimes. Transaction costs, in particular, may be significantly reduced in a co-managed fishery where specified community characteristics exist. Development and implementation processes for ITHQ in Lake Huron were viewed as the interaction of rational, incremental and interest group decision-making processes. Findings suggest that social issues of autonomy, equity and a broad basis of understanding are as important as those of economic efficiency, and that if not dealt with, these issues can significantly impact the efficacy of management interventions. This study is significant because it addresses analysis of common property problems through utilizing the analytical powers derived from models dealing with biological, economic and political relationships to examine a regulatory policy application in a field situation (after Ostrom 1992). / Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies / Graduate

The following three essays present an analysis that combines well-known models of fisheries management with contemporary theories of international trade and industrial organization. The general theme of the thesis is that countries' fisheries management policies can affect the strategic interaction between their fishing industries. The first essay examines the problem of noncooperative management of international fisheries by analyzing the strategic rent-shifting roles for such well-known national management policies as fleet licensing and effort subsidies. It is shown that the noncooperative equilibrium in each policy takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma with dissipated rents in the fishery. It is also shown that strategic effort subsidies can only lead to incomplete rent dissipation but strategic fleet licensing can lead to complete rent dissipation. The second essay develops a theory of cooperative management of international fisheries by considering negotiation between countries over the same fleet licensing and effort subsidy policies considered in the first essay. The outcomes of negotiation over these policies are compared to the corresponding noncooperative outcomes, on the one hand, and to the efficient outcome on the other. It is shown that negotiation over effort subsidies in the absence of side payments is efficient, but negotiation over fleet sizes in the absence of side payments is inefficient. The third essay develops a two-stage two-period model of a 'domestic' country and a 'foreign' country whose respective fishing industries harvest from separate fisheries for the same international market. The domestic country uses a harvest policy to regulate the harvest by its fishing industry, but the harvest by the foreign fishing industry is unregulated. Two types of fisheries are considered. In the case of schooling fisheries, the domestic country may choose a conservative harvest policy in the first period if it can induce the biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period. In the case of search fisheries, the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in the first period in order to induce the economic degradation of the foreign fishery in the second period. The results suggest that international fisheries trade in the presence of divergent national fisheries management regimes could have unexpected consequences for world fisheries. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Southern California, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 219-228).