Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, June, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.

"Written as a thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy in Harvard University (1924)"--Pref. / Bibliography: p. 235-245.

"Written as a thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy in Harvard University (1924)"--Pref. / Bibliography: p. 235-245.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, The Committee on Human Development, December 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

The South African marine environment is utilised for both consumptive and non-consumptive activities and for those activities to continue sustainably it is important that these activities be monitored and policed. South Africa's environmental legislation is structured to do just that; outlining specific regulations for all consumptive and non-consumptive activities that can be conducted in the marine environment. Some disparities have been observed regarding the policing of consumptive and non-consumptive marine activities, and these disparities were analysed by means of several case studies and semi-structured key informant interviews. Case studies covered both consumptive (abalone poaching and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing) and non-consumptive activities (the sardine run and tiger shark diving) currently being conduct in the marine environment. Key informant interviews collected opinions from legal practitioners who felt that the legislation was solid but poorly implemented; and non-consumptive operators who felt that the legislation was implemented in a way that made it difficult for non-consumptive and ecotourism activities to thrive. The poor implementation has resulted in a situation which seems to promote consumptive crimes instead of curbing them.

A computer-implemented simulation model was modified to compare various regulation schemes and determine how they are affected by angler non-compliance and voluntary catch-and release fishing. Combinations of three creel limits and five length limits were simulated. Scenarios for no regulations and catch-and-release were also simulated. Angler noncompliance varied from 0% to 50% and voluntary release included rates of 20%, 50%, and 80%. Based on catch, harvest, yield, and PSD, the ranking of specific regulations changed little among levels of angler non-compliance and voluntary release. All four decision variables were most influenced by regulations when angler compliance was high and voluntary release was low. Further, for a fishery with a high degree of voluntary release, and relatively high angler compliance, regulations did not produce any discernible benefits in the fishery. The model was demonstrated with data on a smallmouth bass, Micropterus dolomieu, fishery for the upper and lower James River, Virginia. Simulated regulations were assessed based on adjustments to angler non-compliance, which averaged based on adjustments to angler non-compliance, which averaged 17 percent, and voluntary release, which averaged 90 percent. Model results indicate that more restrictive regulations improved PSD and catch, whereas numerical harvest and yield in weight benefitted from liberal regulations. Variability among the 81 regulations was low, suggesting that voluntary release (90% average) is a dominant control in the James River smallmouth bass fishery. From a management standpoint, these findings also suggest that, where appropriate, management strategies should focus on increasing voluntary release and rely on regulations only in certain fisheries. / Master of Science

This study explores the politics of regulating the British Columbia and Washington commercial salmon fisheries between 1937 and 1984. The principal focus of this comparative-historical study is upon one particularly striking exception to the tendency of regulators to tighten commercial salmon fishing restrictions over time - the persistence of liberal offshore trolling regulations. The dissertation argues that the anomalous treatment of the offshore troll fishery during this period may be ascribed to the competition between states for the right to harvest salmon - a common property resource. In making this claim, the study questions the adequacy of the interest-group driven explanations of policy which figure prominently in the literature on regulation. Two pillars of interest group theory, the tendencies to explain national policy only through reference to domestic politics and to reduce state behaviour to little more than the product of the demands of private sector interests, are challenged in this comparative case study. The challenge to the first tendency of interest group theory is sustained by examining the relations between national regulatory preferences and the foreign fishery policy goals of Canada and the United States. The pursuit of two goals - Asian exclusion and North American equity - in bilateral and multilateral negotiations demanded the adoption of particular regulatory profiles. Liberal offshore troll regulations may be explained according to the legitimacy and bargaining advantages they lent to Canadian and American efforts to incorporate these two goals into modifications to the traditional fishery regime. The study also suggests that, in a setting characterized by intergovernmental competition, regulatory policies may not always be equated with the preferences of interested private parties. In this setting the state's ability or willingness to respond to even the most influential private sector interests may be limited by the state's evaluation of its bargaining resources and requirements. State competition created a context where government attitudes towards offshore salmon fishing could be understood in terms of state preferences, preferences derived from officials' perceptions of the legitimacy of various national regulatory policies in the context of valued international institutions. While state competition is the centrepiece of the explanation of national fishery policy developed in this study its explanatory power is mediated by two intervening institutional variables - the capacities of states to formulate and implement policies and the structure of the international regime itself. The level of knowledge regarding the salmon resource played an instrumental role in the formulation of regime goals and of pertinent national policies. The extent to which state management in offshore waters was fragmented between different bureaus affected the ability of officials to adopt national policies which suited their international purposes. The redistribution of the American state's fishery management capacity in the 1970s was a catalyst for the severe restrictions visited upon Washington trailers at that time. A second institutional factor, the structure of the international fishery regime, also mediated the competition between states. The series of reciprocal fishing privileges agreements between Canada and the United States was particularly important in maintaining established offshore regulatory preferences during the 1970s when the clash between American and Canadian salmon fishery perspectives was intensifying. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 1979. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Includes bibliographical references. / by Margaret E. Dewar. / Ph.D.

In late Spring of 1969, shortly before the Oregon Legislative Session adjourned, House Bill No. 1302 as amended passed the last legislative hurdle and was signed by the Governor. The new statute recognized steelhead trout as a game fish and provided for an incidental catch of these fish by the commercial fishery. HB 1302 was a turning point in a century of conflict over anadromous fish of the Columbia River. The bill served as an armistice in a long sports-commercial steelhead conflict by providing some protection for these fish from commercial fishing. However the bill held off a major shift in the sports-commercial balance of power for only five years. The "final" victory went to the sports fishermen in 1974--the voters approved Ballot Measure No. 15 which banned steelhead from sale. Although the sportsmen finally won the steelhead battle, they may have lost the war. Unless the erosion of fish runs caused primarily by dams is checked the fishery may disappear. Chapter I gives an overview of HB 130 and discusses the significance of the Columbia River anadromous fishery to Oregon. Chapter II is a history of the Columbia River fishery and traces the conflict between the various fishing interest groups. Chapter III details the causes of the conflict and describes the relationship between dams and declining runs of fish. Chapter IV discusses the Legislative passage of HB 1302. Chapter V discusses lobbying and pressure group activities concerning HB 1302. Chapter VI chronicles events subsequent to passage of HB 1302. Chapter VII contains summary and concluding remarks.