The purpose of this study was to investigate the pricing behavior between the Forest Service, the seller of national forest timber, and the firms in the Arizona timber industry, and buyers of this timber. The period of investigation was for the 1974 timber sales and the ultimate purchases of these sales through 1979. The market structure for the sale of national forest timber is one of monopoly on the part of the Forest Service and that of oligopsony for the industry. Two factors beside the market structure affect the behavior of the market participants. One, the interaction of the participants is constrained by several legal and institutional factors. Two, excess capacity exists in the industry and the supply of timber in Arizona is relatively fixed. Three methods were used in the study to analyze the behavior of the participants. First, the appraised value of the timber was compared to the residual value that could be afforded by each mill, using individual mill costs. Second, a linear transportation model was employed to determine the optimal allocation for the 1974 timber sales. The optimal results were then compared to the actual disposal for further analysis of the pricing behavior. Third, estimated profits were determined for the actual purchases of the 1974 sales and the results compared to the estimated profit allowances in the original appraisal. The results of the analysis showed the following. (1) The appraised values for the 1974 timber sales appeared to be overvalued. (2) The actual allocation of the 1974 sales was essentially optimal. The exceptions to the optimal allocations were generally where legal constraints prevented it. (3) Active bidding for the timber was minimal. Bidding among the firms included in the study occurred on slightly over 2% of the volume of the sales. The major conclusions reached from the analysis were that certain adjustments should be made in the appraisal process. These adjustments should be made for the lag effects of costs, the accuracy of imputed costs used, and the concept of profit allowance used. Also, the industry must improve its efficiency, especially in the area of utilizing the waste material from lumber production. The industry should also reduce its capacity to have a better balance between supply and demand, as supply is relatively fixed. Additionally, the behavior of the participants was determined to be as expected in view of the constraints, fixed supply, and locational factors. It is recommended that long-run study of this nature be conducted to offer more conclusive results.

No description available.

No description available.

In 1998, the government of British Columbia introduced a new form of tenure for community forestry. The Community Forest Agreement (CFA) was envisioned as a unique institutional mechanism for devolution, providing resource-dependent communities and First Nations in B.C. with the authority to set the direction of forest management in their locale, and to create local benefits. Relative to the industrial status quo, there were high expectations of community forestry and what it might achieve. This study empirically tested some of these expectations with respect to B.C.’s Community Forest Program. Taking a realist approach to evaluation, a variety of qualitative research methods were used to critically assess the structure, performance, and outcomes of the CFA. Analysis of the CFA revealed that its structure is virtually identical to tenures designed for industrial forestry with a few minor exceptions. In the current tenure regime, the CFA devolves limited power over strategic decisions and community control largely resides at the operational level, affecting on-the-ground aspects of timber harvesting rather than enabling a broader and more holistic approach to forest management. Outcomes of the CFA generally did not satisfy expectations that communities would commercially harvest botanical non-timber forest products, develop capacity for value-added wood processing, and utilize more environmentally-sensitive harvesting treatments. The study did find that CFAs supported local employment and were more labour intensive than industrial licensees in harvesting and silvicultural activities. Assessing the CFA structure and the on-the-ground outcomes side-by-side, this study suggests that the impediments to realizing a more holistic form of community forestry likely have their roots in the institutional mechanism itself, rather than in the efforts of communities. Flowing from the evaluation are recommendations for government to consider devolving more power over key strategic management decisions and increasing the size of CFAs to improve their economies of scale; and recommendations for communities to build their capacity and critical social mass to leverage policy changes that may further the evolution of community forestry in B.C.

No description available.

Managing public forestland is a challenging enterprise as the government must steward the actions of private forest companies while simultaneously considering public values, natural disturbance, markets, revenue generation and environmental services. Governments use timber sales, volume-based, and area-based tenures to delegate forest harvesting activities to individual timber companies. By delegating forest management, government must wisely navigate the principal-agent relationship to avoid unexpected outcomes. However, the agents’ response is often overlooked despite the likelihood that the agents may possess company-centric financial motivations. The British Columbia context, where the government is facing the aftermath of a catastrophic mountain pine beetle epidemic, provides a fruitful location for the study of the principal-agent dilemma. If forest companies share a future forest focus with the government, such that agents respond with actions that lead to the government’s first best outcome, the government could reduce policy analysis to an examination of the tradeoff between short-term revenue generation and sustainable differentiated product supply. But review of the silviculture funding mechanism reveals that the very regulatory mechanism used to achieve government’s results may affect the future forest estate by reducing the amount of salvage once the value of the forest is degraded below the cost to harvest and regenerate it. Relying primarily on harvest-based silviculture funding, the principal is shown to forego a 20 per cent increase in forest growth in the study area by not using the agents’ forestry expertise to improve the long term productive potential of the forest. A bi-level linear programming model is developed to merge the goals of government with the behavioural responses of the two predominant volume-based tenures used in BC. Results show that the government’s choice of harvest level, timber price and tenure instrument in recognition of agent response is the only way to achieve the government’s forest stewardship objective. Treating each element in isolation neglects the nature of the institutional system and will result not only in unintended outcomes, but very likely, policy failure. / Graduate

In 1998, the government of British Columbia introduced a new form of tenure for community forestry. The Community Forest Agreement (CFA) was envisioned as a unique institutional mechanism for devolution, providing resource-dependent communities and First Nations in B.C. with the authority to set the direction of forest management in their locale, and to create local benefits. Relative to the industrial status quo, there were high expectations of community forestry and what it might achieve. This study empirically tested some of these expectations with respect to B.C.’s Community Forest Program. Taking a realist approach to evaluation, a variety of qualitative research methods were used to critically assess the structure, performance, and outcomes of the CFA. Analysis of the CFA revealed that its structure is virtually identical to tenures designed for industrial forestry with a few minor exceptions. In the current tenure regime, the CFA devolves limited power over strategic decisions and community control largely resides at the operational level, affecting on-the-ground aspects of timber harvesting rather than enabling a broader and more holistic approach to forest management. Outcomes of the CFA generally did not satisfy expectations that communities would commercially harvest botanical non-timber forest products, develop capacity for value-added wood processing, and utilize more environmentally-sensitive harvesting treatments. The study did find that CFAs supported local employment and were more labour intensive than industrial licensees in harvesting and silvicultural activities. Assessing the CFA structure and the on-the-ground outcomes side-by-side, this study suggests that the impediments to realizing a more holistic form of community forestry likely have their roots in the institutional mechanism itself, rather than in the efforts of communities. Flowing from the evaluation are recommendations for government to consider devolving more power over key strategic management decisions and increasing the size of CFAs to improve their economies of scale; and recommendations for communities to build their capacity and critical social mass to leverage policy changes that may further the evolution of community forestry in B.C.

Thesis (M. Env. St.)--University of Adelaide, Mawson Graduate Centre for Environmental Studies, 1992? / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 72-74).

Thesis (Dr. of Philosophy.) -- University of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury, 2000. / Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 219-233).

Dissertation (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.