The purpose of the study was to determine how the Fourth Amendment is treated in the age of the internet. To determine the degree of the significance of this relationship a comparative approach is used. Court opinions from cases involving other technological innovations and the Fourth Amendment were examined and their reasoning was compared to that of cases involving the internet and the Fourth Amendment. The results indicated that contrary to some fears that the internet would require a different approach with respect to the law it actually did not present many novel barriers to its application. The principle conclusion was that the reasoning used in cases involving older technologies, namely the test outlined in Katz v. United States, was consistently applied even in the age of the internet.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) caused thousands of deaths, national and global panic, and immediate action by the federal government to protect the borders of the United States of America (USA) from terrorism. In response to these attacks, the United States (U.S.) government enacted laws for law enforcement agencies to protect against terrorist activities. Law enforcement agencies are effective in combating terrorism, but their measures contain a major flaw - the improper use of race in profiling to address national security and public safety concerns. Racial profiling is an ineffective measure for preventing terrorism. There are solutions to correct this flaw through reconstructing training and implementing policies for all law enforcement agencies. The intent of this thesis is to discuss the history and the effectiveness of profiling in U.S. post-9/11 counterterrorism through theoretical research of peer-reviewed journals and articles, relevant laws, and United States Supreme Court cases to offer solutions to the problems racial profiling presents. The discussion will generate a search for new ways law enforcement agencies could conduct daily counterterrorism operations.

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The United States Constitution had been in existence for almost two hundred years before the Supreme Court decided that some violations of constitutional rights may be too insignificant to warrant remedial action. Known as "harmless error," this statutory doctrine allows a court to affirm a conviction when a mere technicality or minor defect did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. The doctrine aims to promote judicial efficiency and judgment finality. The Court first applied harmless error to constitutional violations by shifting the statutory test away from the error's effect on substantial rights to its impact on the jury's verdict. Over time, the test evolved even further, now allowing a court to disregard the constitutional error when a majority of justices believe that the untainted record evidence shows that the defendant is, in fact, guilty. This sacrifice of individual and institutional constitutional protections at the altar of judicial efficiency and judgment finality subverts the harmless error doctrine's purposes and strikes at the core of America's founding ideals. In particular, it allows appellate courts to invade the jury's role as the finder of fact and guilt, to sidestep their constitutional role to review and correct errors and protect the Constitution, and to incentivize government actors to commit constitutional violations with little-to-no ramifications. After conducting a comprehensive review of the harmless error doctrine and its development, this thesis traces through many substantive, theoretical, and practical problems with the doctrine's current application. It then proposes that the Constitution and the values that it protects should once again be elevated above the harmless error doctrine's pragmatic concerns of judicial efficiency and judgment finality.

More than a century ago in their definitive work “The Right to Privacy” Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis highlighted the challenges posed to individual privacy by advancing technology. Today’s workplace is characterised by its reliance on computer technology, particularly the use of email and the Internet to perform critical business functions. Increasingly these and other workplace activities are the focus of monitoring by employers. There is little formal regulation of electronic monitoring in Australian or United States workplaces. Without reasonable limits or controls, this has the potential to adversely affect employees’ privacy rights. Australia has a history of legislating to protect privacy rights, whereas the United States has relied on a combination of constitutional guarantees, federal and state statutes, and the common law. This thesis examines a number of existing and proposed statutory and other workplace privacy laws in Australia and the United States. The analysis demonstrates that existing measures fail to adequately regulate monitoring or provide employees with suitable remedies where unjustifiable intrusions occur. The thesis ultimately supports the view that enacting uniform legislation at the national level provides a more effective and comprehensive solution for both employers and employees. Chapter One provides a general introduction and briefly discusses issues relevant to electronic monitoring in the workplace. Chapter Two contains an overview of privacy law as it relates to electronic monitoring in Australian and United States workplaces. In Chapter Three there is an examination of the complaint process and remedies available to a hypothetical employee (Mary) who is concerned about protecting her privacy rights at work. Chapter Four provides an analysis of the major themes emerging from the research, and also discusses the draft national uniform legislation. Chapter Five details the proposed legislation in the form of the Workplace Surveillance and Monitoring Act, and Chapter Six contains the conclusion.