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The present study is a survey of Anglo-French imperial, policies on the Upper Nile question and the Fashoda Crisis which resulted, and it is an attempt to place this conflict within the framework of the "new imperialism" after 1870.

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The Office du Niger irrigation scheme, located on the Niger River in the Republic of Mali, originated in a grandiose but seriously flawed proposal devised in 1920 by a French colonial Public Works engineer named Emile Bélime. Originaly conceived as a means of transforming the Niger Valley into a cotton belt, and later promoted as the heart of a French West African granary, the scheme never attained more than a tiny fraction of its presumed agricultural potential. Its construction and exploitation required the forced uprooting of tens of thousands of Africans. It absorbed a large portion of scarce colonial revenues until after the Second World War and generated no profits. During the inter-war period, the Office du Niger gradually acquired the de facto status of a state within the State, with Emile Bélime at its head. When the scheme was finally recognized as an economic and humanitarian failure in 1945, colonial authorities endeavoured to eliminate its worst shortcomings and give it a new identity as a prototype of economic and technical assistance to an underdeveloped area. After 1961, Malian leaders felt that the scheme could be used as a pilot project for agricultural development in the new republlc, and the scheme's existence has dictated the course of Malian agricultural policy ever since. / Le projet d'irrigation de l'Office du Niger, situé dans le delta intérieur du Niger au Mali, est né d'une proposition très insuffisante mais grandiose conçue en 1920 par un ingénieur des Travaux Publics Coloniaux, Émile Bélime. Conçu à l'origine comme un moyen de transformer la Vallée du Niger en une vaste plantation de coton, et envisagé par la suite comme le grenier central de l'Afrique Occidentale, ce projet n'a jamais atteint qu'une petite partie de son potentiel agricole espéré. Sa réalisation et sa mise en exploitation on nécessité le déracinement par contrainte de dizaines de milliers d'Africains. Même après la deuxième guerre mondiale, le projet a absorbé encore une grande partie des revenus coloniaux, déjà limités, mais il n'a généré aucun revenu. Pendant l'entre-deux-guerres, l'Office du Niger a acqui petit à petit le statut de facto d'un état dans l'État, dirigé par Émile Bélime. En 1945, quand le projet a été finalement reconnu comme une échec sur le plan économique et humanitaire, les autorités coloniales ont essayé de corriger les erreurs les plus graves et lui ont accordé le nouveau statu de prototype pour d'autres projets d'assistance économique et technique aux régions sous-développées. En 1961, le Gouvernement du Mali, qui avait récemment accédé à l'indépendance, pensait en faire un projet pilote pour le développement agricole du pays. Sa réalisation détermine encore aujourd'hui la politique agricole du Mali. fr

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This thesis investigates the ways in which British and French imperial heroes involved in the exploration, conquest or administration of Mrica between 1870 and 1939 were selected, packaged and promoted to the various sections of the public of their respective countries. It seeks to unveil the commercial, political and personal interests that lay behind the imperial hero-making business. This research analyses the hidden mechanisms, as well as the reasons that led to the appearance of a new type of hero in the context of the 'new' T Imperialism and the 'Scramble for Mrica': private connections, political lobbies (especially colonial advocates and nationalists), commercial interests (journalists, writers, biographers, hagiographers, publishers, film-makers) and personal ambition, the combination of which underpinned the creation and success ofheroic reputations. The first part of the thesis investigates the process through which imperial heroes progressively became widely known in their homelands, and how it was facilitated by the technical and social improvements of the Second Industrial Revolution. Drawing upon a wide variety of printed and manuscript sources, it shows the ever-increasing commercial success of imperial heroes throughout the period, analyses how they could serve political ends, and explains the values for which 'they were held up as examples. The second part examines the case studies of two military commanders in times of Anglo-French rivalry in Africa (the Sirdar Kitchener and Major Marchand before, during and after the Fashoda confrontation of 1898), in order to compare the modalities of the development of these legends, and the different backdrops against which they took shape. This thesis is the first to combine quantitative evidence (such as print run figures) and qualitative sources (such as police records) to demonstrate conclusively the prevalence and complexity of the hero-making process brought about by the conquest of Mrica, and to evaluate the reception of these heroic myths among the public.