My purpose is to sketch briefly the diplomatic background of the existing relations between France and Germany from 1871 to 1939. I have told the story chronologically, because I believe that we must follow events as they unfold themselves if we are to understand why statesmen made their decisions. I have attempted to mass all the important facts that I could find on Franco-German Diplomatic Relations from 1871 to 1939 without self-interests or prejudices to either of the two nations. My intentions were to seek a general knowledge of the drift of Franco-German Diplomatic affairs during this period of seventy years.

The dismemberment and reparations policy France followed at the end of World War II as an occupying power in Germany was a traditional approach of the victor to the vanquished. The Saar, the Ruhr, and the Rhineland were the borderlands long in dispute. One new element was the idea that while demanding these territories, an attempt at national rapprochement could be carried on through educational measures. For many Germans the University at Mainz did not balance the dismantled factories. This postwar period was characterized by European economic ills. The 1947 Marshall Plan, an American approach to restore Europe to economic health through cooperative effort, was inaugurated. It stimulated the European integration movement which flourished during the 1950’s. The 1948 Council of Europe had not lived up to expectations, in the eyes of European federalists, but the next try, the European Coal and Steel Community, (1952) proved a lusty child of the functionalist movement. When the European Defense Community died, (1954) it embittered Franco-German relations for a while. The European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community completed the European Community in 1958. Through the organizations for economic integration, France and Germany have, in spite of disputes and crises, been able to compromise many divergent drives in the interest of restoring Europe to full economic capacity. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (1949) which originated as a joint military defense and symbolized Western unity in the face of Soviet aggression, became a seedbed of discord between France and German. When General de Gaulle became president in 1958, he pursued an active policy of rapprochement with Adenauer’s Federal German Republic seeking to establish a Paris-Bonn axis on which to base French leadership in the European Community. As leader of a West European bloc independent of the United States, France would hold that place in the first rank of nations that de Gaulle believed she must have. Chancellor Adenauer cooperated with the French president because he believed a tightly knit European group would benefit German interests. The high point in Franco-German rapprochement occurred in 1962 during the summer exchange of state visits, but by the time the Treaty was signed and ratified, (1963) the tone of Franco-German relations and changed. Disagreements on military policies in NATO, on political developments in the European Community, and on agricultural policies in EEC, all reached serious proportions at the time that Chancellor Erhard took office in 1963. The Erhard government’s shift of emphasis from a Europe focused on France to the Atlantic alliance focused on the United States led President de Gaulle to consider a new policy to replace Franco-German rapprochement which had been his primary strategy until 1963. Franco-Russian relations became noticeably warmer after the extension of long term credits by France to the Soviet Union. Germany protested this new turn in French policy. A closer French-Russian relationship may add to the discord which cooled the Franco-German accord of 1962.

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From Preface: In this thesis I have aimed at covering a field in Economic History where not many suitable publications are available in English. During the interwar period, the maintenance of peace and harmonious international relations was directly dependent on a reconciliation of the conflicting interests between France and Germany. In studying the economic implications of the Franco-German antagonism, I have tried to throw light upon the crucial role which this relationship played. The Appendix offers a quantitative survey of economic conditions in the two countries and of the relevant production and exchange problems. To assist the reader who is not completely familiar with this period, a brief summary of the relevant conferences, agreements and treaties is also offered in the Appendix, as well as some short biographical notes. I would like to make it clear, however, that this thesis is neither supposed to be a paraphrase of the Appendix, nor a mere treatise on the commercial relations between the two countries concerned. I aimed rather at revealing the forces behind the events and at illustrating how economic problems became quite often subject to political and military considerations. When trying to attain some understanding of Franco-German relations, it seems advisable to look not only at the interbellum period, but in the first instance to become aware of the currents of history which finally led to the two disastrous World Wars.

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