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Friendly relations between Britain and France are, historically speaking, an innovation of the twentieth century. Even if we ignore the Hundred Years War and Joan of Arc, the modern history of Anglo-French relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is of a struggle for power which culminated in the Napoleonic Wars, and a bitter colonial rivalry climaxed at Fashoda. The alliance of 1914 failed to reconcile deep diplomatie differences: the French felt the British betrayed them at Versailles and deeply resented Britain's negative attitude towards the French invasion of the Ruhr, and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 which, they felt, facilitated Germany's remilitarization. Britain's appeasement policy at Munich was criticized by some Frenchmen while others blamed the British for forcing France into World War II. Thus it can be seen that Anglo-French friendship was a fragile thing indeed and ill-prepared to withstand the pressures of Arras, Dunkirk, Mers-el-Kebir and Montoire. [...]

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Between 1659 and 1689, northern Italy was generally at peace, having endured almost three decades of continuous war from the 1620s. The Peace of the Pyrenees of November 1659, between the French and Spanish crowns, seemed to offer the young Louis XIV an opportunity to gradually subvert Spanish influence over the small princely families of the Po valley. The Houses of Farnese, Este, and Gonzaga-Nevers, respective rulers of Parma, Modena, and Mantua-Monferrato, had all been allies of France at various points in the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659), but had gained scant reward for their willingness to jeopardise their own relationships with the king of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor, despite the promises of material and diplomatic support which Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin had extended to them. As a consequence, they were reluctant to agree to again participate in alliances with France. This thesis examines how Louis XIV gradually came to lose the friendship of these three ruling families, through his arrogant disregard of their interests and their ambitions, and also by his contempt for their capabilities and usefulness. This disregard was frequently born out of the French monarch's unwillingness to jeopardise or to undermine his own interests in Italy – in particular, the permanent retention of the fortress of Pinerolo, in Piedmont, as a porte onto the Po plain. But although the principi padani comprehended the reasons for Louis's unwillingness to act as a benevolent patron, they resented his all-too-palpable distrust of them; his entrenched belief that they were unreliable; and his obvious love of war. The rulers and élites of the Italian states believed that Louis would undoubtedly seek, at some point in his reign, to attack Spain's possessions in Italy, and dwelt in perpetual dread of that day. This thesis provides the account of French policy towards the small Italian states after 1659 which is still absent from the historiography of Louis XIV's foreign policies.

No abstract included. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

The dismemberment and reparations policy France followed at the end of World War II as an occupying power in Germany was a traditional approach of the victor to the vanquished. The Saar, the Ruhr, and the Rhineland were the borderlands long in dispute. One new element was the idea that while demanding these territories, an attempt at national rapprochement could be carried on through educational measures. For many Germans the University at Mainz did not balance the dismantled factories. This postwar period was characterized by European economic ills. The 1947 Marshall Plan, an American approach to restore Europe to economic health through cooperative effort, was inaugurated. It stimulated the European integration movement which flourished during the 1950’s. The 1948 Council of Europe had not lived up to expectations, in the eyes of European federalists, but the next try, the European Coal and Steel Community, (1952) proved a lusty child of the functionalist movement. When the European Defense Community died, (1954) it embittered Franco-German relations for a while. The European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community completed the European Community in 1958. Through the organizations for economic integration, France and Germany have, in spite of disputes and crises, been able to compromise many divergent drives in the interest of restoring Europe to full economic capacity. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (1949) which originated as a joint military defense and symbolized Western unity in the face of Soviet aggression, became a seedbed of discord between France and German. When General de Gaulle became president in 1958, he pursued an active policy of rapprochement with Adenauer’s Federal German Republic seeking to establish a Paris-Bonn axis on which to base French leadership in the European Community. As leader of a West European bloc independent of the United States, France would hold that place in the first rank of nations that de Gaulle believed she must have. Chancellor Adenauer cooperated with the French president because he believed a tightly knit European group would benefit German interests. The high point in Franco-German rapprochement occurred in 1962 during the summer exchange of state visits, but by the time the Treaty was signed and ratified, (1963) the tone of Franco-German relations and changed. Disagreements on military policies in NATO, on political developments in the European Community, and on agricultural policies in EEC, all reached serious proportions at the time that Chancellor Erhard took office in 1963. The Erhard government’s shift of emphasis from a Europe focused on France to the Atlantic alliance focused on the United States led President de Gaulle to consider a new policy to replace Franco-German rapprochement which had been his primary strategy until 1963. Franco-Russian relations became noticeably warmer after the extension of long term credits by France to the Soviet Union. Germany protested this new turn in French policy. A closer French-Russian relationship may add to the discord which cooled the Franco-German accord of 1962.