<p>This thesis compares the two different version of public franchise bidding for awarding 3G licenses used in Sweden and the UK, respectively a beauty contest and an auction. The fact is that the Swedish beauty contest has failed to tackle many of the problems discussed in connection with public franchise bidding in an effective way. Sweden has first of all had problems with enforcing the ambitious coverage criteria. The UK has on the other hand succeeded in tackling the problems and raised governmental revenue of £22.5bn through the auction.</p><p>The conclusion is that this thesis confirms the existing literatures’ critique of the Swedish beauty contest. However, this thesis also provides a new perspective to the existing literature. The main conclusion is that the auction has locked the prices at a high level and externalised negative price and investments effects through the international operators’ behaviour onto consumers in other countries.</p>

This thesis compares the two different version of public franchise bidding for awarding 3G licenses used in Sweden and the UK, respectively a beauty contest and an auction. The fact is that the Swedish beauty contest has failed to tackle many of the problems discussed in connection with public franchise bidding in an effective way. Sweden has first of all had problems with enforcing the ambitious coverage criteria. The UK has on the other hand succeeded in tackling the problems and raised governmental revenue of £22.5bn through the auction. The conclusion is that this thesis confirms the existing literatures’ critique of the Swedish beauty contest. However, this thesis also provides a new perspective to the existing literature. The main conclusion is that the auction has locked the prices at a high level and externalised negative price and investments effects through the international operators’ behaviour onto consumers in other countries.

Il existe une contradiction entre le succès rencontré par les partenariats public-privé (PPP) dans de nombreux pays et les défaillances relevées par une partie de la littérature économique lorsque ce type d'arrangement organisationnel est utilisé dans les industries de réseaux.<br />L'analyse de cette contradiction se situe au coeur de cette thèse. Prenant appui sur plusieurs tests économétriques menés à partir de données recueillies sur le secteur de l'eau en France, ce travail montre que les réserves émises par la théorie économique sont en partie justifiées. Cependant, il est également mis en évidence certaines solutions pour améliorer les performances des PPP. Par exemple, la concurrence entre modes organisationnels se présente comme une alternative crédible au manque de concurrence entre opérateurs dans le secteur de l'eau. D'autres types d'inefficacités couramment attribuées aux PPP trouvent des solutions pratiques.<br />Ainsi, le risque de sous-investissement de l'opérateur en fin de contrat, mis en évidence par des tests économétriques, peut être surmonté de diverses manières, l'une d'elle consistant pour l'autorité publique à prendre à sa charge les investissements spécifiques de fin de contrat.<br />Enfin, ce travail montre à l'aide d'un modèle théorique, que la collusion entre les candidats lors de l'attribution du contrat de PPP peut, dans certains cas, être déstabilisée en combinant la mise aux enchères du service avec, ex-post, une politique de concurrence par comparaison.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o sistema de franchise bidding como uma alternativa à regulação tradicional, tomando-se como exemplo as concessões de rodovias, tanto do ponto de vista teórico como empírico. A partir do estudo de caso envolvendo o programa de concessões rodoviárias gaúchas, o presente trabalho realizou uma análise comparativa entre o sistema de franchise bidding, também conhecido na literatura como leilão de Demsetz (1968), e a regulação direta, identificando-se os principais pressupostos teóricos, as características e os problemas enfrentados e, ainda, as similaridades e diferenças existentes entre os dois modelos propostos. Os resultados obtidos confirmam o diagnóstico realizado por Williamson (1976), indicando que regulação e franchise bidding diferem somente na forma e não em espécie. / The aim of this study is to analyze franchise bidding as an alternative to traditional regulatory systems, approaching both empirically and theoretically the highway concessions as an example. Taking the highway concession program from the state of Rio Grande do Sul as a study case, this study compares the franchise bidding system, also known in the literature as Demsetz bidding (1968), with direct regulation and identifies the main theoretical assumptions, characteristics and problems experienced as well as the similarities and differences between both models. The results confirm Williamson’s (1976) diagnosis showing that regulation and franchise bidding differ only in form rather than kind.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o sistema de franchise bidding como uma alternativa à regulação tradicional, tomando-se como exemplo as concessões de rodovias, tanto do ponto de vista teórico como empírico. A partir do estudo de caso envolvendo o programa de concessões rodoviárias gaúchas, o presente trabalho realizou uma análise comparativa entre o sistema de franchise bidding, também conhecido na literatura como leilão de Demsetz (1968), e a regulação direta, identificando-se os principais pressupostos teóricos, as características e os problemas enfrentados e, ainda, as similaridades e diferenças existentes entre os dois modelos propostos. Os resultados obtidos confirmam o diagnóstico realizado por Williamson (1976), indicando que regulação e franchise bidding diferem somente na forma e não em espécie. / The aim of this study is to analyze franchise bidding as an alternative to traditional regulatory systems, approaching both empirically and theoretically the highway concessions as an example. Taking the highway concession program from the state of Rio Grande do Sul as a study case, this study compares the franchise bidding system, also known in the literature as Demsetz bidding (1968), with direct regulation and identifies the main theoretical assumptions, characteristics and problems experienced as well as the similarities and differences between both models. The results confirm Williamson’s (1976) diagnosis showing that regulation and franchise bidding differ only in form rather than kind.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o sistema de franchise bidding como uma alternativa à regulação tradicional, tomando-se como exemplo as concessões de rodovias, tanto do ponto de vista teórico como empírico. A partir do estudo de caso envolvendo o programa de concessões rodoviárias gaúchas, o presente trabalho realizou uma análise comparativa entre o sistema de franchise bidding, também conhecido na literatura como leilão de Demsetz (1968), e a regulação direta, identificando-se os principais pressupostos teóricos, as características e os problemas enfrentados e, ainda, as similaridades e diferenças existentes entre os dois modelos propostos. Os resultados obtidos confirmam o diagnóstico realizado por Williamson (1976), indicando que regulação e franchise bidding diferem somente na forma e não em espécie. / The aim of this study is to analyze franchise bidding as an alternative to traditional regulatory systems, approaching both empirically and theoretically the highway concessions as an example. Taking the highway concession program from the state of Rio Grande do Sul as a study case, this study compares the franchise bidding system, also known in the literature as Demsetz bidding (1968), with direct regulation and identifies the main theoretical assumptions, characteristics and problems experienced as well as the similarities and differences between both models. The results confirm Williamson’s (1976) diagnosis showing that regulation and franchise bidding differ only in form rather than kind.