This dissertation explores the role of religion in the origins of the Cold War from 1880 to 1948. Building on David Foglesong’s research into the role of religion in shaping American missionaries, businesspeople, and public intellectuals’ perceptions of Russia, as well as Andrew Preston’s insights into the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration’s use of religious tropes to justify intervention against Nazi Germany from 1939 to 1945, this project focuses on the White House and US State Department’s efforts to manage diplomatic tensions and public controversies surrounding religious repression in Russia during the origins of the Cold War from 1880 to 1948. The central finding of this project is that during the period from 1933 to 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his personal allies such as Joseph Davies sought to minimize popular and official criticisms of Soviet religious policies as a part of Roosevelt’s program of pragmatic cooperation with the USSR. Eventually, anti-communist officials in the State Department managed to undermine Roosevelt’s public relations program in order to justify a more confrontational approach to the Soviet regime. Roosevelt’s poor health, growing personal isolation, and neglect of personal relationships with American Catholic leaders after 1943, as well as his failure to create a bureaucracy committed to his vision of post-war cooperation, meant that after his death religion could be used by anti-communists in their campaign to denigrate the Soviet Union. To gain popular support for its containment and roll-back strategies, the Truman administration called for a worldwide Christian crusade to eradicate atheistic communism. By shedding light on how well the Roosevelt administration was able to overcome US-Russian religious tensions, this project supports the “missed opportunities” thesis that the Cold War was not inevitable. It also stands as an example of a growing body of scholarly research linking religion, diplomacy, and US foreign relations. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1966. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Grand Coulee Dam created Franklin D. Roosevelt Lake as part of the Columbia Basin Project. Located in northeastern Washington State, the Project provides economically important hydropower (19 billion kilowatt hours per year), irrigation (225,000 ha), flood control, and sport fishing ($5 to 20 million annually). A good system understanding aids in balancing these beneficial uses for the 230 km long reservoir. The reservoir's atypical 45-day mean residence time is much shorter than a typical lake, and much longer than for a riverine dam. The spring freshet requires drawdowns of 15 to 20 m for flood control—the driving characteristic of reservoir operations. A physically based two-dimensional hydrodynamic and water quality model, CE-QUAL-W2 Version 3.5 (Cole and Wells, 2006), is coupled with a fish bioenergetics model based on the Stockwell and Johnson model (1997, 1999) to examine the effects of hydrodynamics on the reservoir algae-zooplankton-kokanee food web. This model was applied and calibrated to Lake Roosevelt with model improvements of multiple zooplankton compartments and zooplankton omnivory. Calibration parameters included temperature, dissolved oxygen, nutrients, algae, and zooplankton. The fish bioenergetics model is applied over the entire reservoir model space to generate a spatial and temporal fish growth potential distribution. The fish model refinements include sub-daily time-steps and an optimized vertical foraging strategy. The linked model suggests that kokanee fish growth potential is seasonally limited by both warm water and prey densities. While the lake ecology is significantly affected by the reservoir operations in general, the pelagic fish growth potential did not appear sensitive to minor changes in reservoir operations. However, the model suggests that the advantageous foraging locations shift seasonally and that optimal foraging strategies are dependent on fish size.

This paper evaluates the United States' decision not to come to Austria's aid prior to and during the Anschluss of 12 March 1938. The uniqueness of this work is the two-front evaluation of both the internal/domestic affairs of the United States and the foreign policy of the US Government vis-à-vis Hitler's aggressive foreign policy. As this paper will show, Anschluss might have been prevented, but at a cost neither the United States nor European powers were willing to pay. The domestic situation in the United States was too fragile, as was the lack of public support for war for FDR to have any leeway in militarily aiding Austria. American, and to some degree European, opinion held that the Austrian question was a European matter, and to that end American domestic policy dominated foreign policy in hopes of reestablishing the United States economy prior to attempting to aid anyone else.

Má diplomová práce by měla mít ve větší míře analytický charakter. Rozdělila jsem ji na dvě hlavní kapitoly: hospodářský vývoj USA ve 20. letech 20. století a pokusy o obnovu bankovního systému. V první kapitole se věnuji analýze situace, v jaké se Spojené státy nacházely ve dvacátých letech, kdy můžeme pozorovat známky nastupující recese. Spojené státy změnily své postavení a staly se světovou mocností a hlavním vítězem první světové války. Hospodářskou politiku výrazně ovlivňovala válečná zkušenost tohoto konfliktu. S tím však přicházely i nové hospodářské, sociální a politické důsledky. Ze světového dlužníka se staly světovým věřitelem. Narůstala investiční aktivita, lidé si zvykli žít svůj ,,život na půjčku? a stále více se zadlužovali. Měnila se také politická situace, kde vládu demokratů vyměnila na dlouhé období vláda republikánů. V hospodářské politice to znamenalo zejména nižší daně, vyšší cla, omezení přímé regulace a decentralizace rozhodování. Rozpočtová politika se přizpůsobila zejména splácení válečných půjček, což znamenalo po celé období dvacátých let přebytkové rozpočty.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt inspired the Allies with memorable speeches in their fight against the Axis Powers during World War II. These speeches resulted from their personalities, preparation, and correspondence; and the speeches directed Allied conduct and challenged Axis aggression. The speeches examined here pertain to Lend-Lease in November, 1940-March, 1941. The author consulted the collections of Churchill's and Roosevelt's speeches and correspondence and drew from memoirs and newspapers. The first two chapters examine Churchill and Roosevelt's rhetorical abilities; the third chapter looks at how their correspondence shaped their speeches; and the fourth chapter looks at the Lend-Lease rhetoric. Roosevelt and Churchill's speeches contributed to the success of the Lend-Lease bill and strengthened the Anglo-American alliance. Their words and actions led to the emergence of America as the leader in the alliance and affected Hitler's perception of the Anglo-American relationship and policy.

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This Master thesis, U.S. and the Czechoslovak Crisis in 1938: Policy of Appeasement?, examines the policy of the United States in 1938 during the dispute between Czechoslovakia and Nazi Germany over the Sudeten German issue. This paper is a case study and it analyzes a diplomatic correspondence and public statements of key representatives of U.S. foreign policy in the period March to October 1938. The goal of the paper is to evaluate the U.S. policy towards the Czechoslovak crisis and to consider whether or not the U.S. policy could be labeled as a policy of appeasement. There are four chapters. The first chapter recapitulates U.S. foreign policy before 1938, briefly describes issues of appeasement and describes the Czechoslovak-U.S. relations before 1938. The second chapter deals with U.S. policy during the so-called May crisis. The third chapter focuses on U.S. policy during the Munich Conference. The fourth chapter analyzes attitudes and actions of U.S. representatives in the time of the Munich Conference.