Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1969. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [194]-200).

The objective of my thesis was to examine Kant's concept of freedom and the role that it plays in his Critical philosophy. Each section deals with an interpretive or theoretical problem concerning freedom in the context of one of Kant's Critiques. In Section 2, I focus the Critique of Practical Reason and I argue that transcendental freedom is a crucial premise in Kant?s deduction of the moral law. In Section 3, I turn to the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant claims that transcendental idealism is the theoretical apparatus that allows us to understand the compatibility of freedom and determinism. Because the first Critique lays the foundation for the rest of the Critical project, I try to develop a reading of this text that can sustain the viability of Kant's concept of freedom. In Section 4, I look to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, which Kant wrote in order to bridge the gap between nature, as it was described in the first Critique and freedom, as it was developed in the second Critique. Kant's teleological account of nature, which subordinates nature to the moral use of freedom, bridges the gap between nature and freedom by providing an account of how nature can realize the objective end of practical reason, viz., the highest good.

The objective of my thesis was to examine Kant's concept of freedom and the role that it plays in his Critical philosophy. Each section deals with an interpretive or theoretical problem concerning freedom in the context of one of Kant's Critiques. In Section 2, I focus the Critique of Practical Reason and I argue that transcendental freedom is a crucial premise in Kant?s deduction of the moral law. In Section 3, I turn to the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant claims that transcendental idealism is the theoretical apparatus that allows us to understand the compatibility of freedom and determinism. Because the first Critique lays the foundation for the rest of the Critical project, I try to develop a reading of this text that can sustain the viability of Kant's concept of freedom. In Section 4, I look to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, which Kant wrote in order to bridge the gap between nature, as it was described in the first Critique and freedom, as it was developed in the second Critique. Kant's teleological account of nature, which subordinates nature to the moral use of freedom, bridges the gap between nature and freedom by providing an account of how nature can realize the objective end of practical reason, viz., the highest good.

Thèse, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 2008.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Queensland, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references.

The international agenda on poverty, freedom and human rights has become increasingly influential in recent years. Mrs. Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated that "Ip]overty itself is a violation of numerous basic human rights" (1997,6), while the UNDP's Human Development Report 2000 conveys the central message that poverty is a limit on individual freedom, and that freedom from poverty should be addressed as a basic entitlement and a human right (UNDP, 2000). But what do people mean when they say that poverty is a denial or a violation of fundamental human freedoms and basic human rights? This Thesis addresses the need for a robust theoretical framework for thinking about this question. Its aim is to expand basic knowledge and understanding in the field of poverty and human rights by contributing to interdisciplinary dialogue and conceptual development. The Thesis is cross-disciplinary in scope and bridges the perspectives of ethics, economics and international law. It establishes the basis of international legal obligation in the field of poverty and human rights; considers the nature and scope of relevant debates in ethics and political theory; and analyses the significance of Professor Amartya Sen's research agenda in ethics and economics for both conceptual and formal thinking about poverty, fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. The use of deontic logic to capture and formalise statements about poverty, freedom and human rights is assessed. The Thesis concludes with a proposal for a rights-based extension of Sen's capability approach based on authoritative international standards in the field of poverty and human rights. This proposal is mapped out both as a means of integrating the different disciplinary perspectives and as a suggestion for future research.

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Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bern.

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de Gèneve.