This thesis is an attempt to examine interpretations of the May-June Hundred Flowers Movement in China in 1957 through the examination of a principal participant among businessmen: Chang Nai-ch'i. The Hundred Flowers Movement is comprised of a series of violent outbursts and extreme statements. The May-June Hundred Flowers Movement was the last act in what might be termed China's Hundred Flowers Period, a period of intellectual liberation concurrent with the "Liberalization" in the Soviet Union. China, like many other socialist states, is a closed society from which information is often difficult to gather. The criticism, as printed in Chinese newspapers and journals, provides detailed information on factional struggles and organizational difficulties found within the Chinese government. The criticism, though often bountiful in number, is short, emotional and takes the form of a vignette. The existence of a source of official criticisms against Chang Nai-ch'i allows for the examination of the actions of a leading Hundred Flowers participant both prior to, and during the Movement. The method used to examine, compile and evaluate criticisms of Chang Nai-ch'i is the frequency chart in which quantitative examination is made of various critics' statements, and the duration of these statements. Through the use of this technique, over forty criticisms of Chang Nai-ch'i found in two Chinese language businessmen's journals are ordered, placed into chronological sequence and evaluated. These criticisms are then examined against existing information, and in particular, Chinese journal and newspaper accounts to examine their significance and validity. The thesis is divided into three chapters examining three chronological groups of criticisms. The first chapter examines criticisms referring to Chang's past (1927-1951), the second examines criticisms of events immediately prior to the Hundred Flowers Movement (1952-1956) and the third examines criticisms pertaining directly to the Hundred Flowers Movement. Existing interpretations of the Hundred Flowers Movement stress the spontaneity of the Movement, the importance of factional differences within the Chinese leadership, and the importance of the emergence of "disturbances" beyond the expectations of the Chinese leadership. An examination of the criticisms of Chang Nai-Ch'i suggests that the Hundred Flowers Movement was not in any sense spontaneous, and that the "disturbances" which led to an about-face by the Chinese leadership, may have been a product of weaknesses within the Chinese political process, weaknesses that were both factional and historical in nature. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

This thesis explores the issue of how to reconcile the value of individual privacy with that of freedom of speech. It argues that there ought to be legal protection against invasion of privacy by the media, and that such protection should be seen as complementary to a system of free expression rather than opposed to such a system. A definition of privacy is outlined which, it is contended, meets the criteria for a coherent, neutral definition. Various reasons for valuing privacy and in favour of protecting the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy are identified. It is argued that lack of precision in the normative realm, in defining with certainty when privacy is invaded, should not be an excuse for leaving the individual without legal protection. There follows an examination of the protection of privacy against media incursions in English, New Zealand, Australian and Canadian law, other than the coincidental protection afforded by certain common law actions. There has been significant judicial and legislative recognition of the need to safeguard privacy interests, and many interesting developments in recent years are discussed. However, none of the countries considered has yet developed effective recourse for victims of unwarranted and invasive publications. It is argued that the relationship between privacy and free speech has been wrongly conceptualised, and that in fact both interests serve the same underlying set of values. Problems arise when privacy and free speech interests are balanced in the abstract rather than in context, and when a simplistic view of press freedom is adopted in disregard of the realities of the modern mass media. Invasive publications generally do not significantly advance free speech interests unless they help to provide the information needed for public decision-making. Furthermore, this information can in many cases be conveyed without detriment by withholding details which disclose identity. A three-step test is proposed to determine whether privacy and free speech interests can be reconciled without compromise to either of them, or whether it is necessary to balance these interests in the context of the case. It will also be maintained that a contextual approach is preferable to the adoption of categories such as "public figures" and "public places". These concepts tend to be misleading, and should be eschewed as analytical tools, since they confuse important questions which require separate analysis. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

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<p>AbstractTitle: Swedish freedom of speech compared to european freedom of speechNumber of pages: 57Author: Gabriella BoodeTutor: Göran SvenssonCourse: Media and Communication Studies CPeriod: Spring 2009University: Division of Media and Communication, Department of Information Science,Uppsala UniversityPurpose/Aim: The purpose with the dissertation is to see if there has been a limitation inSwedish freedom of speech since parts of the European union laws is superiour to theSwedish constitution as freedom of the press regulations and freedom of speech constitution.A more narrow purpose is to find out how the specific Swedish rights such as individual’slegal right to publish information are influenced by the European union laws and are superiorto the freedom of the press regulations and freedom of speech constitutionThe survey will also try to find out the effectiveness with the Lisbon Strategy ‘s emergencybrake and its purpose to protect the Swedish freedom of the press regulations and freedom ofspeech constitution. How big is the difference between the different member states concerningthe protection of the freedom of speech?Material/Method: The data collected for this thesis is retrieved through personal interviewswith representives from experts with in the field as Uppsala University and the SwedishGovernent.Main results: It is obvious that Sweden has the strongest protection of freedom of speechcomparing to the other EU member states. No other EU country has as detailed constitution asthe Swedish constitution TF and YGL. Comparing the Swedish meddelarfrihet to theEuropean the Swedish is the most protective concerning meddelarfrihet. This may be ofimportance for the individual standing outside of the professional market. It is most importantto the informant since they because of the ensamansvaret in the Swedish rules otherwisewould be left with no answers (with some exeptions). There was criticism to the brakeNödbromsen, considered being not efficient enough and that it was only politics since onlytop level could decide whether to accept an issue or not in different countries. Because of thatthe brake should be a rather bad protection for the Swedish freedom of speech.Keywords: Swedish freedom of speech, European freedom of speech</p>

AbstractTitle: Swedish freedom of speech compared to european freedom of speechNumber of pages: 57Author: Gabriella BoodeTutor: Göran SvenssonCourse: Media and Communication Studies CPeriod: Spring 2009University: Division of Media and Communication, Department of Information Science,Uppsala UniversityPurpose/Aim: The purpose with the dissertation is to see if there has been a limitation inSwedish freedom of speech since parts of the European union laws is superiour to theSwedish constitution as freedom of the press regulations and freedom of speech constitution.A more narrow purpose is to find out how the specific Swedish rights such as individual’slegal right to publish information are influenced by the European union laws and are superiorto the freedom of the press regulations and freedom of speech constitutionThe survey will also try to find out the effectiveness with the Lisbon Strategy ‘s emergencybrake and its purpose to protect the Swedish freedom of the press regulations and freedom ofspeech constitution. How big is the difference between the different member states concerningthe protection of the freedom of speech?Material/Method: The data collected for this thesis is retrieved through personal interviewswith representives from experts with in the field as Uppsala University and the SwedishGovernent.Main results: It is obvious that Sweden has the strongest protection of freedom of speechcomparing to the other EU member states. No other EU country has as detailed constitution asthe Swedish constitution TF and YGL. Comparing the Swedish meddelarfrihet to theEuropean the Swedish is the most protective concerning meddelarfrihet. This may be ofimportance for the individual standing outside of the professional market. It is most importantto the informant since they because of the ensamansvaret in the Swedish rules otherwisewould be left with no answers (with some exeptions). There was criticism to the brakeNödbromsen, considered being not efficient enough and that it was only politics since onlytop level could decide whether to accept an issue or not in different countries. Because of thatthe brake should be a rather bad protection for the Swedish freedom of speech.Keywords: Swedish freedom of speech, European freedom of speech

Reputational interests are protected against defamatory and injurious statements by the common law o f defamation, which permits the targeted individual to recover damages for the injury to his reputation. At the same time, this body of common law sets limits to the constitutional right to free expression of the person who made the penalized communication. However, since s.32(l) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - according to the Supreme Court of Canada - restricts the Charter's application to the actions of legislative, executive and administrative branches of government, the Charter will be at best a bit player in defamation litigation governed by common law rule. This thesis deals with the tension between promoting free speech and protecting a person's reputation, i.e. with the questions whether the common law of defamation has achieved the correct balance between the protection of the individual's reputation and freedom of expression, or whether it needs to be modified in order to better accord with the Charter. A n important component of this thesis is its review of the decision of Hill v. Church of Scientology, where the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of whether defamation law needs to be reconsidered in light o f the Charter protection of free expression, and found the balance struck by the current law to be appropriate. A critical look at this decision, and more generally at the law of defamation itself, particularly its presumptions of falsity, malice and damages, will reveal the problems with the common law's resistance to making any major allowance for free expression. The author will argue that the Charter should apply to the common law in the same way as it applies to statutory law and that defamation law in particular would, in all probability, not survive the test under s.l of the Charter, concerning the justification of a limitation to a fundamental right. It will be concluded that the common law of defamation needs to be modified, i.e. that it must accord significantly more weight to freedom of expression in order to be consistent with the Charter. Insofar as the extent of such modification is concerned, the author will propose first of all to give the element of fault a more significant role in the common law of defamation. In addition, she will argue that the common law presumptions should be abolished. In sum, the author's reform proposal requires the plaintiff to prove not only that the words he complains of are defamatory, identify him and are published to a third person, but also that they are false, did indeed cause damage to his reputation and that the defendant acted with fault, i.e. intentionally or negligently, when publishing the defamatory falsehoods.

Reputational interests are protected against defamatory and injurious statements by the common law o f defamation, which permits the targeted individual to recover damages for the injury to his reputation. At the same time, this body of common law sets limits to the constitutional right to free expression of the person who made the penalized communication. However, since s.32(l) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - according to the Supreme Court of Canada - restricts the Charter's application to the actions of legislative, executive and administrative branches of government, the Charter will be at best a bit player in defamation litigation governed by common law rule. This thesis deals with the tension between promoting free speech and protecting a person's reputation, i.e. with the questions whether the common law of defamation has achieved the correct balance between the protection of the individual's reputation and freedom of expression, or whether it needs to be modified in order to better accord with the Charter. A n important component of this thesis is its review of the decision of Hill v. Church of Scientology, where the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of whether defamation law needs to be reconsidered in light o f the Charter protection of free expression, and found the balance struck by the current law to be appropriate. A critical look at this decision, and more generally at the law of defamation itself, particularly its presumptions of falsity, malice and damages, will reveal the problems with the common law's resistance to making any major allowance for free expression. The author will argue that the Charter should apply to the common law in the same way as it applies to statutory law and that defamation law in particular would, in all probability, not survive the test under s.l of the Charter, concerning the justification of a limitation to a fundamental right. It will be concluded that the common law of defamation needs to be modified, i.e. that it must accord significantly more weight to freedom of expression in order to be consistent with the Charter. Insofar as the extent of such modification is concerned, the author will propose first of all to give the element of fault a more significant role in the common law of defamation. In addition, she will argue that the common law presumptions should be abolished. In sum, the author's reform proposal requires the plaintiff to prove not only that the words he complains of are defamatory, identify him and are published to a third person, but also that they are false, did indeed cause damage to his reputation and that the defendant acted with fault, i.e. intentionally or negligently, when publishing the defamatory falsehoods. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

The issue of so called hate speech in the context of freedom of speech Abstract This thesis titled The issue of so-called hate speech in the context of freedom of speech deals with the legal regulation of hate speech at the international and national level. The thesis contains a comprehensive analysis of legal instruments regulating hate speech in civil, anti-discrimination, administrative and criminal law. This thesis combines the theoretical basis of hate speech regulation with practical knowledge about the applicability of individual legal norms and is supplemented by relevant case law of the Czech courts and the European Court of Human Rights. The aim of this work is to describe the phenomenon of hate speech, provide an analysis of legal instruments regulating hate speech and also to analyse legal arguments for hate speech regulation. The thesis attempts to find the boundary between protected speech and speech that is unprotected by the international and constitutional framework of freedom of speech protection, by means of an analysis of individual court decisions. The thesis also contains a critical reflection of the current legal framework of hate speech regulation and suggests possible variants of legislative changes in the future. The thesis is structured into five chapters. The first part...

The American movie industry did not have to develop into the Hollywood dream factory. There were educative, religious, explicitly political, and other non-commercial alternative arrangements to America’s film industry. These alternatives, along with principles such as film free speech and movie propaganda, had to be cast aside by the emerging moguls of Hollywood. Conflicts with the vanquished liquor industries, moral and economic regulatory concerns, Republican Party politics, and the resurgent Klan all shaped the classic Hollywood system from 1906 to 1927, a 20-year period in which the American film industry depoliticized the Hollywood movie screen, shedding its democratic and propagandistic definitions for the politics of publicity and entertainment as a service to Americans. Developments in this infant industry also shaped the broader trajectory of American consumer capitalism toward big producer control and the self-regulation of the industry’s social effects.