This paper investigates the impact of Economic Freedom on FDI inflows to developing countries and the Middle East in particular. Four forms of Economic Freedom were tested as variables determining FDI inflow. These four variables were Freedom from Corruption, Government Size, Trade Freedom and Investment Freedom. Cross-sectional data for twelve Middle Eastern countries and forty-three other developing countries were gathered for 1995 and 2006. It was revealed that only Trade Freedom and Invest-ment Freedom were significant in both Middle East and other regions. Apart from one case, the general positive sign of the significant variables confirms our hypothesis re-garding the positive effects of these Economic Freedoms on FDI inflows. Based on these findings it can be recommended to improve the investment environment and re-duce the barriers to trade in order to attract more FDI.

Although we have developed modes of governance of religious diversity to accommodate the weak level of religious pluralism which characterized Western societies until recently, it is not clear that these modes of governance can meet the challenges raised by the new and deeper form of religious diversity characterized by a growing gap between the self-understandings of religious and secular citizens as well as by an increasing number of religious groups due to contemporary patterns of immigration. Freedom of conscience and equality between the adherents of different churches have historically been secured by a separation between state and religion. However, contemporary political theorists disagree about the shape that this separation should take. Some defend a model of institutional pluralism which requires the state to equally support and recognize different religious groups by providing them with the means to set up their own pervasively religious social institutions. Others put forth a restrictive secularist model according to which religion should be privatized. There should be a strict separation between the public and the religious spheres to ensure that no religion is privileged or disadvantaged by the state. However, I argue that both approaches fail to meet the challenges raised by the arrival of new religious minorities within Western societies. Accommodation of religious diversity through separate institutions is not required by equality and freedom of conscience. Moreover, since it favours institutional segmentation along religious lines, it fails to provide favourable conditions for the integration of new immigrant groups. Strict secularism requires that religious expressions be severely restricted in the public sphere and thus heavily limit freedom of conscience. Moreover, since the public sphere is never fully neutral, strict secularism fails to equally protect the freedom of new religious groups. How can we then achieve the two apparently irreconcilable goals of integrating new minorities and of protecting their freedom and equal status? The thesis that I defend is that these goals can be reconciled by an approach of open secularism based on the reasonable accommodation of religious diversity within shared public institutions. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-09-26 10:50:03.663

<p>Over the past decades, transitions from repressive rule to democracy have increased all over the world, aiming at establishing disclosure and accountability for the crimes perpetrated. One way of assessing the &ldquo / solidity&rdquo / of these new democracies is to look at their provisions on freedom of expression, one of the most precious and fragile rights of man. The right to freedom of expression was recognised by classical traditional liberal theory as from the eighteenth century. It considered it as a useful tool to enhance true statements within the &ldquo / marketplace of ideas&rdquo / . Liberals also believed that such right was a prerequisite for individual autonomy and selffulfillment. They claimed that it strengthened democracy, by allowing individuals to receive all information on issues of public concern which they needed to vote intelligently. Lastly, they argued that it promoted the ideal of tolerance. Since then, the right to freedom of expression has been considered a cornerstone of democracy and protected as such by international instruments among which the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the African Charter for Human and Peoples&rsquo / Rights of 1981 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950.</p>

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1985.

No description available.

Classical utilitarianism faces significant problems: it ignores moral rights; it cannot take account of all free rational agents; and its focus on happiness means that it dismisses the other things that people value for their own sake. These problems lead to conflicts with autonomy, personal integrity and inconsistencies with the way in which utilitarianism justifies the value of happiness. This thesis seeks to solve these problems by introducing the protection of freedom as a new measure of utility.

It is generally acknowledged that educating children entails limiting their social freedom, (or liberty), to some extent. The question is, how far can children's liberty justifiably be limited in education, and on what grounds? One approach to this issue adopted in recent educational philosophy involves the idea that development of 'free' persons constitutes a key educational ideal, if not the educational ideal itself. It is argued that children's liberty should be regulated in accordance with the ideal of developing 'free' persons. After arguing in Chapter One that freedom may be construed both as a relationship obtaining between human beings and as a form of personality development, I examine philosophically the connection between children's liberty in education and the development of 'free' persons. Some educational philosophers identify 'free' persons with rational, (autonomous) persons, and suggest that the development of reason is consistent with - and may actually presuppose - considerable restrictions on children's liberty. In particular, development of 'free' persons may require that children be initiated into the rational disciplines. Given the analysis of "social freedom" which I advance in Chapter Two, this requirement can be seen to constitute a serious curtailment of children's liberty. I argue that there are good reasons for challenging the view that to be a 'free' person consists in being rational, and then advance an alternative account of "free persons". This has quite different implications for the social freedom of children in education from those of the 'rationalist' view. Indeed, I conclude that whereas the 'rationalist' account of "free persons" is well-suited to justifying a considerable degree of unfreedom for children, mine more obviously lends itself to a positive end: namely, suggesting ways in which children may be offered increased social freedom by comparison with much current educational practice.

In the two years 1994 and 2013 the focus of the Swedish media in the school debate has been on segregation, freedom of choice, and support for weak students. In 2013 while the media was still united on the above issues the overall emphasis is on profitability. In 1994 the focus was more on weak students who in 2013 are considered unprofitable. The purpose of this essay is to study the Swedish media and their debate on Swedish schools and witch concepts related to "one school that fits all" in the year 1994 and also in 2013. We have analysed related articles and their concepts, norms, and values to see if there are any differences between their focus on the said issues in the two years. We have also studied the ideas and concepts that came under scrutiny and discussion in these two years, and shall investigate if there are differences in the debates conducted in 1994 and those conducted in 2013.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse and examine the debate on prenatal testing in Western countries, with a special focus on my own country, Sweden. In the near future it might be possible for a pregnant woman to profile the DNA of her foetus with a simple blood test early in pregnancy. This method of prenatal testing – Non Invasive Prenatal Diagnosis (NIPD) – could potentially detect the genetic causes of almost every disease. I will argue that prenatal testing should be offered by society to all pregnant women, not only to those at highest risk of giving birth to children with severe conditions. I will do that from a perspective of reproductive freedom. Furthermore, I will argue that offering prenatal testing for some conditions (such as Downs’s syndrome) and not for others, is conflicting with the autonomous choice of the pregnant woman.

This thesis examines the relationships between fictional narratives and material objects through writing and sculptural practice. Its purpose is to explore how fiction assists in an understanding of the world we inhabit and, conversely, how our experiences of the world and its real and physically accessible contents (or objects) prevent fiction from transgressing into nonsense. It is anticipated that the combination of material practice and textual fiction will not be an easy marriage: it may be the objects which ultimately give presence to our voices, voices which historically have often attempted to claim and own of things through utterance. The sculptural component of the project addresses the tactility of objects and examines the space where so many tales are told – the home. In so doing, the project explores issues of isolation and connection through objects and materials which harbour a narrative of ostensible comfort. Objects may simultaneously project conflicting accounts of comfort and unease, connection and isolation, contributing to an articulated consciousness of the home.