Export is a top priority for Sweden's economy but for Swedish companies it may involve uncomfortable risks of exporting without sincere consideration. When the United Nations Security Council puts an embargo against a country, this often mean an import and export restriction. The thought is to push undemocratic regimes into respecting human rights. When the embargo is in force, however, the parties are not able to fulfill their contractual obligations, which practically means that the agreement will be suspended. The problem is what happens when an embargo is in force for a longer period of time. After the embargo is withdrawn, the price on the market may have changed significantly, which indicates a financial sacrifice for a seller if he has to provide specific performance to the buyer. The question thus is whether the seller, after a prolonged economic sanctions is withdrawn, still is obliged to provide specific performance? The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is applicable where both parties are signatories to CISG or by rules of international private law. To require performance as a buyer is a general right in Article 46 CISG, but there are exceptions to this rule in Article 28 CISG. Article 28 CISG states that if one party is entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention. Since CISG advocates a harmonized application of international trade, the right to specific performance cannot be waived just on the basis of Article 28 CISG alone. With regard to good faith in international trade in Article 7 (1) CISG, the principle of reasonableness, which is a general principle that the CISG is based upon in accordance with Article 7 (2) CISG and 7.2.2 (b) UPICC, and with the support of international usage regularity observed in the trade concerned in Article 9 CISG, the right to specific performance does not exist anymore after a prolonged embargo has been withdrawn. / Export är högprioriterat för Sveriges ekonomi men för svenska företag kan det inne-bära obekväma risker med att exportera utan eftertanke. När Förenta Nationernas säkerhetsråd går in och lägger ett embargo mot en stat innebär detta ofta en import- och export restriktion. Tanken är att pressa odemokratiska regimer att respektera mänskliga rättigheter. När embargot är i kraft kan dock parterna inte uppfylla sina avtalsförpliktelser vilket innebär att avtalet blir suspenderat. Det problematiska är vad som händer då ett embargo är i kraft under en längre tid. Efter det att ett embargo lyfts kan priset på marknaden ändrats avsevärt vilket innebär en ekonomisk uppoffring för en säljare att tvingas fullgöra i natura. Frågan blir då om säljare efter det att en långvarig ekonomisk sanktion lyfts, fortfarande är tvingen att fullgöra i natura? Lag (1987:822) om internationella köp(CISG) blir tillämplig i det fall då båda parters stater är signatärer eller genom privaträttsliga regler. Att kräva fullgörelse som köpare är en generell rätt i artikel 46 CISG men det finns ett explicit undantag till denna regel i artikel 28 CISG. Artikel 28 CISG stadgar att domstol som ska lösa tvisten, inte är skyldig att meddela dom på fullgörelse om domstol enligt egen forumlandets egen lagstiftning inte skulle ha gjort detta. Skulle tvisten lösas i Svensk domstol blir 23 § köplag (1990:931) tillämplig. Eftersom CISG förespråkar en harmoniserad tillämpning inom internationell handel är det inte tillförlitligt att mena på att rätten till fullgörelse bortfaller med stöd av endast artikel 28 CISG. Med beaktande av god sed i internationell handel i artikel 7(1) CISG, principen om rimlighet/förnuftig person som är en generell princip som CISG är baserat på i enlighet med artikel 7(2) CISG och 7.2.2 (b) UPICC, samt med stöd av handelsbruk i artikel 9 CISG, bortfaller rätten till fullgörelse i natura efter det att ett långvarigt embargo har lyfts.

This thesis concerns the issue of injunctive relief and specific performance in arbitration. The availability of such relief varies significantly between different jurisdictions and the issue is further complicated when parties opt out of litigation in favor of arbitration, not the least in terms of enforcement. In light of this, the thesis aims to determine the consequences for parties opting for arbitration instead of litigation with regard to the availability and enforceability of specific performance and injunctive relief. This overall research question has been answered under the laws of Sweden and the United States of America. First, this thesis has concluded that there are considerable differences between the jurisdictions in the availability of specific performance and injunctive relief in litigation. In Sweden, remedies are issues of substantive law and for many kinds of contracts, the primary remedy for breach. Consequently, courts do not differentiate claims for specific performance or injunctive relief, and routinely grant such claims in no different way than granting monetary relief. Conversely, in the United States, remedies are viewed as procedural issues, not substantive. There, specific performance and injunctive relief are discretionary matters of equity and not rights at law. Hence, the availability of specific performance and injunctive relief is limited as compared to damages. Further, this thesis has concluded that the categorization of reliefs and remedies as substantive and procedural, respectively, is mirrored also in arbitration. While in Sweden, the choice of arbitration as proper contract forum does not affect the availability of the reliefs now in question, it does so in the United States. There, courts have held that the division of remedies into legal and equitable is not applicable in arbitration. Thus, parties have the freedom to by contract control which reliefs an arbitrator may grant. In absence of such agreements, courts have presumed arbitrators to have been given a broad grant of authority, allowing otherwise unavailable reliefs.Third, this thesis has concluded that, inter alia, because of the inherent contempt powers of courts in the United States, the means of enforcing arbitral awards providing specific performance and injunctive relief are more extensive in the United States than in Sweden, where comparable powers do not exist. Further, parties may by means of contract, grant arbitrators the authority to supervise such reliefs and enforce previously granted specific performance and injunctions by contractual fines and sanctions. Again, in absence of explicit contract language such authority is presumed in the United States, but not in Sweden. Overall, the choice of arbitration has consequences in both jurisdictions. In the United States, mostly for the availability of the reliefs in question and in Sweden, mostly for the enforcement.