[pt] Esta tese é uma coleção de três ensaios empíricos em economia bancária no Brasil. O capítulo 1 mostra evidências que cidades governadas por prefeitos da base aliada do governo federal recebem mais crédito de bancos públicos federais. Utilizando uma base de dados longitudinal única que cruza informações de crédito em nível municipal com resultados eleitorais no período 1997-2008, eu exploro variações no alinhamento político de cada município ao longo do tempo para estimar seu impacto no montante de crédito. Como resultado, observo que os bancos públicos federais aumentam seus empréstimos em 10 por cento a mais em cidades alinhadas. Em resposta, os bancos privados restringem sua expansão de crédito nessas localidades, embora o efeito líquido seja de um aumento no crédito agregado para cidades alinhadas, deixando a questão de uma provável má alocação de capital entre cidades. Eu também utilizo outra base de dados de crédito única e ainda mais abrangente, disponível somente a partir de 2004, e emprego a metodologia de regressão com descontinuidade em disputas eleitorais apertadas para avaliar possíveis problemas de identificação. Em contraste com a literatura, eu observo que os resultados não são conduzidos por empréstimos direcionados, mas por operações de crédito livre. O capítulo 2 analisa firmas que contribuem para campanhas eleitorais de modo a testar a hipótese de favorecimento de crédito como retribuição a contribuição de campanha. Combinando dados de contribuição de campanha e informações de crédito ao nível da firma, eu exploro variações em uma mesma firma ao longo do tempo para testar se aquelas que contribuem para partidos da base aliada do governo federal recebem mais crédito de bancos públicos federais. Os resultados indicam que contribuintes de campanha de partidos da base aliada têm maior proporção de seu crédito oriundo de bancos públicos federais e tomam de uma maneira geral 20 por cento a mais de crédito que firmas que contribuem para outros partidos. No capítulo 3, eu aproveito da introdução de uma nova forma de seguro depósito voluntário, conhecido por DPGE (Depósito a Prazo com Garantias Especiais), para avaliar questões relevantes relativas a corrida bancária, liquidez de mercado (market liquidity) e liquidez na captação (funding liquidity). Primeiramente, documento uma corrida de depositantes a bancos pequenos e médios no Brasil após o agravamento da crise financeira global de 2008. A seguir, observo que esta corrida bancária foi impulsionada primordialmente por investidores institucionais. Em seguida, demonstro que, em resposta ao enfraquecimento da posição no seu passivo, os bancos reduziram seu ativo liquidando suas posições de crédito. Em quarto lugar, encontro evidências de que a introdução do DPGE ajudou a estabilizar as captações bancárias. Com este novo instrumento, os certificados de depósito (CD) passaram a ser segurados em até 20 milhões de reais, enquanto os demais eram segurados em até 60 mil reais. Por fim, demonstro que bancos com menor liquidez nos ativos foram aqueles que escolheram emitir DPGE, apesar de seu elevado custo (emissores devem pagar prêmio mensal de mais de seis vezes o valor cobrado em depósitos segurados convencionais). Portanto, restaurar a liquidez pelo lado do passivo (funding liquidity) foi mais importante a bancos mais afetados pela liquidez de mercado (market liquidity), ou seja, para aqueles com menos ativos líquidos. Uma investigação dos determinantes da emissão de DPGE mostra que: 1) bancos mais dependentes de cessão de carteira de crédito antes da crise estão mais propensos a emitir no novo esquema de depósito segurado; e 2) bancos com proporção mais elevada de crédito em relação ao ativo estão mais propensos a emitir sob o novo esquema, embora os resultados sejam menos precisos. Tais resultados são importantes por diversas razões. Primeiramente, estão entre os primeiros resultados empíricos a documentar a relação entre liquidez de mercado (ma / [en] This thesis is a collection of three empirical essays on banking using Brazilian data. Chapter 1 provides evidence that cities ruled by a mayor from the presidential coalition s party receive significantly more credit from public federally owned banks. Using a unique longitudinal database that matches branch-level credit information with election outcomes over the period 1997-2008, I explore the within-municipality variation in political alignment to estimate the impact of alignment on the amount of credit. I find that public federal banks increase their lending 10 per cent more in aligned cities. In response, private banks contract credit, but the net effect is an increase in aggregate credit to aligned cities, raising the issue of a misallocation of capital across cities. I also use another unique and more comprehensive credit database, available only since 2004, and apply a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to address possible identification concerns. In contrast with the received literature, I find that the results are not driven by earmarked lending, but by non-earmarked operations. Chapter 2 focuses the analysis on firms that donate to electoral campaigns in order to test for the hypothesis of favored lending as a reward mechanism for campaign giving. I combine data from firm level campaign contributions with credit information and explore within-firm variation in order to test whether donating to aligned parties results in a better access to credit from public federal banks. Results indicate that campaign contributors to aligned parties have a higher lending share from public federal banks and borrow 20 per cent more than firms that donate to nonaligned parties. In Chapter 3 I take advantage of the introduction of a voluntary deposit insurance program to address several important questions concerning bank runs, market liquidity and funding liquidity. I first document a depositors run on small and medium banks in Brazil after the worsening of the global financial crisis. Second, I find that the bank run was led mainly by institutional investors. Third, I show that, in response to the weakening position on the liability side, banks responded by liquidating their credit position on the asset side of the balance sheet. Fourth, I find evidence that the introduction of a new voluntary insurance instrument called DPGE (Time Deposits with Special Insurance) seemed to have helped stabilize banks positions. Under DPGE, Certificates of Deposit (CD) are insured up to 20 million reais, while standard non-DPGE other time deposits are secured up to 60 thousand reais. Fifth, I show that banks whose assets were more illiquid selected themselves into expensive DPGE (issuers have to pay monthly premium of more than six times the value charged on conventionally insured deposits). Thus, providing funding liquidity was more important for banks that were more affected by market liquidity (having less liquid assets). An investigation of the determinants of issuing DPGE shows that: 1) banks that relied more on credit assignments before the crisis are more likely to issue under the new insurance scheme; 2) banks with higher credit-to-assets ratios are also more likely to issue under the new scheme, although the results on credit-to-assets are a little less precise. These results are important for several reasons. First, they are the first empirical results to document the relationship between market and funding liquidity. In particular, self-selecting into DPGE allows us to see that banks with more illiquid assets need more funding liquidity in the midst of a crisis. Second, the fact of the voluntary nature of the program is interesting per se. By providing voluntary, albeit expensive, insurance, banks may self-select only when they have little option (because of asset-side market illiquidity). Although I do not perform a full welfare analysis, this suggests that mandatory insurance may be sub-optimal for two reasons. First, banks that do not need it may be paying excessive premiums. Second, mandatory insurance may

Cette thèse comporte trois chapitres dans lesquels j'étudie les coûts de transaction des actions, les anomalies en finance et les activités du système bancaire parallèle. Dans le premier chapitre (co-écrit avec René Garcia), une nouvelle façon d'estimer les coûts de transaction des actions est proposée. Les coûts de transaction ont diminué au fil du temps, mais ils peuvent augmenter considérablement lorsque la liquidité de financement se raréfi e, lorsque les craintes des investisseurs augmentent ou lorsqu'il y a d'autres frictions qui empêchent l'arbitrage. Nous estimons dans ce chapitre les écarts entre les cours acheteur et vendeur des actions de milliers d'entreprises à une fréquence journalière et présentons ces mouvements importants pour plusieurs de ces épisodes au cours des 30 dernières années. Le coût de transaction des trois quarts des actions est fortement impacté par la liquidité de fi nancement et augmente en moyenne de 24%. Alors que les actions des petites entreprises et celles des entreprises à forte volatilité ont des coûts de transaction plus élevés, l'augmentation relative des coûts de transaction en temps de crise est plus prononcée pour les actions des grandes entreprises et celles des entreprises à faible volatilité. L'écart entre les coûts de transaction respectifs de ces groupes de qualité élevée et qualité faible augmente également lorsque les conditions financières se détériorent, ce qui prouve le phénomène de fuite vers la qualité. Nous avons construit des portefeuilles basés sur des anomalies et avons estimé leurs "alphas" ajustés pour les coûts de rééquilibrage sur la base de nos estimations des coûts de transaction pour montrer que toutes les stratégies sont soit non rentables soit perdent de l'argent, à l'exception de deux anomalies: le "prix de l'action" et la "dynamique du secteur industriel". Dans le deuxième chapitre, j'étudie comment la popularité des anomalies dans les revues scienti ques spécialisées en finance peut influer sur le rendement des stratégies basées sur ces anomalies. J'utilise le ton du résumé de la publication dans laquelle une anomalie est discutée et le facteur d'impact de la revue dans laquelle cette publication a paru pour prévoir le rendement des stratégies basées sur ces anomalies sur la période après publication. La principale conclusion est la suivante: lorsqu'une anomalie est discutée dans une publication dont le résumé a un ton positif, et qui apparaît dans une revue avec un facteur d'impact supérieur à 3 (Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies), cette anomalie est plus susceptible d'attirer les investisseurs qui vont baser leurs stratégies sur cette anomalie et corriger ainsi la mauvaise évaluation des actions. Le troisième chapitre (co-écrit avec Vasia Panousi) propose une mesure de l'activité bancaire parallèle des entreprises opérant dans le secteur financier aux États-Unis. À cette fi n, nous utilisons l'analyse de données textuelles en extrayant des informations des rapports annuels et trimestriels des entreprises. On constate que l'activité bancaire parallèle était plus élevée pour les "Institutions de dépôt", les "Institutions qui ne prennent pas de dépôt" et le secteur "Immobilier" avant 2008. Mais après 2008, l'activité bancaire parallèle a considérablement baissé pour toutes les fi rmes opérant dans le secteur financier sauf les "Institutions non dépositaires". Notre indice du système bancaire parallèle satisfait certains faits économiques concernant le système bancaire parallèle, en particulier le fait que les politiques monétaires restrictives contribuent à l'expansion du système bancaire parallèle. Nous montrons également avec notre indice que, lorsque l'activité bancaire parallèle des 100 plus grandes banques augmente, les taux de délinquance sur les prêts accordés par ces banques augmentent également. L'inverse est observé avec l'indice bancaire traditionnel: une augmentation de l'activité bancaire traditionnelle des 100 plus grandes banques diminue le taux de délinquance. / This thesis has three chapters in which I study transaction costs, anomalies and shadow banking activities. In the first chapter (co-authored with René Garcia) a novel way of estimating transaction costs is proposed. Transaction costs have declined over time but they can increase considerably when funding liquidity becomes scarce, investors' fears spike or other frictions limit arbitrage. We estimate bid-ask spreads of thousands of firms at a daily frequency and put forward these large movements for several of these episodes in the last 30 years. The transaction cost of three-quarters of the firms is significantly impacted by funding liquidity and increases on average by 24%. While small firms and high volatility firms have larger transaction costs, the relative increase in transaction costs in crisis times is more pronounced in large firms and low-volatility firms. The gap between the respective transaction costs of these high- and low-quality groups also increases when financial conditions deteriorate, which provides evidence of flight to quality. We build anomaly-based long-short portfolios and estimate their alphas adjusted for rebalancing costs based on our security-level transaction cost estimates to show that all strategies are either unprofitable or lose money, except for price per share and industry momentum. In the second chapter I study how the popularity of anomalies in peer-reviewed finance journals can influence the returns on these anomalies. I use the tone of the abstract of the publication in which an anomaly is discussed and the impact factor of the journal in which this publication appears to forecast the post-publication return of strategies based on the anomaly. The main finding is the following: when an anomaly is discussed in a positive tone publication that appears in a journal with an impact factor higher than 3 (Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies), this anomaly is more likely to attract investors that are going to arbitrage away the mispricing. The third chapter (co-authored with Vasia Panousi) proposes a measure of the shadow banking activity of firms operating in the financial industry in the United States. For this purpose we use textual data analysis by extracting information from annual and quarterly reports of firms. We find that the shadow banking activity was higher for the “Depository Institutions", “Non depository Institutions" and the “Real estate" before 2008. But after 2008, the shadow banking activity dropped considerably for all the financial companies except for the “Non depository Institutions". Our shadow banking index satisfies some economic facts about the shadow banking, especially the fact that contractionary monetary policies contribute to expand shadow banking. We also show with our index that, when the shadow banking activity of the 100 biggest banks increases, the delinquency rates on the loans that these banks give also increases. The opposite is observed with the traditional banking index: an increase of the traditional banking activity of the 100 biggest banks decreases the delinquency rate.