The aim of the paper is to discuss the way that the online job banks send resumes to businesses for job seekers, and most businesses and job seekers have chosen online job banks as channel management for job wanted due to the rapid development of information technology for recent years. What businesses find employees and job seekers find jobs through the online job banks can be classified into two kinds, one is active candidates for the job, and another is matching pair by the online job banks. The online job banks help job seekers to send resumes to businesses by means of both ways, and how the online job banks send resumes to businesses for job seekers will affect the outcome. Therefore, this paper focuses on original way of sending resumes used by the online job banks, and also uses Gale-Shapley algorithm to devise different way of sending resumes which the online job banks possibly use in the future and consequently by comparing two ways of sending resumes, it can analyze what ways of sending resumes can be adopted by the online job banks under different situations.

Apresentamos a teoria sobre mercados de dois lados, centralizados e descentralizados, para analisar o mercado de admissão de estudantes aos Centros de Pós-graduação em Economia no Brasil ao longo dos últimos 15 anos. Iniciamos descrevendo a história da organização deste mercado até a época atual. As falhas do sistema descentralizado e as hipóteses sobre o insucesso do procedimento centralizado de 1997 são discutidas. Observações empíricas são utilizadas para propor um modelo teórico que represente aproximadamente o atual mecanismo descentralizado e explique a aparente duradoura aplicação desse mecanismo. Por fim, tecemos considerações a respeito das possibilidades de aprimoramento deste mercado com modificações do mecanismo existente. / We present the theory of two-sided matching markets, with centralized and decentralized mechanisms, in order to analyze a Brazilian market in which graduated students seek positions in postgraduate programs in economics. We first describe the institutional history of this market. The failures of the decentralized procedure and the hypothesis about the failure of the 1997 centralized mechanism are discussed. Empirical observations are used to propose a theoretical model that represents the actual decentralized matching procedure of the market. Based in this model we explain the apparent long-lasting use of this decentralized mechanism. Finally, we make considerations about the possibilities of developments in this market by modifying the mechanism used today.

Apresentamos a teoria sobre mercados de dois lados, centralizados e descentralizados, para analisar o mercado de admissão de estudantes aos Centros de Pós-graduação em Economia no Brasil ao longo dos últimos 15 anos. Iniciamos descrevendo a história da organização deste mercado até a época atual. As falhas do sistema descentralizado e as hipóteses sobre o insucesso do procedimento centralizado de 1997 são discutidas. Observações empíricas são utilizadas para propor um modelo teórico que represente aproximadamente o atual mecanismo descentralizado e explique a aparente duradoura aplicação desse mecanismo. Por fim, tecemos considerações a respeito das possibilidades de aprimoramento deste mercado com modificações do mecanismo existente. / We present the theory of two-sided matching markets, with centralized and decentralized mechanisms, in order to analyze a Brazilian market in which graduated students seek positions in postgraduate programs in economics. We first describe the institutional history of this market. The failures of the decentralized procedure and the hypothesis about the failure of the 1997 centralized mechanism are discussed. Empirical observations are used to propose a theoretical model that represents the actual decentralized matching procedure of the market. Based in this model we explain the apparent long-lasting use of this decentralized mechanism. Finally, we make considerations about the possibilities of developments in this market by modifying the mechanism used today.