The present dissertation deals with how to use the precious wireless resources that are usually wasted by under-utilization of networks. We have been particularly interested by all resources that can be used in an opportunistic fashion using different technologies. We have designed new schemes for better and more efficient use of wireless systems by providing mathematical frameworks. In the first part, We have been interested in cognitive radio networks, where a cellular service provider can lease a part of its resources to secondary users or virtual providers. In the second part, we have chosen delay-tolerant networks as a solution to reduce the pressure on the cell traffic, where mobile users come to use available resources effectively and with a cheaper cost. We have focused on optimal strategy for smartphones in hybrid wireless networks. In the last part, an alternative to delay-tolerant networks, specially in regions that are not covered by the cellular network, is to use Ad-hoc networks. Indeed, they can be used as an extension of the coverage area. We have developed a new analytical modeling of the IEEE 802.11e DCF/EDCF. We have investigated the intricate interactions among layers by building a general cross-layered framework to represent multi-hop ad hoc networks with asymmetric topology and traffic

Placement games are a subclass of combinatorial games which are played on graphs. In this thesis, we demonstrate that placement games could be considered as games played on simplicial complexes. These complexes are constructed using square-free monomials. We define new classes of placement games and the notion of Doppelgänger. To aid in exploring the simplicial complex of a game, we introduce the bipartite flip and develop tools to compare known bounds on simplicial complexes (such as the Kruskal-Katona bounds) with bounds on game complexes.

Neuroeconomic models take economic theory literally, interpreting hypothesized quantities as observables in the brain in order to provide insight into choice behaviour. This thesis develops a model of the neural decision process in strategic games with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. In such games, players face both an incentive to best-respond to valuations and to act unpredictably. Similarly, we model choice as the result of the interaction between action value and the noise inherent in networks of spiking neurons. Our neural model generates any ratio of choices through the specification of action value, including the equilibrium ratio, and provides an explanation for why we observe equilibrium behaviour in some contexts and not others. The model generalizes to a random-utility model which gives a structural specification to the error term and makes action value observable in the spike rates of neurons. Action value is measured in the spike activity of the Superior Colliculus (SC) while monkeys play a saccade version of matching pennies. We find SC activity predicts upcoming choices and is influenced by the history of events in the game, correlating with a behaviourally-established model of learning, and choice simulations based on neural measures of value exhibit similar biases to our behavioural data. A neural measure of value yields a glimpse at how valuations are updated in response to new information and compared stochastically, providing us with unique insight into modelling choice in strategic games. / Thesis (Ph.D, Economics) -- Queen's University, 2011-06-14 14:48:36.226

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Managing a common property resource, especially one jointly owned by two nations, is a formidable problem as it involves both incentives to cooperate and incentives to cheat. Often conflicts flare up, followed by efforts of reconciliation, which are interrupted again by new conflicts. A classic example of this is the Pacific salmon fishery, which is jointly harvested by the U.S.A and Canada. To understand the nature of this conflict, and to make policy recommendations, a game-theoretic approach is developed in this thesis.

In international economics literature, different variants of the Nash equilibrium have been used to formulate strategic and retaliative behavior. However, the negotiation process underlying the Nash equilibrium does not capture the notion of retaliation properly. We use the "contingent threat situation" (Greenberg, 1990) to reformulate three different international economic environments. / First, a two-country, two-commodity model of trade is considered to reformulate the tariff retaliations. It is known that tariff retaliations lead to a Nash equilibrium outcome, a non-free trade outcome. We show, in the framework of the "theory of social situations", that the free trade equilibrium is supported by a "stable standard of behavior". / Second, the basic two-country, single commodity model is employed to formulate the interactive and retaliatory policies regarding the choice between foreign investment and immigration. Considering three different strategic environments, we investigate the outcomes supported by "stable standards of behavior" under these strategic scenarios. We also provide a critical examination of Jones-Coelho-Easton's proposition (Jones, Coelho, and Easton, 1986). / Third, a simple model of international debt is formulated using a strategic form game. In the game, a country in financial crisis and on the verge of default is requesting a new loan, and a bank, with exposure to the foreign country's debt, contemplates whether it should issue the new loan. We show that "issue a new loan" and "not default", a Pareto optimum pair of strategies, is stable. Interestingly, we get this result by using a non-cooperative negotiation process, offered by the "individual contingent threat situation".

We first present a non-cooperative auction game to solve the bandwidth allocation problem for non-cooperative channel access in a wireless network. The Nash equilibrium is obtained as a solution of the game. To address this problem of bandwidth sharing under unknown information, we further develop a Bayesian auction game model and then Bayesian Nash equilibrium is then obtained. Next, we present a framework based on coalitional game for cooperative channel access for carry-and-forward-based data delivery. Each mobile node helps others to carry and then forward their data. A coalitional game is proposed to find a stable coalition structure for this cooperative data delivery. We next present static and dynamic coalitional games for carry-and-forward-based data delivery when the behavior of each mobile node is unknown by others. In the dynamic game, each mobile node can update its beliefs about other mobile nodes’ types when the static coalitional game is played repeatedly.

In the recent years co-opetition has emerged as a new theoretical concept, emphasizing the concurrency of competition and cooperation in business rela-tionships. It is considered as an integrative bridge between older contributions which one-sidedly emphasize either competition or cooperation. However, the co-opetition theory is barely applicable for problems of relationships between enterprises because of structural and methodical flaws. Therefore a framework for the modelling of enterprise co-opetition is introduced. A definition for the term co-opetition and determinants of co-opetition models are introduced, which are external institutions, several industrial boundaries and time. An industrial supply chain is introduced as one of the industrial boundaries in co-opetition models that considers the impact of potential participants and distinguishes be-tween individual customers and mass markets. A profit distribution rule is intro-duced for supply chains with individual customers, which considers the impact of excluded suppliers and can be used for the prediction of the outcome of auc-tions. It is shown for both mass markets and individual customers in how far stable agreements can be achieved, facing the problem of ubiquitous time-inconsistency of agreements. It is shown in which cases the introduced profit distribution rule recommends more stable negotiation outcomes than the Aumann-Drèze-rule and the Myerson-rule for coalition structures. Ideal-typical cases of... [to full text] / Atliktas tiriamasis darbas rengiant disertaciją yra aktualus nagrinėjant tokius klau-simus kaip: − Koopeticijos teorijos plėtra, − Derybų galia ir sutarčių stabilumas, − Ilgalaikės perspektyvos siekiant patobulinti naudojamą įmonėse programą. Koopeticija – tai neologizmas, sudarytas iš terminų konkurencija ir kooperacija. Šiuo neologizmu akcentuojamos įvairios prasmės, kurios įžvelgiamos esant konkurenci-jai ir kooperacijai santykiuose su visomis kitomis įmonėmis pramonės tiekimo tinkle, čia dalyvauja tiekėjai, pirkėjai (užsakovai), konkurentai ir tie, kurie aprūpina papildomomis prekėmis. Koopeticijos teorija dar tebėra pradinėje vystymosi stadijoje. Dėl sisteminių ir metodinių klaidų koopeticijos teorija taikytina tik sprendžiant įmonių savitarpio santykio problemas. Koopeticijos modeliai neturi norminio ir pripažinto apibrėžimo ar sandaros. Be to, neaišku, kokiu būdu galima naudoti šią teoriją. Todėl naujai sukurtas koopeticijos teorijos pagrindimas bei determinančių koopeticijos modeliams suformulavimas būtų svarus indėlis į šiuolaikinį mokslą. Reikėtų sutelkti dėmesį į įvairius savitarpio santykius pačiame pramonės tiekimo tinkle bei į įtaką, kurią turi nesančios tinkle įmonės, kurios visgi yra svarbios savitarpio santykiams, ypač kalbant apie derybų rezultatus ir sutarčių stabilumą. Nuolat augant tarptautiniam verslui atskiros valstybės praranda savo svarbą, kai kalbama apie kontrakto įvykdymo patvirtinimą. Ypač tada, kai nėra pasitikėjimo valsty-binėmis institucijomis... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]

This study is an in-depth investigation of game and excellence theory's linkage within the discipline of public relations during the period of market entry.The literature review defines and analyzes both game and excellence theory and the value of each within public relations. The literature also examines the impact of new businesses within U.S. economy and the importance of strategic decision making during the period of market entry. Decisions made during this time period, of which public relations professionals are often involved, can forecast the success or failure of a new business. The researcher argued that excellence theory's domination over the mindshare of public relations professionals has overshadowed other theories (such as game theory) which can be of value during the time of market entry.In order to quantify any educated opinions held by the researcher, a content analysis was conducted. The researcher identified specific game and excellence theory keywords to be examined and coded. The keywords were derived from a random sample of 384 public relations-based articles from 1997 to 2007 in Entrepreneur's online magazine, the leading magazine for entrepreneurs for over thirty years. The years of 1997 through 2007 were chosen due to a growth in new business births that have occurred over this time frame.The results of the content analysis showed that there were significantly more game theory keywords than excellence theory keywords referenced in Entrepreneur's online magazine in the aforementioned articles and timeframe. From this evidence, the researcher deducted that while excellence theory is still the paradigm for public relations professionals, game theory is being fused within public relations in some areas of the industry, specifically within new market entry strategy. / Department of Journalism

Cloud computing, the long-held dream of computing as a utility, has the potential to transform a large part of the IT industry, making software even more attractive as a service and shaping the way in which hardware is designed and purchased. In this thesis, we reviewed the new cloud computing technologies, and indicated the main challenges for their development in future, among which resource management problem stands out and attracts our attention. Combining the current scheduling theories, we proposed cloud scheduling hierarchy to deal with different requirements of cloud services. From the theoretical aspects, we have accomplished three main research issues. Firstly, we solved the resource allocation problem in the user-level of cloud scheduling. We proposed game theoretical algorithms for user bidding and auctioneer pricing. With Bayesian learning prediction, resource allocation can reach Nash equilibrium among non-cooperative users even though common knowledge is insufficient. Secondly, we addressed the task scheduling problem in the system-level of cloud scheduling. We proved a new utilization bound for on-line schedulability test, considering the sequential feature of MapReduce. We deduced the relationship between cluster utilization bound and the ratio of Map to Reduce. This new schedulable bound with segmentation uplifts classic bound which is most used in industry. Thirdly, we settled the comparison problem among on-line schedulability tests in cloud computing. We proposed a concept of test reliability to evaluate the probability that a random task set could pass a given schedulability test. The larger the probability is, the more reliable the test is. From the aspect of system, a test with high reliability can guarantee high system utilization. From the practical aspects, we have developed a simulator to model MapReduce framework. This simulator offers a simulated environment directly used by MapReduce theoretical researchers. The users of SimMapReduce only concentrate on specific research issues without getting concerned about finer implementation details for diverse service models, so that they can accelerate study progress of new cloud technologies.