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This thesis seeks to understand the developments in Germany’s foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War. Primarily, this thesis will centre on the question of whether Germany can now, after being re-unified for more than 20 years, be considered a normal actor in international relations. Although this subject has been debated extensively, the effects a possible change in foreign policy behaviour has on related fields of policy, have largely been left aside. This thesis therefore sets out to understand if there has in fact been a change in Germany’s foreign and security policy and will then apply the findings on the institution most affected by this change, i.e. Germany’s armed forces the Bundeswehr. It will therefore firstly discuss the perceived changes in German foreign policy since 1990 by analysing the academic debate on the process of normalisation and continuation. It will be argued that Germany has in fact become more normal and abandoned the constrained foreign policy of the Cold-War-era. The Bundeswehr will therefore have to be reformed accordingly to accommodate the new tasks set out by the changed foreign policy – most importantly peacekeeping and peace-enforcing out-of-area missions. This thesis will therefore analyse the reform efforts made over the last 20 years and apply them to the Bundeswehr’s large deployments in Kosovo and Afghanistan to determine how effective the reforms have been. Finally, this thesis will be able to contribute to the discussion on Germany’s status of a normal player in international relations with the added perspective from the Bundeswehr’s point of view.

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When research was begun on this thesis, the object was to evaluate the British estimates of German military strength and intentions and then to determine the effect of these estimates on British policy. This has proved impossible largely because of the length of time that would be required to complete the study. As a result, the thesis has been strictly limited to an evaluation of British estimates of German military strength and intentions. Wherever possible, the estimates made by Government officials have been compared and contrasted with those made in Parliament and in the British press. [...]

This thesis examines the attempts made by Carl Goerdeler, Ludwig Beck, Ernst von Weizsacker and Adam von Trott zu Solz to obtain the support of the British government in their effort to overthrow the Nazi regime between 1937 and 1940. The circumstances surrounding each mission are detailed, including the degree of readiness on the part of the German opposition for a coup d'etat and the particular form of support sought from the British to increase the chance of success in each case. Consideration is given to the factors which conditioned the British reaction to the resistance emissaries, including the British foreign policy imperatives of the moment, important events in European relations and the attitude and degree of influence wielded by the statesmen to whom the German resistance emissaries addressed themselves.

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From 1938 to the outbreak of war in 1939, German opponents of Hitler made numerous contacts with the British government. While the information sent came from a variety of sources, most of the reports landed on the desk of Sir Robert Vansittart, the former Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office. His "internal-exile" to the position of Chief Diplomatic Advisor, as well as his personality conflicts with his successor, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Lord Halifax, led to inefficient use of the information received from Germany. German warnings of Hitler's plans and ambitions, when listened to at all, were awkwardly and ineffectively incorporated into British foreign policy.

My purpose is to sketch briefly the diplomatic background of the existing relations between France and Germany from 1871 to 1939. I have told the story chronologically, because I believe that we must follow events as they unfold themselves if we are to understand why statesmen made their decisions. I have attempted to mass all the important facts that I could find on Franco-German Diplomatic Relations from 1871 to 1939 without self-interests or prejudices to either of the two nations. My intentions were to seek a general knowledge of the drift of Franco-German Diplomatic affairs during this period of seventy years.