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This study examines German-Soviet military relations between 1917 and 1922 and demonstrates the involvement of the Reichswehr in the Treaty of Rapallo. Since early 1919, the Reichswehr cultivated entente with the Soviet Union in opposition to the German government and in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, both to regain its military preeminence and to recapture Germany's power-political position in Europe. The Reichswehr attempted to draw German industry into relations with the Soviet state in order to secure the manufacture of military machinery and support troop training. By 1922, the foundation for collaboration between German industry, the Reichswehr and the Soviet Union/Red Army had been laid. The Treaty of Rapallo, concluded by government officials that were privy to the activities of the Reichswehr, removed the threat of a western consortium against the Soviet Union, and ensured the growth of the Reichswehr's alliance with the Soviet state.

This thesis is concerned with the diplomatic reaction of the Axis Countries, Italy, Japan, Spain and Hungary, to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. The immediate origins of the Pact were studied in order to put into context the individual responses of the various countries, known as the Axis Powers. Each of these countries was confronted with a dramatic change in the European situation and each had to adjust its relations with Germany in accordance with its own interests and expectations for the question of war or peace in Europe. / With the exception of Hungary, all were opposed to the Pact because it seemed to run contrary to their national interests and promised to upset the Balance of Power on the European, and indeed, the Asian continent. The thesis thus illustrates the special character of Hitler's diplomacy, in the last year of peace before the Second World War, which did not consider the interests of his partners when concluding his arrangements with the Soviet Union.

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This thesis explores the political, economic and theoretical underpinnings of the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR’s) development policies towards the Third World between c.1960 and 1990. Particular attention is paid to Africa. Case studies of assistance to SWAPO and the ANC further focus the attention of the reader on southern Africa in particular. Aspects of both military and civilian aid are considered, including both development initiatives overseas in Africa, and development training for Africans within the GDR itself. Since German “reunification”, the GDR’s history has been explored largely from a West German perspective. The present work attempts to provide a more balanced view of successes and shortcomings of the GDR’s policies towards, and interaction with, African countries and liberation movements. It also aims to bring to the attention of English-speaking readers German archival sources, other primary sources and published works which they would otherwise have been unlikely to encounter. From its formation, the GDR made strenuous efforts to develop relations with countries which were either free from colonial dependency or were struggling for freedom. Over the course of thirty years, it followed a number of different approaches, and developed diverse objectives. These were shaped in the wider context of the cold war, the Hallstein doctrine (which established that the FRG – and, in effect, its allies - would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the GDR), the relationships between the GDR and partner socialist states, and the economic difficulties faced by the GDR. Arising from this complex situation, from time to time, both internally in the GDR and in terms of its foreign affairs, tensions and discrepancies arose between theoretical objectives and political and economic reality. Despite these severe constraints, during the period under review, the volume and range of the GDR’s relationships with developing countries increased dramatically. For example, between 1970 and 1987, the number of developing countries with which the GDR had foreign economic relations on the basis of international agreements grew from 23 to 64. Viewed within its economic context, the state was arguably far more committed to development aid than the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, there is a great deal of evidence that “solidarity” with developing nations and the oppressed enjoyed a considerable degree of popular support.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

From Preface: In this thesis I have aimed at covering a field in Economic History where not many suitable publications are available in English. During the interwar period, the maintenance of peace and harmonious international relations was directly dependent on a reconciliation of the conflicting interests between France and Germany. In studying the economic implications of the Franco-German antagonism, I have tried to throw light upon the crucial role which this relationship played. The Appendix offers a quantitative survey of economic conditions in the two countries and of the relevant production and exchange problems. To assist the reader who is not completely familiar with this period, a brief summary of the relevant conferences, agreements and treaties is also offered in the Appendix, as well as some short biographical notes. I would like to make it clear, however, that this thesis is neither supposed to be a paraphrase of the Appendix, nor a mere treatise on the commercial relations between the two countries concerned. I aimed rather at revealing the forces behind the events and at illustrating how economic problems became quite often subject to political and military considerations. When trying to attain some understanding of Franco-German relations, it seems advisable to look not only at the interbellum period, but in the first instance to become aware of the currents of history which finally led to the two disastrous World Wars.

Slated as an economic outlet for Germany, the Baghdad Railway was designed to funnel political influence into the strategically viable regions of the Near East. The Railway was also designed to enrich Germany's coffers with natural resources with natural resources and trade with the Ottomans, their subjects, and their port cities... Over time, the Railway became the only significant route for Germany to reach its "place in the sun," and what began as an international enterprise escalated into a bid for diplomatic influence in the waning Ottoman Empire.