This paper explores theoretical propositions derived from offensive realism, applied to the instance of military export and foreign policy strategies of Russia and the U.S in the field of Africa during the post- Cold War period. The sections of this paper have disserted paradigms of this phenomena by applying the congruence method under the overarching theoretical umbrella of foreign policy analysis, to answer the question regarding does offensive realism provide relevant explanatory insight on the foreign policy of Russia and the U.S in the realm of the African security nexus? The study concludes that the degree as to which offensive realism provides relevant explanatory insight on the foreign policy strategies of the actors is strongly competitive in contrast to other explanatory theories. The study further adds to the propositions of the theoretical framework by arguing that it is conceivable that the ambition to prevent the rise of another hegemon is likely to be prioritized within foreign policy strategy to a greater extent than has been previously asserted, and has in some cases been seen as more imperative than the aspect of maximizing the domestic security, and thus survival.