Um conjunto de reflexões teóricas sobre as incompatibilidades entre a Ordem Inter-nacional pós-Guerra Fria e as categorias estruturantes dos paradigmas analíticos dominantes, esta tese procura também apontar dados empíricos e listar questões a serem compreendidas por um novo modo de produção de conhecimentos em rela-ções internacionais. Ela critica tanto os paradigmas unidimensionais, principalmente os de corte liberal e leno-stalinistas, quanto os bidimensionais, de inspiração realista e racionalista, indicando que ambos formam redes conceituais baseadas numa dialé-tica dicotômica, que reduz a complexidade do internacional e do estrangeiro a um olhar e interesse nacionais. Sugere que o sistema internacional e os subsistemas regionais, como objetos de estudo, não se reduzem a suas unidades, constituindo uma terceira dimensão, ou zona cinzenta, cuja conformação, para ser compreendida depende da análise integrada dos fenômenos da guerra, das globalizações e do for-talecimento do Estado. Completando as sugestões para o debate e a formulação de conceitos interpretativos mais abrangentes, além de alguns neologismos, esta tese constrói algumas tipologias compreensivas. O autor adverte, contudo, que essas formulações têm o propósito de ilustrar a análise, não de fechar a discussão com um modelo acabado. / A set of theoretical reflections on the contradictions between the post-Cold War inter-national order and the structuring categories of the prevailing analytical paradigms, this thesis also tries to point to empirical data and list questions to be understood by a new way of producing knowledge in international relations. It criticizes both one-dimensional paradigms, mainly those in the liberal and Lenin-Stalinist model, and two-dimensional paradigms of realistic and rational inspiration, showing that both of them build conceptual networks based on the dialectics of dichotomy, which reduces the complexity of being international and foreign to a national vision and interest. The work also suggests that the international system and the regional subsystems, as objects of study, are not limited to their units, making up a third dimension, or grey zone, whose configuration can only be understood through an integrated analysis of the war phenomena, globalization and the strengthening of the State. By making suggestions for the debate and formulation of more comprehensive interpretation concepts, in addition to some neologisms, this thesis builds some broad typologies. However, the author warns that these formulations have the purpose of illustrating the analysis, not closing the debate on a finished model.

Um conjunto de reflexões teóricas sobre as incompatibilidades entre a Ordem Inter-nacional pós-Guerra Fria e as categorias estruturantes dos paradigmas analíticos dominantes, esta tese procura também apontar dados empíricos e listar questões a serem compreendidas por um novo modo de produção de conhecimentos em rela-ções internacionais. Ela critica tanto os paradigmas unidimensionais, principalmente os de corte liberal e leno-stalinistas, quanto os bidimensionais, de inspiração realista e racionalista, indicando que ambos formam redes conceituais baseadas numa dialé-tica dicotômica, que reduz a complexidade do internacional e do estrangeiro a um olhar e interesse nacionais. Sugere que o sistema internacional e os subsistemas regionais, como objetos de estudo, não se reduzem a suas unidades, constituindo uma terceira dimensão, ou zona cinzenta, cuja conformação, para ser compreendida depende da análise integrada dos fenômenos da guerra, das globalizações e do for-talecimento do Estado. Completando as sugestões para o debate e a formulação de conceitos interpretativos mais abrangentes, além de alguns neologismos, esta tese constrói algumas tipologias compreensivas. O autor adverte, contudo, que essas formulações têm o propósito de ilustrar a análise, não de fechar a discussão com um modelo acabado. / A set of theoretical reflections on the contradictions between the post-Cold War inter-national order and the structuring categories of the prevailing analytical paradigms, this thesis also tries to point to empirical data and list questions to be understood by a new way of producing knowledge in international relations. It criticizes both one-dimensional paradigms, mainly those in the liberal and Lenin-Stalinist model, and two-dimensional paradigms of realistic and rational inspiration, showing that both of them build conceptual networks based on the dialectics of dichotomy, which reduces the complexity of being international and foreign to a national vision and interest. The work also suggests that the international system and the regional subsystems, as objects of study, are not limited to their units, making up a third dimension, or grey zone, whose configuration can only be understood through an integrated analysis of the war phenomena, globalization and the strengthening of the State. By making suggestions for the debate and formulation of more comprehensive interpretation concepts, in addition to some neologisms, this thesis builds some broad typologies. However, the author warns that these formulations have the purpose of illustrating the analysis, not closing the debate on a finished model.

En prenant le MF20 comme principale étude de cas , je plaide contre les affirmations du caractère nouveau, unique, fructueux, manqué ou achevé de ces mouvements arabes. Je passe en revue la première décennie du 21ème siècle et la déclaration de la Guerre contre le terrorisme (2003) comme déclencheurs de conflits socio-politiques déjà installés dans la région MENA. La deuxième décennie de ce siècle, à travers les soulèvements arabes, a seulement rendu visibles aux yeux du monde les transgressions des droits de l'homme et les atrocités prenant place au Moyen-Orient.Ces soulèvements ont rapidement été réduits à des soulèvements épisodiques. La troisième décennie semble malheureusement entre les mains des idéologues de droite qui s’opposent au multiculturalisme et à l'extrémisme religieux, et qui, de fait, réorientent le débat loin des problèmes sociaux en mettant en avant le récit « nous contre eux ». Pour ces raisons, je prétends que les soulèvements arabes sont loin d’être achevés ; ils n’ont fait que débuter. Contrairement au dessin qu’en fait Davis (2013), ils ne s’estompent pas pour disparaître complètement mais seulement pour revenir en force.L'analyse approfondie dans le projet de la saga des luttes de ces mouvements arabes avec les régimes autocratiques arabes, qui n’ont fait rien d’autre que mettre en place des réformes préventives, nécessite de notre part une attention particulière pour les décennies à venir. Même les cas dits « fructueux », notamment la Tunisie et le Maroc, indiquent que ce qui est célébré est en fait un état de stabilité temporaire qui cache des faiblesses majeures et alarmantes dans le cadre du changement social et de la justice sociale ; deux des principaux déclencheurs du soi-disant printemps arabe.Thomas Friedman fait appel à des détails historiques, dans son excellent article pour le New York Times, demandant à ce que l'expression « Printemps arabe » soit retirée et remplacée par la « Décennie arabe » d'Anthony Cordesman ou le « Quart de siècle arabe ». Je propose que nous nous situons au-delà, et que nous assistons en fait à un Siècle arabe en mutation.Si l’on se fie aux changements politiques récents dans le monde, il apparaît que les changements sociaux dans le monde arabe seront négligés pendant au moins une autre décennie. La montée au pouvoir de l’extrême-droite aux États-Unis et en Europe a déjà retiré l’accent des injustices sociales dans le monde arabe au profit de la question éternelle de l'islam et de l'extrémisme en Occident. Cela s'avère offrir une pause aux régimes autocratiques arabes qui utilisent cette ascension de l'islamophobie en Occident comme un argument unificateur qui distrait des injustices sociales au sein de leurs républiques et leurs royaumes. Ainsi, la lutte des citoyens arabes dans les états arabes pour la dignité sociale sera négligée jusqu'à ce que le récit revivifié du choc de l'islam et de l'Occident disparaisse. / With the MF20 as the major Case Study , I argue against the claims of the newness, uniqueness, success and failure or finality of these Arab movements. I revisit the first decade of the 21st century and the declaration of War on Terrorism (2003) as one trigger of sociopolitical conflicts that were already entrenched in the MENA region. What we witnessed in the second decade of this century is that the Arab uprisings only exposed transgressions in human rights and atrocities in the Middle East to the world. These uprisings were hurriedly reduced to seasonal uprisings. The third decade unfortunately looks to be in the hands of right-wing ideologues standing against multiculturalism and stressing the fear of religious extremism to change the focus from social issues and force the narrative of us-against-them on the forefront. For these reasons, I claim, there is no finality to the Arab uprisings, they have just begun and they are not in a state of thaw as Davis (2013) depicts them, but they are in slumbering phase recouping for a stronger come back. The close analysis in the project of the saga of struggles of these Arab movements with the Arab autocratic regimes who engineered nothing but preemptive reforms, requires our close attention for the remaining decades in this 21st century. Even the so-called successful cases, Tunisia and Morocco, indicate that what is celebrated is a state of temporary stability with major and alarming short comings in social change and social justice; two of the main reasons of the so called Arab Spring. Thomas Friedman suggests great historical details, in his great piece for the New York Times, calling for the expression “Arab Spring” be retired and be replaced by Anthony Cordesman’s the “Arab Decade” or “Arab Quarter Century” . I claim we are beyond that, and that we are witnessing an Arab Century in movement.If the recent political changes around the world are any indication, social change in the Arab world will be overlooked for at least another decade. The rise of the extreme right to power in the US and in Europe has already shifted the focus from the social injustices in the Arab world to the everlasting issue of Islam and extremism in the West. This is proving to be a big break for Arab autocratic regimes, who are using this rise of Islamophobia in the West as a unifying argument that distracts from the social injustices within their republics and kingdoms. Thus, the struggle of Arab citizens within the Arab states for social dignity will be overlooked until the revived narrative of the clash of Islam and the West dies down.