by Ching Chi Keung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-91). / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.3 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.9 / Chapter 3. --- Data --- p.17 / Chapter 4. --- Profile of IPOs in Hong Kong --- p.24 / Chapter 5. --- Methodology --- p.27 / Chapter 6. --- Results --- p.43 / Chapter 7. --- Comparison with the study in U. S --- p.57 / Chapter 8. --- Summary --- p.61 / Chapter 9. --- Tables --- p.64 / Chapter 10. --- Results of statistical test --- p.70 / Chapter 11. --- Charts --- p.72 / Chapter 12. --- Appendixes --- p.79 / Chapter 13. --- Reference --- p.89

by Cheong Mei Kin, Sung Shuk Ka. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-99). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.iv / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.v / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vii / LIST OF GRAPHS --- p.viii / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- REVIEW OF THEORY AND LITERATURE --- p.4 / Rock's Model (Adverse Selection) --- p.5 / Principal - Agent Model --- p.6 / Signalling Model --- p.8 / Heterodox Explanations --- p.11 / Ownership Structure --- p.16 / Chapter III. --- REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK IN HONG KONG --- p.18 / Initial Public Offering in Hong Kong: Procedures and Regulations --- p.18 / Underpricing of IPOs before the Merger of Hong Kong Stock Exchanges --- p.20 / P.McGuiness's Work --- p.21 / Chapter IV. --- DATA AND METHODOLOGY --- p.22 / Research Period and Data Description --- p.22 / Measures of Underpricing --- p.23 / Grouping of Data --- p.25 / Test for Rock's Model --- p.29 / Chapter V. --- RESULT AND DISCUSSION --- p.32 / Underpricing of IPOs in Hong Kong --- p.32 / Listing Methods and Underpricing of IPOs --- p.34 / Stock Groups and Underpricing of IPOs --- p.36 / Different Years of Underpricing Levels --- p.40 / Subscription Ratios and Underpricing --- p.44 / Capital Raising and Underpricing --- p.48 / Test of Rock's Model --- p.51 / Chapter VI. --- CONCLUSION --- p.56 / APPENDIX --- p.59 / Chapter 1. --- Warrant Effect On Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990- 1996) --- p.59 / Chapter 2. --- Listing Method Effect On Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990 -1996) --- p.60 / Chapter 3. --- Stock Group Effect On Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990-1996) --- p.63 / Chapter 4. --- Different Years of Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990- 1996) --- p.72 / Chapter 5. --- Subscription Ratio Effect On Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990- 1996) --- p.77 / Chapter 6. --- Amount of Capital Raised Effect On Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990- 1996) --- p.81 / Chapter 7. --- Initial Public Offerings in Hong Kong (Jan. 1990 - Nov. 1996) --- p.84 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.94

Zugl.: Hohenheim, Univ., Diss., 2008

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references.

Diss. rer. pol. Bern, 1988. / Im Buchh.: Köln : Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität zu Köln. Bibliogr.: p. 287- 293.

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

In this dissertation, I develop and empirically test a comparison of the private versus public strategies presidents use to gain support and passage of their policy agendas. By focusing on presidential influence on policy outcomes in Congress, I can determine which form of presidential leadership - going public or using private bargaining or both - may prove most effective in shaping policies to suit the administration's political interests, given the context in Congress. This allows for an assessment of Neustadt's (1990) classic private bargaining presidency and Kernell's (1997) public presidency to show that both may be compatible and may even work in combination in order for presidents to pass their policy agendas under varying political circumstances in Congress.Original data is collected from Statements of Administration Policy to examine private presidential rhetoric, and additional data is collected from the yearly editions of Congressional Quarterly Almanac to assess the effects of public presidential rhetoric. I test my hypotheses with this new collection of data using logistic regressions, as well as complimentary case studies of No Child Left Behind, immigration reform, and the Andean Trade Preference Act. The broader implications of this study include: systematic assessments of presidential influence on Congress; indentifying a broader view of presidential leadership to better fit empirical observations; and incorporating inter-branch influences in Congressional behavior.

The research questions investigated are: 1. Are the expected post-issue fractional holdings of the directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions signals of firm value? 2. Are the expected post-issue fractional holdings of the directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions signals of underpricing? and 3. Are the directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions monitors of IPO investments? The signaling theory developed by Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) (GH) and the monitoring theory for IPO investments have been used to develop the hypotheses for this dissertation. Four factors make my methodology unique. These factors are: 1. I apply and test the GH IPO signaling model over a unique data set collected from the IPO prospectuses, proxy statements and annual reports; 2. I disaggregate the expected post-issue holdings of the different groups of pre-issue blockholders and insiders and hypothesizes that these individual groups represents signals of firm value and underpricing; 3. I hypothesize that these groups, in aggregate and separately, monitor IPO investments over the long term; And 4. I develop signaling and monitoring hypotheses to make predictions at the two stages of the IPO. The results show that firm value is positively related to the level of underpricing, at a given variance of the firms cash flows; the level of underpricing is positively related to the holdings of the directors and officers as a group and the aggregate of the directors and officers, VCs and institutions, at given variances of the firm's cash flows; the firm value is not related to the level of underpricing, at a given level of capital outlay and holdings of either the aggregate blockholders, directors and officers, VCs or institutions. For the monitoring hypotheses, the results show that the long-run buy-and-hold-returns are positively related to the investment bank reputation and the gross spread. Also, the results do not support the theories that the holdings of the VCs, institutions and the aggregate holdings of the different groups, represent the level of monitoring. Therefore, these groups do not increase the value of IPO investments over the long-run.

Abstract not available