Thesis (M.A.)--Abilene Christian University, 2002. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 95-102).

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Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study comprises a survey of the atheist solution to the problem of evil that has occasionally in the past been suggested by philosophers, but has largely been neglected in the philosophy of religion. Against this background, the study has two main objectives. It focusses in the first place on the reasons upon which philosophers like Mackie and McCloskey regard the giving up of one or more of the attributes of God in theism as an adequate solution to the problem of evil, considered to be the strongest argument against the rationality of theistic belief. What the study however would like to add to this objective, is to point to the existence of an even more fundamental reason upon which it can be claimed that the problem of evil can be solved along this way and that the emotional pressure so typical of this problem can be relieved without any serious implications for the belief in God. Concerning the more negative orientated of these reasons, it is shown that the latter revolves around the concept of the logical inconsistency of the theistic theory that can truly be regarded as the rationale of the atheistic argument known as the problem of evil. Furthermore, this concept also represents the cornerstone of the rejection of theistic solutions to this problem by Mackie and others as inadequate. In focussing on the origins of these reasons, it is shown that although the roots of the problem of evil is to be found in pre-Christian times and it continued to be a point of discussion throughout the whole of the Apostolic Age and the Middle Ages, it was the period of the Enlightenment and in particular the legacy of David Hume that became the strongest inspiration of the atheist rejection of theism in modern times. Concerning the more positive orientated of these reasons, the focus is on the efforts of philosophers that have been following the suggestions of Hume and that have against the background of the deficiencies of the theistic solutions to the problem of evil, started to experiment with solutions wherein at least one of the constituting propositions of the problem of evil is rejected. It is also argued that the way to these experiments has been paved by the contributions of Mill and Geach and that the latter encouraged philosophers to also belabour the problem of evil from an atheistic point of view. Against this background, the final focus is on the second objective of the study, namely to show that there exists an even more fundamental reason upon which it can be claimed that the problem of evil can be solved along this way and that the emotional pressure so typical of this problem can be relieved without any serious implications for the belief in God. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie behels 'n ondersoek na die ateïstiese oplossing vir die probleem van die kwaad wat weliswaar in die verlede al by geleentheid deur filosowe gesuggereer is, maar wat nietemin nog nie veel aandag in die godsdiensfilosofiese debat oor hierdie problematiek geniet het nie. Binne hierdie raamwerk het die studie twee oogmerke. Dit wil in die eerste plek fokus op al daardie redes op grond waarvan filosowe soos Mackie en McCloskey meen dat die skrapping van een of meer van die Goddelike attribute in die teïsme tot 'n toereikende oplossing van die probleem van die kwaad as sterkste argument teen die rasionele houdbaarheid van hierdie teorie kan lei. Wat die studie in die tweede plek egter hieraan wil toevoeg, is om aan te toon dat daar 'n nog meer fundamentele rede bestaan op grond waarvan daar aangevoer kan word dat die probleem van die kwaad inderdaad langs hierdie weg en ook sonder ernstige implikasies vir die geloof in God opgelos en die emosionele druk so eie aan hierdie problematiek verlig kan word. Wat die meer negatief gerigte van hierdie redes aan betref, word daar verduidelik dat laasgenoemde rondom die konsep van die logiese inkonsistensie van die teïstiese teorie sentreer. Laasgenoemde kan met reg as die spil van die ateïstiese argument bekend as die probleem van die kwaad beskryf kan word en verteenwoordig die rasionaal van die argumente op grond waarvan Mackie en andere die teïstiese oplossings vir die probleem van die kwaad as ontoereikend afwys. In 'n nadere omskrywing van die oorspronge van hierdie redes, word daarop gewys dat alhoewel die probleem van die kwaad sy wortels in die voor-Christelike tyd het en dit ook dwarsdeur die Patristiek en die Middeleeue In onderwerp van drukke bespreking gebly het, dit egter die denkklimaat van die Verligting en in die besonder die nalatenskap van David Hume was wat sedertdien die belangrikste inspirasie van ateïstiese afwysings van die teïsme geword het. Wat die meer positief gerigte redes betref, word daar gefokus op ateïsties georiënteerde filosowe se pogings om op voetspoor van die onderskeidings van Hume en teen die agtergrond van die leemtes van teïsties georiënteerde oplossings vir die probleem, met daardie oplossings te eksperimenteer waarin daar van ten minste van een van die proposisies wat die probleem van die kwaad konstitueer, afstand gedoen word. Daar word aangevoer dat die weg tot eksperimentering met hierdie oplossings reeds deur onder meer die opvattings van Mill en Geach gebaan is en dat dit aan filosowe oënskynlik genoegsame rede gebied het om die probleem van die kwaad ook vanuit 'n ateïstiese gesigspunt te bearbei. Teen hierdie agtergrond word daar ten slotte op die tweede oogmerk van die studie gefokus, naamlik om aan te toon dat daar 'n nog meer fundamentele rede bestaan op grond waarvan daar aangevoer kan word dat die probleem van die kwaad inderdaad langs hierdie weg en ook sonder ernstige implikasies vir die geloof in God opgelos en die emosionele druk so eie aan hierdie problematiek verlig kan word. / wa201509

Thesis (M.A.)--Lancaster Bible College, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 57-59).

Revised thesis (doctoral)--Monash University, Australia, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 347-367) and index.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008. / Title from file title page. Mary E. Stuckey, committee chair; Greg Smith, Ted Friedman, committee members. Electronic text (220 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Sept. 19, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 213-220).

Revised Thesis (doctoral)--Monash University, Australia, 2005. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 347-367) and index.

Thesis (M. A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1996. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 109-118).

Thesis (M.A.)--Rutgers University, 2008. / "Graduate Program in Liberal Studies." Includes bibliographical references (p. 42-44).

Inaug.-Diss.--Erlangen. / Lebenslauf. "Benutzte Literatur": p. [79]