D.Comm. / In commercial corporations shareholders, at least in theory, evaluate the performance of the boards they have appointed. Such evaluation is mainly based on the financial performance of the entity. Public (state funded) entities have only the state as shareholder and the performance of their boards is not evaluated by the taxpayers who ultimately pay the directors' fees. The term "public entity" refers to 20 corporations with an annual turnover in excess of R 55 billion which are substantially tax-funded or are awarded a market monopoly in terms of legislation by parliament. Although these public entities are regularly criticised by the press, the academic literature reports neither an assessment of the quality of governance by their non-executive directors' nor any instrument to use in such an assessment. The aim of this study was to measure the expectations and perceptions of executives in public entities about their non-executive boards' corporate governance service. This began with a literature was analysis, firstly to define what "proper" corporate governance and secondly to find a recognised methodology to use in the development of an assessment instrument. It was found that two main corporate governance models were generally recognised, namely the United Kingdom model and the German model. The United Kingdom model advocates a single board comprising both executive and non-executive directors while the German model has a supervisory board of non-executive directors overseeing the activities of an executive management board. It was further found that, contrary to King's (1994) recommendation to use unitary boards, the 20 listed public entities all had supervisory boards as advocated in the German model. A procedure advocated by Churchill (1979:65-72), in his paradigm for developing measures of marketing constructs, proved to be very successful in the development in the United States of America of an instrument named SERVQUAL which was applied in the general service arena where a paying client evaluated a service. Churchill's method was therefore used in this study to develop an instrument called ECGSI to measure the quality of governance of listed public entities' non-executive boards. The opinions of executives attending board meetings, e.g. to make presentations, were used both to develop ECGSI and to measure the quality of the non-executive directors' service.

Um dos principais focos da pesquisa sobre governança corporativa é investigar se boas práticas refletem no desempenho da companhia. Entretanto, as pesquisas neste tema têm apresentado resultados divergentes, possivelmente em função da dificuldade de definir e mensurar a qualidade da governança corporativa. Muitos dos estudos que investigam a qualidade da governança corporativa baseiam-se na criação de índices para refletir tal construto, enquanto outros utilizam-se da classificação feita pela BM&FBovespa em Níveis Diferenciados de Governança Corporativa. Porém, há uma lacuna em estudos brasileiros que comparem a eficácia destas diferentes medidas que visam captar a qualidade da Governança Corporativa. Desta maneira, o objetivo deste estudo foi verificar se uma medida complexa de governança, desenvolvida pela literatura é mais eficaz que a medida construída pelo mercado, e assim, comparou o Índice de Qualidade de Governança de Correia, Amaral e Louvet (2011), com os Níveis Diferenciados de Governança Corporativa. Para cumprir esse objetivo, o presente estudo verificou a eficiência destas duas medidas em explicar os retornas das ações e para as análises foram utilizadas regressões em painel, para uma amostra com dados de seis anos (2010-2015), para 124 empresas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA. Os resultados encontrados mostraram que a listagem nos Níveis Diferenciados de Governança Corporativa 1 e 2 possuem impacto estatisticamente significativo sobre os retornos das ações, enquanto que o Índice de Governança Corporativa de Correia, Amaral e Louvet (2011) não apresentou influência significativa nos retornos das ações, demonstrando que a classificação em Níveis Diferenciados de Governança Corporativa seria uma melhor medida de qualidade de governança; Entretanto, uma análise comparativa com modelos sem utilizar quaisquer umas das variáveis de governança corporativa citadas, mostrou que estas variáveis refletoras de governança corporativa pouco agregam à explicação dos retornos, concluindo assim, que a adição de variáveis proxies relacionadas à qualidade da governança não aumenta a capacidade em explicar os retornos das empresas listadas. / One of the main focuses of corporate governance research is to investigate whether good practices reflect the company\'s performance. However, research on this topic has presented divergent results, possibly due to the difficulty of defining and measuring the quality of corporate governance. Many of the studies that investigate the quality of corporate governance are based on the creation of indices to reflect this construct, while others use the classification in Listing Segments made by BM&FBovespa. Thus, there is a gap in Brazilian studies comparing the effectiveness of these different measures aiming to capture the quality of Corporate Governance. In this way, the objective of this study was to verify if a complex measure of governance, developed in the literature is more effective than the measure constructed by the market, and for this pourpose, it compares the Governance Quality Index, developed by Correia Amaral and Louvet (2011), with the Listing Segments by BM&FBovespa. In order to fulfill this objective, the present study verified the efficiency of these two measures in explaining the stock returns, and, for the analyzes, panel regressions were used for a sample with data of six years (2010-2015) for 124 companies listed on the BM & FBovespa. The results found that the listing in the segments Levels 1 and 2 have a statistically significant impact on stock returns, while the Corporate Governance Index by Correia, Amaral and Louvet (2011) did not present significant influence on stock returns. This results demonstrated that the classification in Listing Segments would be a better measure of governance quality. However, a comparative analysis with models without using any of the mentioned corporate governance variables, showed that these variables do not add much to the explanation of returns, concluding that the addition of proxy variables related to governance quality does not increase the ability to explain the returns of listed companies.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / Este trabalho investigou a relaÃÃo entre estrutura de propriedade e qualidade da governanÃa corporativa nas maiores companhias de capital aberto do Brasil. A literatura indica que os acionistas buscam maiores participaÃÃes societÃrias para aumentar o monitoramento sobre a gestÃo e/ou para auferir benefÃcios privados do controle. Os diferentes interesses dos acionistas, dependendo de suas participaÃÃes acionÃrias e de sua natureza, podem afetar a qualidade da governanÃa das companhias, sugerindo-se a hipÃtese de que a estrutura de propriedade esteja afetando o nÃvel de adoÃÃo das companhias de capital aberto do Brasil Ãs prÃticas voluntÃrias de governanÃa corporativa, segundo o efeito expropriaÃÃo e o efeito substituiÃÃo. A amostra compreendeu 85 das 100 maiores companhias listadas na BM&FBovespa no perÃodo entre 2010 e 2013. A qualidade da governanÃa foi mensurada por meio de um Ãndice composto por 28 prÃticas recomendadas nos principais cÃdigos de boas prÃticas de governanÃa corporativa do Brasil â Ãndice de Qualidade da GovernanÃa Corporativa (IQGC). A estrutura de propriedade foi analisada a partir da concentraÃÃo acionÃria, da natureza dos principais acionistas e de caracterÃsticas do controle societÃrio. A relaÃÃo entre as variÃveis de estrutura de propriedade e o IQGC foi testada por meio de anÃlises de regressÃo, utilizando-se trÃs modelagens: mÃnimos quadrados ordinÃrios, mÃnimos quadrados generalizados e mÃtodo generalizado de momentos sistÃmico. As estimaÃÃes revelaram que a concentraÃÃo de propriedade e de controle afeta negativamente o IQGC, sobretudo em elevados Ãndices de concentraÃÃo. Quanto à natureza dos principais acionistas, o IQGC à menor quando hà uma maior participaÃÃo de outra empresa ou de pessoas fÃsicas no controle das companhias, em comparaÃÃo com os demais tipos de acionistas. A anÃlise do controle societÃrio corrobora com as anÃlises anteriores, indicando que direitos de voto e de fluxo de caixa dos controladores e o controle exercido por outra empresa e por famÃlias estÃo relacionados ao menor IQGC. Ademais, o controle disperso e a ausÃncia de um acionista majoritÃrio estÃo associados à melhora da qualidade da governanÃa corporativa, enquanto a separaÃÃo entre direitos de voto e de fluxo de caixa dos principais acionistas e do acionista controlador nÃo afetam o IQGC. Estes resultados sugerem que a qualidade da governanÃa corporativa das maiores empresas de capital aberto no Brasil depende de sua estrutura de propriedade. A relaÃÃo negativa da concentraÃÃo acionÃria e da presenÃa de um acionista controlador com IQGC à mais compatÃvel com o efeito substituiÃÃo, indicando que os acionistas controladores podem estar usando a seu poder sobre a gestÃo como um substituto para outras prÃticas voluntÃrias de governanÃa corporativa, embora nÃo se possa excluir uma possÃvel expropriaÃÃo. A relaÃÃo negativa entre o IQGC e o controle exercido por grupos empresariais e famÃlias pode ser reflexo dos interesses estratÃgicos desses acionistas, sugerindo o efeito expropriaÃÃo, ou apenas uma consequÃncia do efeito substituiÃÃo, por causa de seu maior poder de controle. / This study investigated the relationship between ownership structure and corporate governance quality in the largest public companies in Brazil. The literature indicates that shareholders pursue higher stakes to increase monitoring on the management and/or obtaining private benefits of control. The different interests of shareholders, depending on their shareholdingsâ position and their nature can affect the governance quality of companies, suggesting the hypothesis that the ownership structure is affecting the level of adoption of voluntary corporate governance practices by public companies from Brazil, according to the purpose of the expropriation effect and the substitution effect. The sample included 85 of the 100 largest companies listed on the BM&FBovespa in the period between 2010 and 2013. We measured he corporate governance quality by an index composed of 28 recommended practices on the main codes of good corporate governance practices in Brazil â Ãndice de Qualidade da GovernanÃa Corporativa (IQGC). We analyzed the ownership structure from ownership concentration, nature of the principal shareholders and corporate control characteristics. The relationship between the variables of ownership structure and the IQGC was tested via regression analyzes, using three econometric modeling: ordinary least squares, generalized least squares and generalized method of moments systemic. The estimates revealed that the concentration of ownership and control affect negatively the IQGC, especially in high levels of concentration. About the nature of principal shareholders, the IQGC is lower when there is a higher share of another company or persons in control of the companies, compared with other types of shareholders. The analysis of the shareholding control corroborates with previous analyzes, indicating that the voting and cash flow rights of controller shareholders and the control exercised by another company or a family are related with less IQGC. Moreover, the dispersed ownership and the absence of a majority shareholder are associated with increasing the corporate governance quality, while the separation between voting rights and cash flow rights of both main and controller shareholders do not affects the IQGC. These results suggest that corporate governance quality of the largest public companies in Brazil depends of their ownership structure. The negative relationship between ownership concentration and the presence of a controlling shareholder with IQGC is more compatible with the substitution effect, indicating that controlling shareholders may be using his power over the management as a substitute for other voluntary practices of corporate governance, although one cannot exclude a possible expropriation. The negative relationship between the IQGC and the control exerted by corporate groups and families may be reflective of the strategic interests of these shareholders, suggesting the effect of expropriation, or just a consequence of the effect substitution because their most control power.

<p>A major challenge facing the South African wine industry has been the economic repositioning of the sector, which since 1994 has moved away from a highly regulated domestic environment. The increasing integration of the local industry into international markets and global value chains has been accompanied by the industry&rsquo / s deregulation and restructuring. From the production focus&nbsp / on a limited range of low value-added varieties produced for domestic tastes and to meet monopoly quotas, producers have shifted to planting noble cultivars suited to various international&nbsp / tastes. Despite the lack of growth in traditional Western European markets, new world producers like South Africa have successfully competed and secured new market share. The Western Cape&nbsp / ine industry is ranked as the second-largest contributor to the Western Cape economy. The thesis explores the effect of cluster governance and the coordination of strategic collective&nbsp / actions on the Western Cape wine cluster&rsquo / s competitiveness. The data has been gathered through a combination of documentary analysis and interviews conducted with the leadership and/or&nbsp / management of various industry organisations. A qualitative approach has been adopted in the data analysis and interpretation of the findings, with information gathered via a combination of&nbsp / documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with key representatives of established industry bodies and key role-players in the Western Cape wine cluster. </p>

<p>A major challenge facing the South African wine industry has been the economic repositioning of the sector, which since 1994 has moved away from a highly regulated domestic environment. The increasing integration of the local industry into international markets and global value chains has been accompanied by the industry&rsquo / s deregulation and restructuring. From the production focus&nbsp / on a limited range of low value-added varieties produced for domestic tastes and to meet monopoly quotas, producers have shifted to planting noble cultivars suited to various international&nbsp / tastes. Despite the lack of growth in traditional Western European markets, new world producers like South Africa have successfully competed and secured new market share. The Western Cape&nbsp / ine industry is ranked as the second-largest contributor to the Western Cape economy. The thesis explores the effect of cluster governance and the coordination of strategic collective&nbsp / actions on the Western Cape wine cluster&rsquo / s competitiveness. The data has been gathered through a combination of documentary analysis and interviews conducted with the leadership and/or&nbsp / management of various industry organisations. A qualitative approach has been adopted in the data analysis and interpretation of the findings, with information gathered via a combination of&nbsp / documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with key representatives of established industry bodies and key role-players in the Western Cape wine cluster. </p>

Um dos principais focos da pesquisa sobre governança corporativa é investigar se boas práticas refletem no desempenho da companhia. Entretanto, as pesquisas neste tema têm apresentado resultados divergentes, possivelmente em função da dificuldade de definir e mensurar a qualidade da governança corporativa. Muitos dos estudos que investigam a qualidade da governança corporativa baseiam-se na criação de índices para refletir tal construto, enquanto outros utilizam-se da classificação feita pela BM&FBovespa em Níveis Diferenciados de Governança Corporativa. Porém, há uma lacuna em estudos brasileiros que comparem a eficácia destas diferentes medidas que visam captar a qualidade da Governança Corporativa. Desta maneira, o objetivo deste estudo foi verificar se uma medida complexa de governança, desenvolvida pela literatura é mais eficaz que a medida construída pelo mercado, e assim, comparou o Índice de Qualidade de Governança de Correia, Amaral e Louvet (2011), com os Níveis Diferenciados de Governança Corporativa. Para cumprir esse objetivo, o presente estudo verificou a eficiência destas duas medidas em explicar os retornas das ações e para as análises foram utilizadas regressões em painel, para uma amostra com dados de seis anos (2010-2015), para 124 empresas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA. Os resultados encontrados mostraram que a listagem nos Níveis Diferenciados de Governança Corporativa 1 e 2 possuem impacto estatisticamente significativo sobre os retornos das ações, enquanto que o Índice de Governança Corporativa de Correia, Amaral e Louvet (2011) não apresentou influência significativa nos retornos das ações, demonstrando que a classificação em Níveis Diferenciados de Governança Corporativa seria uma melhor medida de qualidade de governança; Entretanto, uma análise comparativa com modelos sem utilizar quaisquer umas das variáveis de governança corporativa citadas, mostrou que estas variáveis refletoras de governança corporativa pouco agregam à explicação dos retornos, concluindo assim, que a adição de variáveis proxies relacionadas à qualidade da governança não aumenta a capacidade em explicar os retornos das empresas listadas. / One of the main focuses of corporate governance research is to investigate whether good practices reflect the company\'s performance. However, research on this topic has presented divergent results, possibly due to the difficulty of defining and measuring the quality of corporate governance. Many of the studies that investigate the quality of corporate governance are based on the creation of indices to reflect this construct, while others use the classification in Listing Segments made by BM&FBovespa. Thus, there is a gap in Brazilian studies comparing the effectiveness of these different measures aiming to capture the quality of Corporate Governance. In this way, the objective of this study was to verify if a complex measure of governance, developed in the literature is more effective than the measure constructed by the market, and for this pourpose, it compares the Governance Quality Index, developed by Correia Amaral and Louvet (2011), with the Listing Segments by BM&FBovespa. In order to fulfill this objective, the present study verified the efficiency of these two measures in explaining the stock returns, and, for the analyzes, panel regressions were used for a sample with data of six years (2010-2015) for 124 companies listed on the BM & FBovespa. The results found that the listing in the segments Levels 1 and 2 have a statistically significant impact on stock returns, while the Corporate Governance Index by Correia, Amaral and Louvet (2011) did not present significant influence on stock returns. This results demonstrated that the classification in Listing Segments would be a better measure of governance quality. However, a comparative analysis with models without using any of the mentioned corporate governance variables, showed that these variables do not add much to the explanation of returns, concluding that the addition of proxy variables related to governance quality does not increase the ability to explain the returns of listed companies.

Magister Commercii - MCom / A major challenge facing the South African wine industry has been the economic repositioning of the sector, which since 1994 has moved away from a highly regulated domestic environment. The increasing integration of the local industry into international markets and global value chains has been accompanied by the industry’s deregulation and restructuring. From the production focus on a limited range of low value-added varieties produced for domestic tastes and to meet monopoly quotas, producers have shifted to planting noble cultivars suited to various international tastes. Despite the lack of growth in traditional Western European markets, new world producers like South Africa have successfully competed and secured new market share. The Western Cape ine industry is ranked as the second-largest contributor to the Western Cape economy. The thesis explores the effect of cluster governance and the coordination of strategic collective actions on the Western Cape wine cluster’s competitiveness. The data has been gathered through a combination of documentary analysis and interviews conducted with the leadership and/or management of various industry organisations. A qualitative approach has been adopted in the data analysis and interpretation of the findings, with information gathered via a combination of documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with key representatives of established industry bodies and key role-players in the Western Cape wine cluster. / South Africa

This thesis examines the influence of governance quality on emigration in Latin America during the period of 2005-2010. It goes beyond the traditional focus on corruption and explores the impact of other dimensions of governance represented by the six World Governance Indicators. The research aims to expand the understanding of governance quality's role in emigration and its relationship with socioeconomic factors. The study utilizes quantitative analysis based on secondary data sources to investigate the research questions. The findings highlight the significance of considering multiple dimensions of governance quality beyond corruption in explaining emigration patterns. The theories of Push-Pull, Systems, Institutional, and State Capacity provide a conceptual framework for understanding the relationships between governance quality and Latin-American migration patterns. The analysis demonstrates that a comprehensive understanding of governance quality, along with socioeconomic variables, improves the explanatory power of the model. The research contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex factors driving emigration in Latin America.

The thesis focuses on the concept of information management, its history and definition by various authors and also according to Cobit 5 methodology particularly its part Cobit 5: Enabling Information. The aim of the thesis is the application of Cobit 5 information model on a specific problem with information in the selected company and assessing the suitability of this application.