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The implementation of total quality management in ChinaShi, Ji 24 January 2009 (has links)
As global competition intensifies, more companies have found that it is imperative to develop quality management systems that will continuously improve the quality of their products, simply in order to survive. Total quality management (TQM), a term widely accepted as a new management philosophy which was developed based on the management practices in Japan, may hold the key to unlock American industries’ competitive power. It is understandable that many American managers have embraced TQM with great enthusiasm since the early 1980s. China, on the other hand, adopted a policy of economic “reform and openness” in 1978; the goal of this more “open and reformed” policy was to create a better economic, social, and political environment for its state-run enterprises in order to improve their efficiency. Since then, however, western management systems ---- including total quality management ---- have been introduced to Chinese managers. Realizing the potential of TQM in helping those state-run enterprises, the Chinese government has taken a leading role in promoting the implementation of TQM. Rules and regulations have been instigated to enforce the government’s determination to pursue TQM. Moreover, the news media in China has taken an active role in the process of promoting TQM. Special programs have been produced to raise people’s attention to those quality related issues.
Despite the early start and wide support received from the government, media, and industry, the effectiveness of TQM implementation in China’s state-run enterprises has been far from satisfactory. Quantity, not quality, is still a main concern of many managers in China. “Shady” products (products of suspect quality) are still sold in the markets. The overall quality level achieved by the Chinese products is clearly below the quality standard set by developed countries. Why have China’s state-run enterprises failed to reap the benefits of implementing total quality management?
The main objective of this thesis is to report research that examines the recent history of quality management in China, the national movement toward TQM, the benefits some enterprises have gained since implementing TQM, and the reasons of China’s failure to reap TQM’s full benefits. It is hoped that the experience of China’s TQM implementation can assist other countries in developing a better strategy and to avoid making similar costly mistakes. / Master of Science
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Perceived environment, strategic orientation, ownership effect and performance implications in a transition economy: an empirical study in the People's Republic of ChinaTan, J. Justin 26 October 2005 (has links)
A key element that enables a firm to achieve better performance is a fit between environment and firm strategy. A review of the literature on strategic management reveals that this relationship is moderated by other contextual variables, and that these contextual variables have not been systematically studied. The major focus of this study was to examine the impact of an important contextual variable, property ownership type, on the environment-strategy relationship and its performance implications.
To guide this study theoretically, the literature on organizational environment, strategy, the environment-strategy relationship, and property ownership was reviewed, and theoretical implications discussed. It was hypothesized that (1) firms exhibiting same ownership type were likely to respond to perceived environment with similar strategy, and such responses varied across ownership types, (2) such strategic decisions would lead to better firm performance, and (3) in addition to the indirect impact of ownership on performance through the environment-strategy relationship, ownership type also had direct impact on performance.
In order to test these hypotheses, constructs were operationalized in multidimensional manner. Perceived environment was operationalized in terms of three dimensions (resource scarcity, dynamism, and complexity), and strategy was operationalized in terms of five dimensions (futurity, proactiveness, analysis, defensiveness, and riskiness). Each of these dimensions were found to be theoretically significant in previous research.
The research was set in the People’s Republic of China. Two hundred and two firms were surveyed, and these firms represented four ownership types (state enterprises, collective enterprises, joint venture enterprises, and private enterprises).
Analysis of results suggest that ownership type is a theoretically important variable that has significant impact on variables that subject to managerial control. Firm ownership type moderated the magnitude (in two ownership types) and configuration (in another two ownership types) of environment-strategy relationship. This moderating effect of ownership led to significant performance implications. Moreover, firm ownership also had significant direct impact on firm performance. Findings from this study contribute insight into the environment-strategy relationship and hold promise for studying strategic management issues in former centrally planned economies undergoing transition toward market economies. / Ph. D.
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The reforms of China's state owned enterprises: a comparative study of Guangdong and Liaoning provinces,1997-2002Ming, Yu., 明玉. January 2003 (has links)
published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / China Area Studies / Master / Master of Arts
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A case study of IT outsourcing in Hong Kong governmentLam, Cheuk-yung., 林卓蓉. January 1995 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration
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Enterprise reform and productivity changes: a case study of Wuhan.January 1994 (has links)
Ngai, Fai Shuet. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-72). / ABSTRACT / ACKNOWLEDGMENT / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- The Management Structure Before1978 --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2 --- The Post-1978 Enterprise Reform --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- An Introduction to Wuhan --- p.8 / Chapter 1.4 --- A Review of Recent Empirical Studies on the Productivity of Chinese Industry --- p.13 / Chapter 1.5 --- Aims of the Study --- p.18 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- "Wuhan's Industrial Productivity Changes, 1962-1992" --- p.24 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Theoretical Framework --- p.24 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Production Function Estimates --- p.26 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Productivity Changes --- p.27 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- The Sources of Productivity Differences - Theoretical Foundation --- p.32 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Technological Progress --- p.32 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Incentive to Work --- p.3 6 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- The Bonus Payment --- p.37 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- The Retained Profit --- p.39 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Vintage Adjustment on Capital --- p.41 / Chapter 3.4 --- The Refined Production Function --- p.42 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- The Sources of Productivity Differences - Empirical Analysis --- p.46 / Chapter 4.1 --- The Estimation Procedure --- p.46 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Empirical Results --- p.49 / Chapter 4.3 --- Discussions on Sources of Productivity Differences --- p.54 / Chapter Chapter 5. --- "An Analysis on Allocative Efficiency,1987-89" --- p.59 / Chapter 5.1 --- An Introduction --- p.59 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Value of Marginal Products and Their Implications --- p.61 / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Concluding Remarks --- p.64 / REFERENCES --- p.67 / APPENDIXES --- p.73 / Appendix 1: The Data Set --- p.74 / Appendix 2: The Correction on Capital --- p.76 / Appendix 3: A Summary of Notations --- p.78 / Appendix 4: The Relationship between Payment Scheme and the Incentive to Work --- p.79 / "Appendix 5a: Mean, Variance, Maximum and Minimum for Each Variable (Original Data)" --- p.81 / "Appendix 5b: Mean, Variance, Maximum and Minimum for Each Variable (Without outliers)" --- p.83
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囯有企业劳动雇傭制度改革与工人的理性选择. / Guo you qi ye lao dong gu yong zhi du gai ge yu gong ren de li xing xuan ze.January 1996 (has links)
丘海雄. / 論文(哲學博士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院社會學學部, 1996. / 參考文献 : leaves 175-182. / Qiu Haixiong. / Chapter 第一篇 --- 理论和方法 --- p.1 / 导言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章 --- 相关的理论 --- p.2 / Chapter 第一节 --- 理性选择理论 --- p.2 / Chapter 第二节 --- 劳动力市场及雇佣关系的理论 --- p.9 / Chapter 第三节 --- 中国劳动力市场及雇佣制度的研究 --- p.16 / Chapter 第二章 --- 本文的理论和方法 --- p.22 / Chapter 第一节 --- 理论架构 --- p.23 / Chapter 第二节 --- 研究方法 --- p.25 / 第一篇 注释 --- p.27 / Chapter 第二篇 --- 制度 --- p.33 / 导言 --- p.33 / Chapter 第三章 --- 劳动用工 --- p.35 / Chapter 第一节 --- 招收工人 --- p.35 / Chapter 第二节 --- 用工形式 --- p.39 / Chapter 第三节 --- 劳动管理 --- p.45 / Chapter 第四节 --- 工人流动 --- p.50 / 小結 --- p.56 / Chapter 第四章 --- 工资分配 --- p.58 / Chapter 第一节 --- 工资分配制度改革综述 --- p.58 / Chapter 第二节 --- 企业之间的分化 --- p.61 / Chapter 第三节 --- 内部工资制度 --- p.65 / Chapter 第四节 --- 工资改革的效果 --- p.74 / 小結 --- p.78 / Chapter 第五章 --- 福利保险 --- p.81 / Chapter 第一节 --- 住房分配 --- p.81 / Chapter 第二节 --- 医疗照顾 --- p.87 / Chapter 第三节 --- 劳动保险 --- p.95 / 小結 --- p.108 / 第二篇 注释 --- p.110 / Chapter 第三篇 --- 行动 --- p.124 / 导言 --- p.124 / Chapter 第六章 --- 工作价值和态度 --- p.124 / Chapter 第一节 --- 工作价值和满足感 --- p.124 / Chapter 第二节 --- 对有关改革的评价 --- p.129 / Chapter 第三节 --- 转工和第二职业的意愿和取向 --- p.131 / Chapter 第四节 --- 对工人、工会和企业地位的评价 --- p.133 / Chapter 第五节 --- 对解决问题的途径的评价 --- p.137 / 小結 --- p.138 / Chapter 第七章 --- 工人的行动选择 --- p.139 / Chapter 第一节 --- 一家两制 --- p.139 / Chapter 第二节 --- 一人两制 --- p.146 / 小結 --- p.160 / 讨论和总结 --- p.175 / 第三篇 注释 --- p.175 / 参考文献 --- p.175 / 英文参考书目 --- p.175 / 中文参考书目 --- p.180
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Reforming H shares based on comprehensive event studies.January 2001 (has links)
Xu Zhi. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-62 (2nd gp.)). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.II / 中文摘要 --- p.V / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.XI / Chapter CHAPTER 1 --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER 2 --- VALUE OR GROWTH STOCK? --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Summary Statistics: Financial Ratios of h Shares --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Profitability analysis --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Debt Structure --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Operational Management --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Corporate Identity: Value or Growth Stock? --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Are H Shares Value Stocks? --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Are H Shares Growth Stocks? --- p.12 / Chapter 2.3 --- Summary --- p.13 / Chapter CHAPTER 3 --- THE METHODOLOGY OF EVENT STUDIES --- p.14 / Chapter 3.1 --- Brief Outline of an Event Study --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2 --- Issues on Event Studies --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Unknown Event Dates --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Which is the best benchmark model for the normal return? --- p.18 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Hypothesis testing and problems with heteroskedasticity and dependence --- p.21 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- A multivariate regression model (MVRM) employed in the event study --- p.24 / Chapter 3.2.5 --- Measuring long horizon security price performance --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2.6 --- Use daily return or monthly return in event study? --- p.27 / Chapter CHAPTER 4 --- ARE H SHARES WANTED: DEAD OR ALIVE? --- p.28 / Chapter 4.1 --- Definitions of Events --- p.28 / Chapter 4.2 --- Sample and Estimation Procedures --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Sample Selection --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Estimation Procedures --- p.30 / Chapter 4.3 --- Empirical Results of Good and Bad Earnings Announcements --- p.31 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Short Term Effects on Securities Prices --- p.31 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Long Term Post-Earnings-Announcement Drifts --- p.34 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Regression Analysis --- p.35 / Chapter 4.3.3.1 --- REGRESSION RESULTS FOR GOOD EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS --- p.37 / Chapter 4.3.3.2 --- REGRESSION RESULTS FOR BAD EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS --- p.38 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Summary --- p.39 / Chapter 4.4 --- Empirical Results of Good and Bad News --- p.40 / Chapter 4.5 --- "Empirical Results of SEO, M&A and New Projects" --- p.41 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- Summary --- p.42 / Chapter CHAPTER 5 --- A PRACTICAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR H SHARES --- p.43 / Chapter 5.1 --- Problems Corporate Governance Deals with --- p.45 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- The Agency Problem --- p.45 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Management Discretion --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2 --- Solutions to the Problems --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Incentive Contracts --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Large Investors --- p.47 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Debt Choice --- p.49 / Chapter 5.3 --- Corporate Governance for H Shares: a Practical Framework --- p.50 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Essential Elements of Good Corporate Governance --- p.51 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Summary : A Practical Framework of Good Corporate Governance --- p.53 / Chapter CHAPTER 6 --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.58 / REFERENCE --- p.61 / APPENDIX OF TABLES --- p.63 / APPENDIX OF FIGURES --- p.64
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Share system: toward enterprise reform in the PRC.January 1993 (has links)
by Yao Fang. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 51-55). / ABSTRACT --- p.3 / CHAPTERS / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.4 / Chapter II. --- CHINA'S STATE ENTERPRISES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1. --- The operation of the state enterprise system --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2. --- Agent problems in the management of state enterprises --- p.10 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Managers as agents of the government --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3. --- Soft budget constraints --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3.1. --- Implication --- p.14 / Chapter III. --- PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ORIGIN OF THE INEFFICIENCY --- p.17 / Chapter 3.1. --- Enterprises and government apparatus --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2. --- Specification of property rights --- p.19 / Chapter 3.3. --- Institutional arrangement --- p.21 / Chapter IV. --- A REVIEW ON PRC'S ENTERPRISE REFORM --- p.24 / Chapter 4.1. --- The reconstruction of labour ownership --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2. --- The manager reform --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3. --- Some outcomes of the delegation --- p.27 / Chapter V. --- SHARE SYSTEM : A PROSPECT FUTURE --- p.29 / Chapter 5.1. --- To liberalize the economic foundation --- p.29 / Chapter 5.2. --- Share ownership system --- p.30 / Chapter 5.2.1. --- Purposes of share system reform --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2.2. --- Important factors in the application --- p.33 / Chapter 5.2.3. --- Some steps of share system reform --- p.34 / Chapter VI. --- CASE STUDY : SHANGHAI FEILO COMPANY LIMITED --- p.38 / Chapter 6.1. --- Introduction --- p.38 / Chapter 6.2. --- The process of transforming the share system --- p.40 / Chapter 6.3. --- Financial outcomes of the company --- p.43 / Chapter 6.4. --- Problems of the new system --- p.43 / Chapter VII. --- CONCLUSION --- p.46 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.51
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Privatization in China: a case study of state-owned enterprise.January 2000 (has links)
by Chak Hoi Kee, Clara, Lee Chi Chung, Jonathan. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-72). / ABSTRACT --- p.II / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.III / INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / METHODOLOGY --- p.3 / LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.4 / PRIVATIZATION --- p.7 / Chapter 4.1 --- Definition --- p.7 / Chapter 4.2 --- Privatization and Economic Theory --- p.8 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Principal Agent Problem --- p.8 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Non-Profit Maximizing Objectives --- p.9 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Access to Information --- p.9 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Alternate Suggestions --- p.9 / Chapter 4.3 --- Motivations for Privatization --- p.10 / SOE REFORMS IN CHINA --- p.11 / Chapter 5.1 --- Inadequacy of Previous SOE Reforms --- p.11 / Chapter 5.2 --- Development of the Shareholding System Reform - Early Attempts --- p.12 / Chapter 5.3 --- Setback (1989-1991) --- p.12 / Chapter 5.4 --- Rapid Expansion and Standardization --- p.13 / Chapter 5.5 --- A Step Closer to Privatization --- p.14 / Chapter 5.6 --- Shrinking State Ownership --- p.15 / Chapter 5.7 --- """Let Go of the Small""" --- p.17 / Chapter 5.8 --- Take a Firm Grip on the Large --- p.18 / Chapter 5.9 --- Current Situation --- p.18 / DEVEOPMENT OF THE CHINESE CAPITAL MARKET --- p.20 / Chapter 6.1 --- The Chinese Stock Market --- p.20 / Chapter 6.2 --- Types of Shares --- p.21 / "TSINGTAO BREWERY COMPANY LIMITED (""TSINGTAO"")" --- p.23 / Chapter 7.1 --- Background --- p.23 / Chapter 7.2 --- Ownership --- p.24 / Chapter 7.3 --- Group Structure --- p.25 / LEGAL PERSONS --- p.25 / PRC INVESTORS --- p.25 / THE COMPANY --- p.25 / Chapter 7.4 --- Board of Directors (as of 1998) --- p.26 / Chapter 7.5 --- The Brewery Industry --- p.27 / Chapter 7.6 --- Initial Public Offering --- p.28 / Chapter 7.6.1 --- Business Performance Prior to IPO --- p.28 / Chapter 7.6.2 --- Restructuring of the Group --- p.29 / BOARD OF DIRECTORS --- p.30 / GENERAL MANAGER --- p.30 / Chapter 7.7 --- IPO in Hong Kong and Shanghai --- p.30 / Chapter 7.8 --- Business Downturn 1993-1996 --- p.32 / Chapter 7.8.1 --- Deny Reporting the First Interim Result --- p.32 / Chapter 7.8.2 --- Misuse of the IPO Proceeds --- p.33 / Chapter 7.8.3 --- Disappointing 1994 Results --- p.33 / Chapter 7.8.4 --- Unsuccessful Acquisition Attempts --- p.34 / Chapter 7.8.5 --- Loss of the Leading Position --- p.35 / Chapter 7.8.6 --- Change in Management --- p.36 / Chapter 7.9 --- Turnaround 1996-Present --- p.37 / Chapter 7.9.1 --- Second Restructuring in 1997 --- p.37 / Chapter 7.9.2 --- Refocus Efforts in Marketing Activities --- p.38 / Chapter 7.9.3 --- Expansion to the Low-Middle Market --- p.39 / Chapter 7.9.4 --- Further Acquisition Via Low Cost Expansion --- p.39 / Chapter 7.9.5 --- Enhancing Shareholders Value --- p.40 / Chapter 7.9.6 --- Outstanding First Half 1999 Results --- p.40 / Chapter 7.10 --- Financial Performance --- p.41 / CHINA TELECOM (HONG KONG) LIMITED --- p.43 / Chapter 8.1 --- Introduction --- p.43 / Chapter 8.2 --- Privatization --- p.43 / Chapter 8.3 --- Board of Directors --- p.45 / Chapter 8.3.1 --- Executive Directors --- p.46 / Chapter 8.3.2 --- Non-Executive Directors --- p.47 / Chapter 8.3.3 --- Independent Non-Executive Directors --- p.47 / Chapter 8.4 --- Government Regulations --- p.48 / Chapter 8.5 --- Telecommunication Industry in China --- p.48 / Chapter 8.6 --- Acquisition (1997-1999) --- p.49 / Chapter 8.7 --- Sales Analysis --- p.50 / Chapter 8.8 --- Profitability Analysis --- p.52 / Chapter 8.9 --- Financial Positions --- p.53 / Chapter 8.10 --- Overall Performance --- p.54 / Chapter 8.11 --- Future Prospects --- p.55 / IMPLICATIONS --- p.56 / Chapter 9.1 --- Agency Problem Remained --- p.56 / Chapter 9.2 --- Corporate Governance Weakened --- p.58 / Chapter 9.3 --- Corporate Disclosure --- p.58 / Chapter 9.4 --- Disappointing Results --- p.58 / Chapter 9.5 --- Turnaround --- p.59 / Chapter 9.6 --- Competition --- p.59 / Chapter 9.7 --- Scrutiny from the Capital Market --- p.60 / Chapter 9.8 --- "Is Privatization Necessary or is it a ""Red Herring""?" --- p.61 / RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.62 / Chapter 10.1 --- Corporate Governance Incentives --- p.62 / Chapter 10.2 --- Diversified Representation of Board Members --- p.63 / Chapter 10.3 --- Create a market for corporate control --- p.63 / Chapter 10.4 --- Modernize financial accounting and auditing practices --- p.64 / Chapter 10.5 --- Establishing the Rule of Law --- p.65 / SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION --- p.66 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.69
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One family, two systems.January 2006 (has links)
Shi Hui. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 31-34). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Contents / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.4 / Chapter 3 --- Theoretical Model and Predictions --- p.7 / Chapter 4 --- Hypotheses Development / Chapter 5 --- Research Methodology / Chapter 5.1 --- Data --- p.15 / Chapter 5.2 --- Variables --- p.16 / Chapter 5.3 --- Regression Models --- p.18 / Chapter 6 --- Empirical Results --- p.21 / Chapter 6.1 --- Individual Housework Time / Chapter 6.2 --- Housework Allocation Within a Family / Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.27 / References --- p.31 / Tables --- p.35
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