This dissertation analyzes competition for foundation grants in the nonprofit sector. First, I examine how inter-organization competition and foundation activity in local grants markets affect organization behavior through institutional pressure on (1) firm fundraising expenses, (2) program expense ratios, and (3) revenue diversification. Second, I explore the impacts of nonprofit program expense ratios and fundraising expenses on foundation grantmaking. This analysis focuses on the relative "prices" of donations to competing nonprofit organizations, represented by these expense ratios, and the impact prices have on foundation grant decisions relative to the impact that nonprofit marketing has. Finally, I examine whether greater competition in grants markets increases the importance of program expense ratios and firm marketing behavior for grant selection. Overall, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of organization behavior and foundation influence in grant-seeking markets and competition's role in the distribution of charitable grants.

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This dissertation is a theoretical exploration of commonly used policy tools meant to improve market performance. The first chapter examines the use of prizes and grants as instruments for encouraging research and development. The second chapter investigates the welfare impact of price caps in oligopoly markets with endogenous entry. The third chapter studies the relationship between deposit insurance and bank risk taking, when a banker is motivated by reciprocity. The first chapter explores the use of grants and prizes as tools for encouraging research activity and innovation. Grants and prizes are commonly used by public and private research funders, and encourage R&D activity in different ways. Grants encourage innovation by subsidizing research inputs, while prizes reward research output. A common rationale for prizes is moral hazard; if a funder cannot observe all relevant research inputs then prizes create a strong incentive for R&D activity. In this chapter, it is shown that grants are a more efficient means of funding when a researcher's ability is unknown to the funder (adverse selection). When both adverse selection and moral hazard problems exist, a grant may emerge as an optimal funding mechanism, provided the moral hazard problem is relatively weak. In settings where the moral hazard problem is sufficiently strong, a grant emerges as part of an optimal funding mechanism, in conjunction with a prize. These results are useful for understanding different funding mechanisms used by both public and private entities. The second chapter, which is based on joint work with Stan Reynolds, examines the impact of price caps in oligopoly markets with endogenous entry. In the case of deterministic demand, reducing a price cap yields increased total output, consumer welfare, and total welfare. This result falls in line with classic results on price caps in monopoly markets, and with results for oligopoly markets with a fixed number of firms. These comparative static results for price caps need not hold when demand is stochastic and the number of firms is fixed, but recent results in the literature show that a welfare improving price cap does exist. We show that a welfare-improving cap need not exist in the case where demand is stochastic and entry is endogenous. In addition, we provide restrictions on the demand function such that a welfare-improving price cap exists under endogenous entry and stochastic demand. The third chapter, which is based on a joint project with Martin Dufwenberg, investigates the relationship between deposit insurance, risk taking, and insolvency. Empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of deposit insurance increases risk taking by banks and results in a greater chance of insolvency. The common rationale for this connection is that deposit insurance decreases the incentive for customers to monitor their banks, and invites excessive risk taking. In this chapter, it is argued that this classic explanation is somewhat puzzling. If customers can monitor their bank's behavior, certainly the insurance provider (FDIC) has this same ability. If this is the case, appropriate mechanisms could limit the moral hazard problem. We put forth an alternative explanation, and demonstrate that deposit insurance invites excessive risk taking when a banker is motivated by reciprocity.

Magistro darbe atlikta valstybės finansinės paramos studentams Šiaulių universitete analizė. Išanalizuota studentų skaičiaus dinamika ir struktūros pokyčiai. Išsamiai analizuojamos aukštojo mokslo studijų paramos sistemos priemonės: stipendijos, paskolos.Jos palyginamos su kitais universitetais.Atlikta universiteto studentų, dalyvaujančių SOCRATES/ERASMUS programoje finansavimo, analizė.Palygintos studijų paskolų suteikimo ir grąžinimo tvarka su komercinių bankų teikiamais vartojimo kreditais.Įvertintas paskolų studijų įmokoms naudingumas. Patvirtinama autorės suformuluota mokslinio tyrimo hipotezė, jog paskolos studijų įmokoms mokėti teikia realią naudą studentui. / Analysis of the financial state support for students at Siauliai university was performed in the Master’s degree work. Dynamics of change in the number of students and structural changes were analysed. Means of the system of studies’ support in higher education, such as the student grants, loans, were analysed and were compared with other universities. The analysis of the funding for the university students, who participate in SOCRATES/ ERASMUS programme was performed. The order of getting and paying back the study loans was compared with credits, offered by commercial banks. Usefulness of the loans for paying the tuition fees was evaluated. The hypothesis of a scientific research, formulated by the author was confirmed that the loans for paying the tuition fees give practical benefit for students.

Research grant proposals are a very important genre in many academic disciplines, and a window into which we are able to observe academic engagements and interactions. However, there has been little textual analysis of the genre and research on how successful scholars approach the writing task. Drawing on the social constructionist genre scholarship, this study collected and analyzed nine successful SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada) research grant proposals from nine professors in the field of education at a Canadian university. The proposals were examined in terms of three important textual features: generic structure, referential behavior, hedges and boosters. Semi-structured discourse-based interviews with the nine professors as insider informants were also conducted. The main findings of the study include the following: (1) A three-move scheme was developed in this study as reflecting the generic structure of research grant proposal summaries. In analyzing the main text of research grant proposals, I first recognized the ICMC pattern (Introduction-Context-Methodology-Communication of Results) as the overall structure; ten moves as the constitutive functional components were then identified under this pattern. (2) Non-integral (where the name of the cited author does not appear in the actual citing sentence), non-reporting (where no reporting verb such as show, establish, suggest is employed to introduce the cited work), and generalization (where the proposition is attributed to two or more sources) forms of citations were found to be predominantly used in the research grant proposals. Self-citation was also used with a high frequency in this genre. 3) The use of boosters was found to exceed the use of hedges, and the distribution of hedges and boosters were found uneven across the rhetorical sections. Interviews with the nine professors further reveal how communicative purposes, institutional practice, and reader-writer relationship co-constructed the format as well as the stylistic features of grant writing. The study provides genre analysts as well as novice grant writers some useful insights into the research grant proposal writing.

This study surveyed grant writers at independent small colleges in Indiana and bordering states to discover their typical processes, personnel management, and whether these colleges encouraged effective grantsmanship. Data were analyzed with descriptive statistics reported as percentages, frequencies, and means.Conclusions include the following:Over five-sixths of respondents had additional duties. The vast majority said grant writing time varies daily due to these other tasks. As a median, writers with dual or more duties devoted 33% of their time to grant writing.Over three-fourths were not required to attend introductory training. While most pursued training classes, superiors seemed to be nonchalant about their professional development. Self motivated study, grant writing associations, and mentors were major factors for growth in grant writing skills.Around 90% of presidents and 85% of advancement vice presidents met grantors. Just over half of other superiors and a plurality of other senior advancement personnel cultivated grantors.Over three-fourths helped faculty with proposals. This informal quality control involved editing, writing, and teaching faculty how to write proposals. Just over half the colleges used formal quality control. About two-thirds have internal permission systems to prevent embarrassments, so one-third cannot prevent disasters or track proposal success, failure, or origin. Colleges seemed complacent about liability since less than half required approval from an Institutional Review Board for proposals with human subjects.About half felt their colleges succeeded with grants. Actual results were decidedly mixed. Deciding factors were income, faculty engagement, and external and internal relationships. Many colleges seemed to lack easily accessible grant records. Having dual or more duties could hinder but did not prevent success.Over two-thirds contacted donors. About half who cultivated increased success rates or gained profitable insights. Most of the others tacitly implied increased success. The top three overall grant winners all cultivated. Respondents saw cultivating as good, but viewed skillful writing as crucial.Other attributes such as religious affiliation, enrollment, minority percentages, etc. seemed not to affect success.Results cannot be completely generalized, but descriptive data and inferred conclusions should assist all small-college grant writers. / Department of Educational Studies

This dissertation analyzes competition for foundation grants in the nonprofit sector. First, I examine how inter-organization competition and foundation activity in local grants markets affect organization behavior through institutional pressure on (1) firm fundraising expenses, (2) program expense ratios, and (3) revenue diversification. Second, I explore the impacts of nonprofit program expense ratios and fundraising expenses on foundation grantmaking. This analysis focuses on the relative "prices" of donations to competing nonprofit organizations, represented by these expense ratios, and the impact prices have on foundation grant decisions relative to the impact that nonprofit marketing has. Finally, I examine whether greater competition in grants markets increases the importance of program expense ratios and firm marketing behavior for grant selection. Overall, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of organization behavior and foundation influence in grant-seeking markets and competition's role in the distribution of charitable grants.

Thesis (M. P. A.)--Texas State University-San Marcos, 2006. / "Spring 2006." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 77-84).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1997. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 127-130). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1997. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 127-130). Also available on the Internet.