The War of the Spanish Succession saw the culmination in the development of European warfare during the “Military Revolution” period, which saw European states fielding larger armies with geographically more ambitious strategies under the umbrella of the nascent eighteenth‐century phenomenon of the “Fiscal‐Military State.” By investigating the Austro‐British alliance at the diplomatic, strategic, logistical, and operational levels during the war, greater insight can be gained into the mechanics of alliance warfare and how two allies reconcile independent war strategies in order to achieve a common goal. This is done in particular by exploring British attempts to influence Austrian war strategy through the tools of diplomacy and logistics in order to bring it more in line with British war strategy, particularly in the region of southern Europe. The chronological approach adopted by this thesis will demonstrate how the course of a war can influence strategy and, in turn, facilitate or impede allied collaboration. The early years of the war saw unsuccessful attempts at Austro‐British collaboration due to the distance between the two allies and the limited contact between them. The 1703 crisis of the Austrian monarchy following financial collapse, rebellion, and a hostile Bavaria forced a dramatic revision of British strategy, culminating the Blenheim campaign of 1704. The expansion of the war into Iberia saw a broadening of Austro‐British military contacts, and the strategic situation in Italy was the source of greater collaboration. However, this expanded collaboration could prove diplomatically damaging when strategic or operational goals diverged. The later years of the war saw Austro‐British collaboration reach its peak, but Austria had to sacrifice much of the direction of its own war effort in the Mediterranean to Britain as the price for British support. The final years of the war saw British and Austrian war strategies diverge in light of the death of Joseph I.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis aims to conceptualize what is often referred to in diplomacy, as a policy of “constructive engagement”, by employing neoliberal-institutionalist theories and conflict resolution approaches. The adopted “model for constructive engagement” serves as the theoretical framework and centres on the basic assumption that non-coercive diplomacy coupled with the offer of incentives is best suited at resolving conflict as well as promoting human rights in international relations. Rather than looking at determinants of foreign policy making, the thesis focuses, therefore, on the actual exercise of power and influence in international relations. As such, power, both in terms of a state’s available assets as well as seen as a form causation, is considered the crucial variable in determining diplomatic manoeuvring and negotiation behaviour. The empirical context for the research project is provided by the case of British-Iranian relations during the period from 1989 to 2004. The narrative is divided into two parts: the first one deals with the impact of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie by Ayatollah Khomeini on bilateral relations and investigates British diplomacy towards Tehran, which followed the European Union’s policy of “Critical Dialogue” with Iran. Whilst the promotion of human rights was on the agenda of the “Critical Dialogue”, findings indicate that contrary to other EU member states, most notably Germany, Whitehall was able to genuinely pursuing a policy of “constructive engagement”, demanding meaningful changes in Iranian behaviour. However, findings also show that Britain’s priority was at resolving the “Rushdie affair” and not necessarily at promoting and protecting human rights in Iran. The second part of the narrative looks at the “Comprehensive Dialogue” which was implemented by the European Union in 2000 and established a direct linkage between economic rewards and the improvements of human rights in Iran. Whilst the Iranian government and parliament met EU demands, the country’s maze of power centres, most notably those dominated by hardliners and conservatives, worked against any meaningful improvements in the protection and respect of human rights. Both narratives indicate to what extent diplomacy and negotiations were influenced by domestic constituents, referred to as the Two-Level Game, as well as by asymmetries of interdependence between the EU and Iran. Overall, the data implies that constructive engagement, whilst subject to political and economic interdependence, constitutes an effective form of human rights diplomacy.

This thesis concludes that (1) Immediately following the July Revolution, the Paris government refused to concede the right of search to British commanders. (2) Due to France's isolation in 1831-1833, she sought British support by negotiating the conventions of 1831 and 1833. (3) In response to Palmerston's insistence and to preserve France's influence Sdbastiani signed the protocol of a five-power accord to suppress the slave trade. Guizot accepted the Quintuple Treaty to facilitate an Anglo-French rapprochement. (4) Opposition encouraged by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, however, forced Guizot to repudiate this new agreement. (5) As a concession to Guizot,Aberdeen dropped the demand for a mutual right of search and negotiated the Convention of 1845, establishing a system of joint-cruising.

No one has investigated in detail the totality of Anglo-Russian relations from the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 to the outbreak of World War I. Those who have written on the history of the Triple Entente have tended to claim that France was the dominant partner and that her efforts pulled Great Britain and Russia together and kept them together. Britain and Russia had little in common, the standard argument asserts; their ideological and political views were almost diametrically opposed, and furthermore,they had major imperial conflicts. This dissertation tests two hypotheses. The first is that Russia and Britain were drawn together less from French efforts than from a mutual reaction to German policy. The second is that there was less political and ideological friction between Britain and Russia than previous writers have assumed. The first hypothesis has been supported in previous writings only tangentially, while the second has not been tested for the period under review. Studies of the period have been detailed studies on specific events and crises, while this investigation reviews the course of the Anglo-Russian partnership for the entire seven year period. The dissertation concludes that it was primarily the need for allies in the face of German military and economic expansion that motivated and sustained the Anglo-Russian friendship. It furthermore concludes that the ideological and political differences of the two countries were less important to their diplomatic relationship than has usually been contended, and that they were easily overcome in their mutual desire for strength against Germany. In the long run, Britain and Russia pursued diplomatic and imperial policies that were not dissimilar. Their primary needs were allies in Europe, with which to oppose the Triple Alliance, and they could both afford to overlook differences of approach and policy to achieve this strength. Expediency, not ideology, was the key to the Anglo-Russian friendship.

No description available.

As an issue affecting the foreign relations of the United States and Britain, impressment has been given varying emphasis by different authors. This thesis is first a chronological outline of the events and correspondence that trace the subject. Beyond this basic delineation I will consider exactly how important impressment was to the two countries. James F. Zimmerman, in Impressment of American Seamen, posits that impressment was of paramount significance while other authors have attempted to down grade it into a status of utter inconsequence. This paper will show that the actual influence of impressment varied from one time, one set of circumstances, to another. Finally, my thesis will attempt to show more of the British side of the question, heretofore primarily ignored. It will be shown that members of the British government had what they felt to be perfectly valid reasons for continuing the practice, even though it eventually led to war. Chapter one serves as an introduction and explanation of the legal and historical backgrounds of impressment. The chapter also covers the first difficulties the two countries had over the issue, when England and France nearly went to war in 1787. These would serve as a model for the problems to come. Chapter two looks into the reasons behind the need for impressment and America's argument against it. Britain needed men to man the navy, America needed these same men for its merchant marine, out of this the basic conflict was born. Chapter three deals with American efforts to contain or eliminate impressment, mostly through acts of Congress to protect United States sailors. The problem America had with issuing proofs of citizenship and Britain's requirement that America issue them began to bring impressment to the fore. James Monroe was sent to London for talks of which impressment was to be a major topic. Chapter four covers the parallel careers of Monroe, United States envoy to London, and Anthony Merry, British minister to America. Both men had troubles dealing with what they felt were obstinate foreign governments and both mens' missions were, in the end, failures. Merry, feeling America to be inflating the reaction against impressment, paid little attention to the complaints and ended up having to deal with harsh anti-British legislation. Monroe's lack of success took longer and forms the basis of chapter five. This chapter details how the Jefferson administration and Monroe were incapable of getting Britain to give an inch on the subject. This culminated in the Treaty of 1806, which was silent on impressment. Chapter six shows how this lack of action set the stage for the encounter between the Chesapeake and the Leopard. This skirmish almost led to war and represents the peak of impressment's importance as an issue in foreign affairs. Chapter seven details other differences between the two countries as they slid toward the War of 1812. Impressment was but one of many causes of the conflict, though one which both sides contributed to keeping alive. Finally, chapter eight covers war-time diplomacy and shows how impressment quickly became the only subject the two countries were fighting over. Later actions on America's part reveal that impressment, as a single complaint, was no longer considered a war-worthy topic, or even much of a cause for complaint.