This thesis is concerned with the reaction of British M. P.'s to the Labor government's Palestinian policy 1945-48. The primary data comes from the British Parliamentary Debates (Commons) and works by British leaders. There are great differences among British political parties and between individuals within the parties in their reactions to and suggestions concerning the deteriorating situation in Palestine. Most politicians supported the Jews prior to the terrorist activity of 1947, but many then shifted to the Arab side. Due to the anti-Zionist policy of Ernest Bevin and Clement Attlee, a solution to the Palestinian problem was delayed; the Jews were driven to desperation; and Great Britain, previously a friend to the Jews, became their bitterest enemy.

Due to their desire for a strong Central European nation to counterbalance France and Russia and their belief that any people should have the right to unification, the British supported the German nationalist movement after 1866. Due to French meddling in the affairs of other countries and French opposition to what the British thought was the legitimate aim of the German people, the British became anti-French in the late 1860s. Due to the belief of the British in progress, they could view most of the events on the Continent, even the violent ones, as the gradual advancement of civilization. The Franco-Prussian War required the British to re-evaluate all of these views, as well as many others, and conclude that Germany, not France, constituted the threat to Europe.

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This study involves an examination of Anglo-American relations between the years 1933 and 1938 through the policies of U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. It is based on the thesis that both of these foreign ministers believed strongly in the need to establish a "special relationship" between Great Britain and the United States as a means to counter the growing world economic and political crisis that developed during the 1930s, but that in spite of these sentiments, they failed in this effort. This work explores the reasons for this failure. / The study begins by noting the widespread expectation, following the 1932 election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, that the onset of a new American Administration under the leadership of Roosevelt and Hull would lead to closer transatlantic ties. It then goes on to explore Eden and Hull's efforts to establish a new economic and security relationship between the two powers through the workings of the World Economic Conference, the Geneva Disarmament Talks, the London Naval Conference, and the negotiation of an Anglo-American trade agreement. It then traces Eden and Hull's reaction to the outbreak of hostilities in Abyssinia, Spain and China, and notes how the increasing likelihood of a world war led to an intensification of their efforts to find a vehicle of cooperation. / The work then closes by examining the circumstances which led to Eden's resignation, and the successful negotiation of the Anglo-American Trade Agreement. In the latter case, however, it is argued that the trade agreement had little effect on the behavior of the fascist states, and hence proved ineffective as a means to stop the drift towards war. The study then concludes by reiterating the argument that both men shared in the belief that it was in their respective country's best interests to pursue closer transatlantic ties. It also concludes that they each carried certain idealistic notions about the benefits which might accrue from such a pursuit, as each felt that even the mere appearance of Anglo-American solidarity would give serious pause to the dictators and thus further advance the cause of peace. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)