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Ryssland har efter det Kalla krigets slut fört en undanskymd roll på den internationella arenan.Efter Sovjetunionens kollaps var Ryssland för svagt för att överta dess roll som globalstormakt. Det bipolära världssystemet ersattes av ett unipolärt system med USA som ensamglobal stormakt. På senare tid har dock Ryssland börjat visa alltmer självförtroende i sittinternationella agerande. Frågan uppstår då om landet har en ambition att åter bli en globalstormakt. Studien syftar till att undersöka om Ryssland har dessa ambitioner. Studien har sinteoretiska grund i den politiska realismen och utgår från hypotesen att Ryssland har klaraambitioner att åter bli en global stormakt och att dessa ambitioner kommer att visa sig ilandets ageranden inom de militära, politiska och ekonomiska sektorerna. Genom att förstdefiniera revisionism och stormakt analyseras därefter Rysslands internationella agerandeinom dessa sektorer. I analysen visar Ryssland tydliga ambitioner att återta en roll som globalstormakt helt i linje med hypotesen. / Russia has after the end of the Cold war played a hidden role at the international arena. Afterthe collapse of the Soviet union Russia was to week to takeover its role as a global greatpower. The bipolar world system was replaced by a unipolar system with the USA as singleglobal great power. Lately however Russia has started to show more self confidence in itsinternational acting. The question then arises if the country has the ambition to once againbecome a global great power. This study aims to examine if Russia has these ambitions. Thestudy has its theoretical base in the political realism and assumes from the hypothesis thatRussia has clear ambitions to once again become a global great power and that theseambitions will be shown in the country’s acting within the military, political and economicsectors. By first define revisionism and great power Russia’s international acting is thenanalyzed within these sectors. In the analysis Russia shows clear ambitions to recapture a roleas a global great power in according to the hypothesis.

Yes / Are nuclear weapons still relevant to global security? Compared with the nuclear confrontation in the depths of the Cold War, nuclear weapons and deterrence appear to have lost their salience. Considering the conflicts in which the major powers engaged, the focus in strategic studies changed to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and subconventional conflict.2 Only recently, with the conflict in Ukraine and the increasingly confrontational relationship between the United States and China has this narrative come into question. The general perception on international security exhibits a strange paradox. On the one hand the US-led military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and other parts, the conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, the nuclearization of North Korea and the conflict between India and Pakistan among other regional security issues have given rise to a view that the modern world is less secure than ever, and we live in a world of chaos riven by unpredictable patterns of violence. By contrast, Steven Pinker has demonstrated the casualties from armed conflict are at their lowest point in human history, and interstate warfare has virtually ceased to exist as a phenomenon.3 The imminence of a global nuclear war in which at a minimum hundreds of millions of people would die appears to have dissipated. In some respects, it appears that war has become almost a phenomenon of the past. Most of the recent literature on nuclear weapons has focused on regional crises areas, such as South Asia (India and Pakistan) or the Korean peninsula.4 However, the modernization of arsenals by the nuclear powers, the integration of strategic conventional and nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and the more confrontational dynamics in Great Power politics is cited as evidence that the risk of nuclear use is increasing. This paper contests the emerging narratives on an increased threat of nuclear conflict and considers the sources of insecurity in the contemporary period and in particular the risks of armed conflict between the United States, Russia, and China in order to assess the role of nuclear weapons in contemporary security.

This thesis examines Albanian foreign policy from a small state point of view.The main argument is that Albania as a weak small state developed close relations with the regional and great powers and align with them in order to compensate its weakness. An historical analysis of the Albanian foreign policy line since its establishment portrays a continuity in this trend except the short isolationist period. The study has three main objectives, firstly, it aims to provide an analysis of the small state foreign policy and small state &ndash / great power asymmetric relations within the framework of Albania&rsquo / s relations with various regional and great powers. Secondly, to elaborate the relevance of the enduring weakness of Albania on its foreign policy making in particular with its relations and alliances with the great powers. In this sense, an analysis of the Albanian foreign policy shows a pattern of shifting alliances in different time periods and under different regimes as part of foreign policy line. Thirdly, to make the historical account of Albania&rsquo / s alliances and relations with the great powers in terms of continuity and change in its foreign policy line. Albania&rsquo / s post-Cold War era foreign policy indicates a continuity in this line as it approaches the US as the great power to align with as well as one of two main pillars of its foreign policy along with the Euro-Atlantic integration. In this context, the contemporary Albanian-US relations constitute the last phase of the Albanian foreign policy trend.

Those who today hear the name Djurhamn are maybe first thinking of a summer resort place with sunbathing, swimming and recreational boating activities. Djurhamn has an interesting and fascinating history well intertwined with the history of Sweden. The interesting history was exposed by the Stockholm Sport Diving Club which, during the summers of 1964 and 1965, brought up a large number of finds from the bottom of Djurhamn. The findings could essentially be dated to be in the in the period 1500s to 1700s. Like other parts of the East Coast Djurhamn was hit in "Russian raids" in the early 1700s. The known meetings of warships during the Vasa era and the history of naval ship Riskswasas fate also reflects the interesting parts of Djurhamn history. While working on this, a number of dives were made at the bottom of the basin in Djurhamn. Two side-scan surveys have also been conducted. Overall, this has not resulted in any change of the picture of what's on Djurhamns bottom. A previously unknown wreck that lies south of the cemetery have, however, been located based on information from the public. The finds from the dives during 1964 and 1965 talk about food and drinks, cooking utensils, three-leg pots and bottles speaks their language. Even earlier dated bargain materials speak the same language. It is a place where everyday objects leave imprints on the bottom along with the testimony of a brickyard, which flourished for a short period. Which traces have been left from the naval activities? Practically none. On land there are no naval monuments. The objects which were brought up at the 1960 dives were almost entirely attributable to the applications connected to cooking. Our modern society is a complex reality. There are homes, workplaces, hospitals, places of entertainment, etc. People are born, grow up, grow old and die. What do we find in the signs of the Djurhamn? Well, a picture that much is a reflection of today's society. Also here you are born grown up grown old and finally dead. Heavy drinking has flourished. In addition to self-household and shipping, there has been brick industry and cholera quarantine. Finally, perhaps Djurhamn over time is best described as farmers, fishermen and hungry sailors’ history more than the history of the fleet in the Vasa kings’ service.

China’s renewed engagement in Africa is shaped by an ever more coherent and multi-faceted African strategy which is informed by and supportive of Beijing’s emerging foreign policy strategy in general. Through an investigation into economic, political and military dimensions of this relationship, it is apparent that China’s interests in Africa are not confined to the continent nor simply a patch work of ad hoc relations of economic opportunism, but rather Africa is seen as playing a vital role in furthering China’s three foreign policy objectives of 1) access to economic and political resources both on the continent and internationally; 2) assurance of China’s rise as peaceful and beneficial; 3) and acceptance of China’s ascendance and growing influence internationally as legitimate. While economic interests, particularly resource extraction, remain paramount, Africa is becoming an important political ally in supporting Chinese efforts towards creating a more conducive international environment for its domestic development and rise to great power status. Military relations in Africa, though growing, remain limited and play an assisting role to China’s greater economic and political interests. While this developing African strategy has so far been largely successful in securing economic resources and generating backing for Chinese interests internationally, concerns and criticisms stemming both from Western states and increasingly within the continent itself over issues such as development, economic exploitation, human rights and governance, and support for pariah regimes remain central challenges. China’s African strategy, therefore, while informed by a number of strategic interests and practices, remains highly contingent as Beijing attempts to constantly balance interests and relationships on the continent with those internationally, including both of a short and long term nature.

This thesis examines the discursive construction of Russian national identity through the 2008 war in Georgia with a focus on how this process was influenced by the Russian leadership’s desire to gain the support of both the domestic and international audiences for its actions outside its borders. These actions involved forceful military intervention, the recognition of the independence of the two Georgian break-away republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the decision to place Russian military troops in the two republics during the aftermath of war. The study critically examines the official Russian discourse, with a focus on particular visions of national identity that this discourse utilized. The study demonstrates how the official discourse in the context of the 2008 war contributed to the construction of Russian national identity and thereby seeks to highlight the performative power of language. By placing considerable focus on the internal dimension of the Russian leadership’s conduct in the international arena, i.e. the consolidation of the national community in the event of war, the thesis contributes to an oft overlooked element of Russian foreign policy initiatives. Consequently, it seeks to challenge the tendency to explain Russian actions with regard to the war as a natural result of a neo-imperialistic identity – a tendency that fails to take into account how national identity can be constructed in its more immediate context. By making use of Rogers Brubaker's concept of nationalism as an event, the study discusses the increased force of nationalism during war and demonstrates how this was clearly the case during the 2008 war in Georgia. The analysis concentrates on three main identity visions within the official Russian discourse. Firstly, it examines how contemporary Russia was constructed as a great power, partly as a response to the claims that it was an imperialist state. Secondly, it discusses the role of certain historical concepts, i.e. the Cold War and the Soviet Union, within the discourse and elaborates upon the act of politicising history. Thirdly, the study analyses the Russian leadership’s protection narrative that emphasised the responsibility to protect Russian citizens and compatriots in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is demonstrated how these different identity visions were intertwined, resulting in a rather contradictory official discourse that speaks to many different audiences simultaneously, while foregrounding the first of the above-mentioned identity visions, namely of Russia as a great power.

This Master 's thesis focuses on the rising power of China in contemporary international relations. The rise of China faces the post-Cold-War international system with one of the most significant changes in power distribution; as such, it is of significant importance for the entire field of international relations. The thesis aims to evaluate the Chinese rise to power, and determine whether the country should be considered a great power affecting the international system. To achieve this goal, the author performs a two-level analysis based on the theory of realism, which first analyzes China's position as a state and then its impact on the international system. The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first one sets the theoretical framework. Chapters two to five look into China's position of power in the military, economic, political and socio-environmental dimension. The sixth chapter analyzes the influence of China on the international system in the case study of the current China-U.S. relations. The thesis concludes that China could be considered a great power, but only a partial one with a limited impact on the international system.

This thesis deals with the Russia's foreign policy pursued by presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev, respectively. The studied phenomenon is viewed through the lens of the theory of neo-Eurasianism, coined by the Russian philosopher and political scientist Alexander Gelevich Dugin. The starting point of the neo-Eurasian geopolitical theory is a conviction that the current world order is unipolar and that the U.S.-led globalization is an instrument of its reproduction. The alternative to the hostile, free development of nations curtailing, Atlantic order is represented by multipolarity which, according to the neo-Eurasian theory, will supposedly be established through the messianic mission of Russia-Eurasia, which has nevertheless first to free itself from the Atlantic bond. Application of the neo- Eurasian theory in the context of Russian foreign policy since 2000 then points to the conclusion that Russia's foreign policy can, to some extent, be considered neo-Eurasian.