Yes / Technological systems are not merely designed with a narrow function in mind. Good designs typically aim at reducing operational costs, e.g. through achieving high energy efficiency and improved dependability (i.e. reliability, availability and maintainability). When there is a choice of alternative design options that perform the same function, it makes sense to compare alternatives so that the variant that minimises operational costs can be selected. In this paper, we examine this issue in the context of the design of Waste Heat Recovery Systems (WHRS) for main engines of large commercial freight vessels. We propose a method that can predict the operational cost of a WHRS via thermodynamic analysis which shows costs related to energy utilisation, and dependability analysis which shows costs related to system unavailability and repair. Our approach builds on recent advances in thermodynamic simulation and compositional dependability analysis techniques. It is a model-based approach, and allows reuse of component libraries, and a high degree of automation which simplify application of the method. Our case study shows that alternative designs can be explored in fast iterations of this method, and that this facilitates the evidence-based selection of a design that minimises operational costs.

A fuel levy is one of the market-based measures (MBMs) currently under consideration at the International Maritime Organization. MBMs have been proposed to improve the energy efficiency of the shipping sector and reduce its emissions. This paper analyses the economic and environmental implications of two types of levy on shipping bunker fuels by means of an analytical model built on the cobweb theorem. A unit-tax per ton of fuel and an ad-valorem tax, enforced as a percentage of fuel prices, are examined. In both cases, a speed and fuel-consumption reduction equivalent to an improvement in the energy efficiency of the sector would be expected as a result of the regulation enforcement. The speed reduction in the unit-tax case depends on fuel prices and the tax amount, whereas in the ad-valorem case it relies upon the enforced tax percentage. Both schemes lead to industry profit decline, the extent of which depend on the structure of the levy and market conditions. Since there is concern that the costs resulting from the policy will be passed from shipping companies to their customers along the supply chain, the paper dwells on how the costs arising from the enforcement of the levy will be actually allocated between ship-owners and operators, and cargo-owners. In a market characterised by high freight rates and with no or limited excess capacity, a higher percentage of the total tax amount is transferred from ship-owners to shippers. In case of a recession the opposite happens.