Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Histoire--Taipei, 2001. / Mention parallèle de titre ou de responsabilité : The @interrelationship between the Kuomintang government's propagation policies and the transformation of China. Bibliogr. p. 217-312. Index.

Cette thèse se propose d’étudier le gouvernement collaborateur dirigé par Wang Jingwei (1940-1945) à la croisée de deux trajectoires : celle de l’État chinois moderne et celle de l’Empire japonais. Au-delà d’un approfondissement des connaissances sur l’occupation japonaise en Chine, mon travail ambitionne d’enrichir le champ des études sur l’État lui-même. Une telle approche ne va pas de soi, tant le caractère « fantoche » attribué à ce régime par l’historiographie chinoise l’a longtemps isolé du reste de la période et cantonné à une histoire des tenants idéologiques de la collaboration. Sans évacuer cet aspect, mon approche consiste à l’inscrire dans une étude politique et sociale du gouvernement et de l'administration, afin de saisir le fonctionnement réel de la machine étatique en zone occupée. Pour ce faire, je développe le concept d’État d’occupation, qui désigne l’ensemble formé par les organisations japonaises (institutions militaires et civiles) et chinoises (gouvernements collaborateurs locaux), établies afin d’administrer la Chine occupée. La construction de cet État, qui visa, à partir de 1940, à intégrer ces organisations derrière la façade du gouvernement de Wang Jingwei, fut détournée par des logiques de formation, nées des contradictions entre ses différents acteurs. Ce processus est examiné en adoptant des focales différentes. La première partie étudie la mise en place de l’État d’occupation du point de vue japonais, en montrant l’impact qu’eurent, l’un sur l’autre, centre et périphérie au sein de l’Empire nippon. Je reviens ensuite sur la genèse de cet État d’occupation, jusqu’à la formation du gouvernement de Wang Jingwei. La deuxième partie réduit la focale pour s’intéresser à l’organisation particulière de ce dernier, dont la spécificité, par rapport aux autres régimes collaborateurs, provenait de l’ambition qu’avait le groupe de Wang de restaurer le Gouvernement nationaliste légitime dans le cadre d’un « retour à la capitale ». La troisième partie, enfin, se penche sur le cas de la fonction publique en zone occupée, dont le cadre institutionnel et idéologique est mis en regard avec les conditions de vie des agents. / This dissertation studies the collaboration government headed by Wang Jingwei (1940-1945) at the crossroads of two trajectories: those of China’s modern state and Japan’s Empire. More broadly, my work aims at enriching the field of state-building research. Such an approach may seem counter-intuitive, as this regime is still labelled a "puppet" by Chinese historiography, which has cast it aside from the rest of the period and confined it to an ideological history of collaboration. I consider it within the context of a political and social study of government and administration, which tries to grasp the real functioning of the state machine in the occupied zone. For this purpose, I develop the concept of occupation state, i.e. a larger apparatus than the sole collaboration regimes, which included Japanese military and civilian agencies as well as Chinese local governments. From 1940 on, the state-building process aimed at integrating these organizations behind the façade of the Wang Jingwei government. However, it was diverted by a formation process, which resulted from the contradictions between its different actors. I explore this process from three different angles. The first part studies the establishment of the occupation state from the Japanese point of view, showing the mutual impact of centre and periphery within the Japanese Empire. Then, it follows the genesis of the occupation state up to the establishment of the Wang Jingwei government. The second part focuses on the experience of the latter, whose specificity, compared to other pro-Japanese regimes, was the ambition of the Wang group to restore the legitimate nationalist government as part of a "return to the capital". Thirdly, I look at the administrative personnel’s institutional and ideological framework as well as their living conditions.

Between 1919 and 1934, as members of China's Guomindang (Nationalist Party) struggled to take control of and transform the country, they increasingly appropriated language and symbols associated with the fallen Qing Dynasty. At the same time, these were accompanied in party discourse by radical appeals that included strong critiques of China's past. In this they were far from unique: studies of nationalisms around the world have found them to combine appeals to the new and the old. Yet in China this combination incited particular controversy, as Guomindang members and others, wrestling with the cultural legacy of the empire, put forward powerfully radical critiques not only of the culture of the past but also of traditionalist appeals to it. The result was distinctive textual practices I term 'revolutionary traditionalism', which appropriated cultural elements of the imperial orthodoxy while reconciling these appropriations with radical language. Yet this revolutionary traditionalism could not unproblematically form a unified modern nationalist orthodoxy. Radical and traditionalist positions in regard to culture recurred through power struggles within and beyond the party. Through these struggles, by the end of the 1920s revolutionary traditionalism came to characterise the new Nationalist Government formed by Guomindang members in Nanjing. While like other nationalists Guomindang members reinvented the language and symbols to which they appealed, however, the case of Confucius shows that they could not unilaterally control these reinterpretations. The central place of Confucius in national culture was established through a process of negotiation, as groups identifying themselves as 'Confucian' petitioned the state, appropriating its own traditionalist discourse, for recognition and commemoration. Yet these Confucians, pursuing their own often religious agendas, also cast doubt on the authenticity of the state's commitment. Revolutionary traditionalism thus remained unstable, repeatedly challenged both from radical and traditionalist positions.

xv, 322 p. : ill. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / This dissertation examines formal and popular campaigns against collaborators during the second Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945, considering the role of these campaigns in the political struggles of the Nationalist (Guomindang) government, the interplay between discourses of law and morality, and the interactions of legal professionals, intellectuals, and commoners in the development of Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialism. During the Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese army occupied vast areas in China and sponsored puppet regimes at central and local levels in areas under its occupation. These regimes variously attracted, persuaded, or forced a large number of Chinese officials, intellectuals, and local elites to work in their administrations. The Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, which was the central Chinese government since 1928, retreated to the inland city of Chongqing to organize resistance against Japan. The Nationalist government labeled collaborators as hanjian , "traitors to the Han." The word became widely used in legal regulations, popular literature, and newspapers and became the most derogatory and politically disastrous title possible for a Chinese citizen. Individuals designated hanjian were exposed to public humiliation, confiscation of land and property, and the threat of assassination. Chiang Kai-shek's government also called for the common people to expose hanjian . Most such accusations were then transformed into legal procedures. These accusations resulted in varying and often unfair sentences. Designed by the Nationalist government to harness the force of popular nationalism and to restore justice, the anti- hanjian campaigns instead inadvertently exposed the corruption and incompetence of the Nationalist government and damaged the post-war construction effort. / Committee in charge: Bryna Goodman, Chairperson, History; Andrew Goble, Member, History; Ina Asim, Member, History; Tze-lan Sang, Outside Member, East Asian Languages & Literature

No description available.

La tesi si concentra sul Partito Nazionalista Cinese negli anni Venti come punto privilegiato di osservazione del cambiamento politico della Cina dopo la Prima guerra mondiale. Questo decennio rappresentò un momento di definizione identitaria sia per i comunisti sia per i nazionalisti. La storiografia ne ha sottolineato numerosi aspetti, ma si è finora occupata del periodo 1919-1928 come una preistoria degli anni Trenta piuttosto che come un autonomo segmento di storia cinese. Studi recenti hanno superato implicitamente questo approccio criticando due date periodizzanti fondamentali per il Novecento cinese: la nascita della Repubblica nazionalista (1911) e la nascita della Repubblica Popolare (1949). A metà tra queste due date, gli anni Venti sono emersi come snodo decisivo nel passaggio da impero a Stato nazionale, durante cui si definì un nuovo spazio di discussione politica. Questo processo, pur interno, subì l’influsso delle strategie internazionali di sovietici e statunitensi dando vita a una nuova visione non soltanto della rivoluzione ma anche dello Stato post-rivoluzionario. Le classi dirigenti nazionalista e comunista, durante la collaborazione, si rivelarono dinamiche e tale “competizione” si trasferì anche all’interno di ciascun movimento diventando un fattore determinante per il successo o il fallimento del partito inteso come moderna formazione politica. / The thesis focuses on the Chinese Nationalist Party in the 1920s as a special standpoint to analyze the political changes in China after the World War I. That decade was crucial for shaping the identity of nationalists and communists. Many works have already examined some aspects, but they mostly considered the years 1919-1928 as a pre-history of the Thirties rather than an autonomous part of Chinese history. Recent studies have overcome this approach by criticizing two of the main periodization in the Chinese twentieth century: the birth of the nationalist Republic (1911) and the birth of the People’s Republic (1949). Halfway, the 1920s stood out as a critical juncture in the transition from empire to nation-state. A new space of political discussion was defined. The process, albeit internal, was under the influence of the USSR and US international strategies and gave birth not only to a new vision of the revolution, but also to a vision of the post-revolutionary state. Also, the nationalist and communist leaderships turned out to be dynamic. That "competition" may be seen also within the two political movements and became a shaping factor for the success or failure of the party as a modern political formation.