My study examines the relationship between principal and agent in a moral hazard setting where the principal has the ability to monitor the actions of the agent at an interim stage of the project. I show that monitoring can induce the agent to exert higher levels of effort and can result in a reallocation of project payoffs between the two parties. This reallocation is not a one-way street: Situations exist where monitoring encourages greater effort from the agent, resulting in greater project payoffs for both principal and agent. For projects that are characterized as high-risk, high-reward projects where agent involvement is costly, monitoring is often the optimal strategy; this is an explanation for why venture capital type investments are the subject of intense monitoring. When the principal can share monitoring results at an interim stage with the agent, the agent is able to modify his effort levels in certain situations for the benefit of both parties.

Interorganizational alliances are widely recognized as critical to product innovation. A notable trend is the rapid growth of new product development (NPD) alliances between large, well-established firms and small, growing firms. This dissertation is comprised of two studies on the formation and termination of asymmetric new product development alliances. In study one I examine the factors that drive the changes in shareholder values of the partner firms. I develop and empirically test a model of short-term changes in shareholder values of larger and smaller firms involved in NPD alliances, using the event study methodology on data covering 167 asymmetric alliances in the information technology and communication industries. The model accounts for selection correction, potential cross-correlation across the residuals from the models of firm value changes for the larger and smaller firms, and unobserved heterogeneity. The results suggest that both the partners experience significant short-term financial gains, but there are considerable asymmetries between the larger and smaller firms with regard to the effects of alliance, partner and firm characteristics on the gains of the partner firms. The findings of this study have important implications for managers of both large and small firms. In study two I develop and test a framework of the determinants of new product alliance (NPA) terminations. The hypotheses for study two are tested on a unique database comprised of 401 new product alliances involving 24 pharmaceutical firms during 1990-2005. NPA terminations are modeled using Cox’s proportional hazard specification that accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity of firms with multiple NPAs, competing risks and ties among NPA duration times. The results suggest that NPA terminations are not made in isolation but are influenced by composition of the firm’s portfolio. The results also suggest that NPA terminations are predicted to a great extent by competition between alliances (i.e., product market rivalry) and competition within alliances (i.e., partner value). The findings of this study have important implications for managing a portfolio of new product partnerships.

Venture Capital Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Abstract This study offers a discussion on the agency theory of venture capital, including the cases of one venture capitalist and one entrepreneur, one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs, and two venture capitalists and one entrepreneur. The first model compares the effort levels of the two parties, one venture capitalist and one entrepreneur, when there is a double moral hazard problem. The results are as follows:(1)the effort levels under double moral hazard are lower than those under full information¡Ano matter if the contract is common stock or convertible debt ; (2) a suitably chosen convertible debt contract outperforms a common stock contract; and (3) in the equilibrium, the venture capitalist¡¦s net compensation is equal to his cost of capital. Secondly, the study extends to a double side moral hazard problem between one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs. The results show: (1) the effort levels under double moral hazard are still lower than those under full information in the model; (2) one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs will come up with a double moral hazard problem if they sign the common stock contract; and (3) the incentive to lessen the double moral hazard problem is the total profit shared conditionally by one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs. Finally, this study develops a joint investment framework with an adverse selection problem. One entrepreneur is informed about the project¡¦s potential profitability but two venture capitalists are not .The results show:(1)if the entrepreneur reveals his private information, the individual management cost of two venture capitalists will be equal; (2)if the entrepreneur does not reveal his private information, the individual management cost of the two venture capitalists will be higher in an uncooperative situation; and (3)if the entrepreneur does not reveal his private information, the venture capitalists¡¦ effort levels will be higher in case their management knowledge is of substitutive nature than that of complementary nature. Key words¡Gventure capital, moral hazard, adverse selection

¡@¡@Recently due to the significant economic growth in Taiwan, buildings were constructed taller with usage diversified. However, the Building Code is difficult to cope with this rapid change and also sometimes with design negligence, fire accidents are not uncommon in this country. ¡@¡@Based on former experience, casualties occurred mainly due to the smoke hazard and inadequate time for egress. Therefore, quantitative assessment on these two items has become increasingly important, which is the main theme of this study. ¡@¡@During the design stage, a lot of constraints existed in adapting the local fire code, which is prescriptive in nature, especially in designing buildings with large spaces, atria, or malls. In that case, performance-based design was often attempted followed by quantitative risk assessment to validate its design effectiveness. ¡@¡@In this study, the ABRI Manual for Fire Risk assessment has been applied, followed by the F method for comparative study. The result indicated that both methods can be applied as reliable tools for fire risk assessment and warrants its application in engineering projects.

This research, aimed at advancing the theory of environmental hazard adjustment processes by contrasting households from three cities in a high seismic hazard area with households from three other cities in a moderate seismic hazard area. It identified seven types of stakeholders namely, the risk area residents and their families (primary group), the news media, employers, and friends (secondary group), and federal, state, and local governments (tertiary group), and explained why they are relevant to the adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. It also addressed three key attributes— knowledge, trustworthiness, and responsibility for protection—ascribed to these multiple stakeholders and the relationships of these stakeholder attributes with risk perception, hazard intrusiveness, hazard experience, gender, resource adequacy, fatalism and hazard adjustment adoption. It was specifically concerned with the effects of nested interactions due to trust and power differentials among the seven stakeholders, with the self reported adoption of 16 earthquake protective measures at two points in time (1997 and 1999). Some of the key findings indicate that risk perception, gender, fatalism, city activity in earthquake management and demographic characteristics did not significantly predict hazard adjustment adoption. However, all stakeholder characteristics had significant positive correlations with risk perception and hazard adjustment, implying a peripheral route for social influence. Hazard intrusiveness, hazard experience, and stakeholder knowledge, trustworthiness, and responsibility affected the increased adoption of hazard adjustments by households. Particularly important are the peer groups’ (employers, friends and family) knowledge, trustworthiness and responsibility. These findings suggest, hazard managers cannot count only on the federal, state, and local government advisories put out through the news media to affect community decisions and thereby households’ decisions to take protective actions. Instead, hazard managers need to shift focus and work through peer group networks such as service organizations, industry groups, trade unions, neighborhood organizations, community emergency response teams, faith-based organizations, and educational institutions to increase the knowledge, trustworthiness and responsibility of all in the peer group. This will assure higher household hazard adjustment adoption levels, thus facilitating a reduction in post disaster losses and recovery time.

Thesis (M.S.)--Oregon State University, 2001. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 71-73). Also available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.F.A.), University of Central Oklahoma, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-111).

Thesis (M.S.)--Ball State University, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Dec. 14, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 95-98).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 447-462).

Thesis (M.S.)--Oregon State University, 2003. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 99-101). Also available on the World Wide Web.