Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:02:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 31 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Este trabalho tenciona analisar, segundo as perspectivas fenomenológica, lógica e noológica que perfazem a filosofia de Hegel, o percurso social de autorealização do indivíduo moderno. Nosso objetivo é demonstrar que a realização das potências subjetivas individuais depende de um mecanismo que conduza a intencionalidade fenomenológica ao encontro da própria idealidade lógica. Pois, compreendido como a injunção dos binômios ‘autonomia subjetiva e emancipação econômica’ e ‘dependência intersubjetiva e carência material’, este indivíduo: segundo a perspectiva fenomenológica, tanto tem assegurado pelo itinerário de formação da cultura ocidental o saber de si através do outro, portanto, o experienciar do espírito mediante seu saber da própria liberdade; como, ao sair de si, colhe o desagrado da intersubjetividade abstrata, se abnega e necessita que a mediação universal protagonize seu perdão; mas, segundo a perspectiva lógica, tendo experienciado a espiritualidade do mundo e conferido-lhe o papel de manifestação d / This work intends analyse, accordingly phenomenologic, logical and noological perspectives which complete Hegel´s Philosophy, the self-achievement social path of modern individual person. Our target is to demonstrate that the achievement of the individual subjective potential depends on a mechanism which leads the phenomenologic intentionality to reach the logical ideality itself. Therefore, since understood how the injunction of the binomial ‘subjective autonomy and economical emancipation’ plus ‘intersubjective dependance and marerial needs’, this individual person: accordingly phenomenologic perspective, such has guaranteed the knowledge about himself through another one by Occidental culture itinerary build up, and so, the spirit experiencing in the presence of his own freedom knowledge; as, going out of himself, picks up the dislike of the abstract intersubjectivity, denies himself and demands that universal mediation acts for his forgiveness; but, accordingly the logical perspective, after experience t

acase@tulane.edu / This dissertation argues that Hegel’s Phenomenology presents a rigorous account of the essential tension between politics and theology that lies at the heart of our striving to be at home in the world. The project has two principal components. The first argues, through a detailed exegesis of Chapter IV on self-consciousness, that Hegel derives both our political nature and our impulse to transcend the mundane from the oppositional structure of consciousness, thereby demonstrating that the two impulses are equally rooted in the ontology of man as a self-conscious being. Contrary to recent interpretations, which have tended to focus on the social conditions of normativity to the exclusion of the religious impulse, I argue that the chapter must be read as a whole, as a continuous elaboration of the essential needs of self-consciousness. Rather than understanding the philosophic postures of the stoic and the skeptic and the religious yearning of the unhappy consciousness as spiritual aberrations, resulting from an inadequate social ordering, I argue that they are developments of the bondsman’s discovery of interiority. The relation between these twain impulses then guides an interpretation of the variegated and multifaceted material encountered in the Phenomenology’s subsequent chapters, which present repeated attempts to reconcile this duality and realize the “concept of spirit.” Following a careful analysis of the first stage of “spirit”—the ethical world—I argue that the Phenomenology shows how man’s effort to achieve a harmonious twofold relation to what is other than himself is the obverse of his pursuit of self-knowledge. Ultimately, the tension between politics and theology is only overcome with the advent of absolute knowing, wherein spirit attains a comprehensive understanding of its essential structure. Hegel’s Phenomenology thus reveals the human quest for just social relations and his longing for the divine to be two facets of his search for self-knowledge. / 1 / Paul T. Wilford

This dissertation examines the possible interchangeable connection between the medieval ontological relationship of essence/existence and the modern epistemological relationship of subject/object. Rather than investigating the many medieval and modern philosophers, this dissertation focuses on two philosophers as study cases: One is the Islamic philosopher Mulla Sadra, and the other is the German philosopher George. W. F. Hegel. While the medieval relationship of essence/existence finds its highest development in Sadra, the modern relationship of subject/object finds its highest summit in Hegel. Sadra's break with the metaphysical essentialism of both Greek philosophy and Arabic philosophy results in the moment of Absolute Existentialism. This moment is not explicitly mentioned by Hegel-- neither in the historical development of the Philosophical Idea in the Lectures on The History of Philosophy, nor in the conceptual development of the Logical Idea in the Science of Logic. If the moment of the Absolute Existentialism is contained within Hegel's Absolute Idealism at all, it is so implicitly, as a moment within the Hegelian Idea's self-dialectical process of determining. In this dissertation, I unveil Sadra's moment of the Absolute Existentialism within Hegel's moment of the Absolute Idealism. I argue that, although Sadra's Absolute Existentialism and Hegel's Absolute Idealism are different, both challenge the traditional views of metaphysical essentialism. I provide the logical connection between Sadra's and Hegel's critiques of metaphysical essentialism. I show that, within Hegel's Absolute Idealism, Sadra's Absolute Existentialism emerges in opposition to quality as affirmative reality in the metaphysical essentialism of the Aristotelian tradition. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

In an interview with Jessica Benjamin and Margaret Simons in 1979, Simone de Beauvoir identified the problem that had preoccupied her across her lifetime, that is, “her” problem, as the problem of the “the consciousness of the other”. In making this claim, she echoed words she had written almost fifty years earlier, when in 1927 as an undergraduate student, she wrote in her journal that what interested her was “almost always this opposition of self and other that I have felt since beginning to live”. In bookending her career in this manner, Beauvoir points her readers to consider her work as a sustained engagement with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, for it is in this text that this problem takes shape. Hegel traces the journey of spirit from consciousness to Absolute Knowledge. In so doing he provides a description of how it is that the self comes to reside in the other and the other to reside in the self as the hostility that initially leads to the objectification of one by the other gives way to recognition. This study investigates the development of Beauvoir’s understanding of the problem of the other’s consciousness. Three times across her career Beauvoir would turn to Hegel’s text. Using these readings as guideposts, it traces her account of the relationship between self and other from her study of hostility in her early works, through to her discovery of the force of history and the interdependence of subjectivities in her moral period, to her exploration of the forms of reciprocity in her mature studies, finally through to her acknowledgement of mutual recognition via her reflections on writing in her late works.

The expression, "Realizing Reason in History," has at least two senses, both of which Hegel tries to bring out in his philosophy of history. The first suggests that there. is reason in history. That is, the task of the philosopher is to show how reason has developed itself through history. The second sense suggests that, not only does history show us that reason has developed over time, but the task of history is precisely to develop or realize reason in time. There is reason in history because that is what history brings about. Thus, the "realization" of reason in history is both something that is recognized and something that must be done. This "realization" is accomplished, willy-nilly, through the doings and sufferings of concrete human beings. Hegel wants to show that history is not a cold, anonymous process which simply sweeps up human lives and never looks back. Indeed, his philosophy of history is primarily concerned with the concrete doings and sufferings of human beings, and wishes to rescue from meaninglessness all those ephemeral human lives which populate the historical process. That, according to Hegel, is what the philosophy of history is all about.

Hegel’s master-slave dialectic has often been used as a model or starting point for later theories about emancipation and subversive changes in society. But one often overlooks the fact that the chapter in The Phenomenology of Spirit ends in disaster, as Judith Butler remarks. Instead of realising freedom, the consciousness gets entangled in self debasing activities in its attempts to master the unrelenting principles of the abstract freedom. We get “the unhappy consciousness”. This development is further examined in this essay in dialog with Butler and Slavoj Žižek, amongst others. Focus is placed on the concept of stubborn attachment (Eigensinnigkeit) and the paradoxical role this plays in the development towards freedom. What are the possibilities for transcending a detrimental relationship like the one between slave and master according to the Hegelian dialectic? A conclusion drawn here is that the two chapters about the master and the slave and “the unhappy consciousness” together exemplify Hegel’s assertion of the necessity of having both the abstract, universal freedom – which often take extreme expressions in its one-sidedness – and its concrete correspondence. This aspect is easily overlooked with Butler’s Foucault-inspired view on resistance – a suggestion that also will be further developed in the following.

With the diverse development of modern society, the marital institution including family construction and composed members is different from the traditional one. On the basis of Hegel¡¦s family conception, the following discussion will focus on whether Hegel¡¦s theory is suitable to analyze the institution of marital law or not, and to see if the conception is still one of the motives of social development. More and more socio-phenomena make people take marital problems seriously. By means of analyzing J.Y. Interpretation and Hegel¡¦s family conception, this paper makes some comment and discussion for the meaning and development of the coming family institution. Furthermore, it could be the reference for decision-making of the government¡¦s family police in the future. There are seven chapters included: Chapter 1¡GBackground, motives and objective of this research. The scope and limitation of this research are described as well. Chapter 2¡GIntroduction to Hegel¡¦s biography, public opinion and his writings. Chapter 3¡GA comparison between the real institution and Hegel¡¦s family conception. ¡]including marriage, fortune, children¡¦s education, and disbandment of a family.¡^ Chapter 4¡GDiscuss the marital rights and family rights extended from Constitution, and introduce the nature and related rules of marriage. Chapter 5¡GPoint out some conclusions and contentions of the Judicial Yuan. Interpretation. Chapter 6¡GReview the real problems in our society. Chapter 7¡GConclusion and suggestions.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Fachbereich Erziehungswissenschaften/Humanwissenschaften--Kassel--Universität-Gesamthochschule, 2000. / Bibliogr. p. 431-441. Index.

Diss.--Fachbereich Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften I--Berlin--Freie Universität, 1996. / Bibliogr. p. 277-293. Index.

Habili.-schr.--Philosophische Fakultät I--Berlin--Humboldt-Universität. / Bibliogr. p. 239-246. Index.