Thesis (doctoral)--Universität München, 1983. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [199]-208).

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Bochum, Univ., Diss., 2005.

Zugl.: Wuppertal, Univ., Diss., 2008

Habili.-schr.--Fach Rhilosophie, Fakultät der Kulturwissenschaften--Universität Klagenfurt, 1998. / Bibliogr. p. 699-704. Index.

Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer both advanced a philosophical hermeneutics. These two thinkers, as teacher and student, share much in common, yet their hermeneutics are also divergent. I argue that their commonalities and differences are both markedly present in their contrasted interpretations of Plato. Heidegger argued that Plato was the founder of onto-theological metaphysics because Socrates’ program of education in the Republic required a reorientation of the soul to the Idea of the Good. In this educational reorientation of the soul to the Good, Heidegger claimed Plato effectively sublimated a-letheia to correctness. As his student, Hans-Georg Gadamer shared and attempted to further Heidegger’s interest in primordiality. However, whereas Heidegger “liquefied” Plato, Gadamer’s hermeneutics sought to recover an ontological Plato, one who stood against the tradition as a proponent of primordial a-letheia. Gadamer emphasized the transcendence of the Idea of the Good in Plato’s Republic as evidence that the Good is not an entity like all other Ideas. Through a reading of Plato’s Philebus, Gadamer argued that the Good discloses itself to humans engaged in dialectic in the beautiful unity and proportion of all things. Dialectic is disclosure and concealment of the Good in the matter under discussion. By interpreting Plato as a partner in ontology, Gadamer departed from Heidegger and his reading of the allegory of the cave while also offering a Heideggerian interpretation of Plato.

Lo que aquí se presenta ha de ser una breve tesis de filosofía. Bien puede extrañar que para tal propósito se ofrezca una traducción, pues lo que se esperaría, aun al interpretar a un pensador, es una propuesta “original”. La originalidad se entiende, y con ello se pierde, como la producción de algo novedoso. En ese caso, ¿qué menos original que trasladar de una lengua a otra lo que otro ha dicho?. En medio de este hoy corriente tender a la “originalidad” y “creatividad”, una traducción parece un trabajo demasiado cómodo para que pueda valer como tesis. Esto podría ser, siempre que juzguemos sobre algo sin que primero ello mismo se nos muestre y no nos extrañemos de esta creciente necesidad por lo “original”, la cual difícilmente necesita presentir el origen.

The aim of this study was to investigate ontic conscience, as derived from Heidegger's ontological conception of conscience, as it is lived in concrete experience. Having established, through a close examination of Heidegger's writings on conscience, a question which would elicit actual experience of this phenomenon, the researcher collected sixty-four written accounts of these experiences. Of these he chose the four psychologically richest accounts and, having interviewed each of these four subjects on his situated experience, analysed in detail (using the phenomenological method) the resulting protocols comprising the written accounts and interviews. He then explicated the structure of conscience within its context of authenticity and inauthenticity. The context of conscience was discovered to be such that the person, having surrendered himself to others' experience and expectations of him, lives a pretence in the service of (inauthentically) being-for-others. He loses his sense of (bodily) self in the process, and it is at this point of his living at the extremes of inauthenticity, that he is forced to realise his own (authentic) reality which he has hitherto been concealing both from himself and from others. His primary attunement is reflected in feelings of betrayal, guilt, shame, dread and ambivalence. Through openly and resolutely living his authentic experience, he heals the rupture in his existence between what is revealed (his being-for-others) and what is concealed (his authentic experience), and feels liberated in so doing. This structure of conscience was dialogued with the writings of existential and psychoanalytic philosophers and psychologists in the context of discussing particular areas of psychological significance such as self, others, meaning, awareness and psychotherapy.

No description available.

This thesis gives an account of Heidegger’s understanding of anxiety and death as it relates to the Christian theology of resurrection. It does so by investigating three primary accusations that Heidegger makes against Christianity with respect to its views on death and anxiety interpreted through a belief in an afterlife. In order to interact with Heidegger’s criticisms, Christian phenomenologist Emmanuel Falque’s work is explored for a more dialogical Heideggerian and Christian understanding of death. In doing so, this thesis picks up questions such as: can resurrection interpreted phenomenologically contribute something new to a Heideggerian view of Dasein as a Being-towards-death? as well as in what ways can Heidegger’s starting-point of finitude formulate new possibilities for interpreting Christ’s death and resurrection? Are these theological events necessary for an “authentic” understanding of death and finitude? These questions pertain to anxiety about what Heidegger calls the “to-come”, a concept mapped out in Heidegger’s own work on Christianity and then secularized in his fundamental ontology delineated in chapter one. Chapter two takes up Falque’s work on the death of Jesus and its correlations to Heideggerian views on death, while chapter three contemplates resurrection (and through this, birth) and the various modes of being that it opens up for human finitude. Chapter three concludes with a Levinasian reading of the New Testament resurrection accounts in order to consider how the Christian mode of Being-towards-resurrection can work alongside and, in a certain sense, within a Heideggerian view of human finitude as a Being-towards-death. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)