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This dissertation examines the concept of event, as found in the ontologies developed by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). The texts I focus on are Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (1927), "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1928), "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (lecture 1930, print 1943), Beiträge zur Philosopie (vom Ereignis) (written 1936-38, but not published until 1989), and Deleuze's Différence et répétition (1968). My focus is on the way each philosopher advances an account of the event in relation to a set of key fundamental themes. For Heidegger, these are truth, difference, ground, and time-space. For Deleuze I also discuss ground and time, but focus especially on difference. Deleuze's account of difference entails a distinction between a “virtual” register of dialectical Ideas and an “actual” register of systems of simulacra, and clarifying his concept of event in relation to these plays a dominant role in my analysis. Deleuze's account of dialectical Ideas is profoundly influenced by that of the early twentieth century mathematician and philosopher, Albert Lautman (1908-1944). Lautman, in turn, developed his account through an engagement with Heidegger's early work. In Chapter V, I reconstruct the Heideggerian line of influence on Deleuze via Lautman. Beginning in the mid-1930s Heidegger understands being to be evental in nature, while difference constitutes an essential dimension of the event, though the latter point is often neglected in the scholarship. Truth, ground, and time-space articulate the structure and dynamics of being as event. For Deleuze, being is difference, but difference differentiates by way of events. Ground, time, systems of simulacra, and dialectical Ideas articulate the structure of being's evental differentiation and the genesis of worlds of beings possessing quasi-stable identities modulated by their complex relations. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

My dissertation is a phenomenological analysis of the relationship between intersubjectivity and imagination in Hannah Arendt. The objective of my dissertation is to demonstrate that Arendt has a theory of imagination that provides a substratum to explain her key notions such as "action," "freedom" "beginning," "history," "power," "understanding," "appearance," "space of appearance," and "judgment." In other words, my dissertation shows that not only are these notions related, and not only do they characterize Arendt's account of the political life as fundamentally intersubjective, but they are also derived from her peculiar understanding of imagination that arises within the phenomenological legacy. <br> The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an analysis to suggest a strong relation between imagination and taste as an intersubjective phenomenon in Arendt's Lectures on Kant Political Philosophy (1992). Chapter 2 traces the "possible" nature of imagination in Arendt's notion of "action and "understanding" back through her various works, beginning with the essay "Understanding and Politics" (Difficulties of Understanding) (1954) and the last chapter of The Origins of Totalitarianism (1952), the proceeding through further analyses in The Human Condition (1958). There is an intermediate section outlining the structure of Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 focuses on what Arendt calls "metaphysical fallacies" that are derived from thinking activity and the thinking ego in The Life of the Mind: Thinking. Moreover, this chapter serves as a preparatory discussion and analysis for the following chapter, in addition to discussing how Arendt tries to reestablish a linkage between thinking and judgment based on intersubjectivity, echoing her encounter of Adolf Eichmann's "thoughtlessness." The last chapter demonstrates that these analyses of the "metaphysical fallacies," which Arendt points out in The Life of the Mind: Thinking, are her implicit criticism of Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Kant's transcendental imagination in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1973). Furthermore and finally, by pointing out several parallelisms between Heidegger's interpretation of Kant and Arendt's criticism, the chapter offers a way to reconstruct Arendt's account of intersubjectivity as her own phenomenological interpretation of Kant's transcendental imagination as reproductive imagination against the productive imagination in Heidegger's interpretation. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

(…) La presente tesina pretende ser un intento del autor por llevar a la luz de su propio entendimiento aquello que es el mundo, descubrir en qué consiste y llevar la reflexión a un suelo firme donde sea posible describir su esencia. Para esto entraremos en diálogo con el autor de Ser y Tiempo, Martin Heidegger, quien mediante sus reflexiones nos dará una guía y una base firme para desarrollar las nuestras.

Tesis para optar al grado de Doctor en Filosofía / El presente trabajo aborda la construcción de la dimensión afectiva que, posteriormente, se desarrollará en la Analítica Existencial del Dasein presentada en la obra del pensador alemán Martin Heidegger Ser y tiempo. Nos disponemos a dar cuenta de cómo se fueron constituyendo en el pensamiento del joven Heidegger, a través de sus cursos u obras, los elementos esenciales para la construcción de aquello que en el ámbito ontológico recibe el nombre de disposición afectiva (Befindlichkeit). Para ello nuestro trabajo se desarrolla a través de dos grandes áreas temáticas. Por una parte, lo que hemos llamado “El camino hacia la construcción de la ‘Befindlichkeit’. Primeros pasos hacia la elaboración presentada en Ser y tiempo”; y, por otra, lo que hemos denominado “La Befindlichkeit en Ser y tiempo”.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía / Se presenta el modo en que Heidegger, en sus lecciones tempranas, aborda el problema relativo a cómo determinar la idea de la filosofía. Con ese fin, se exponen algunas condiciones para la interpretación de las pistas seguidas, en el intento de descubrir la articulación inmanente del problema ya señalado. En el transcurso procuro hacer ver las características del momento inicial desde el cual arranca la formulación del problema. Luego, se presenta un fundamental e inicial momento en el transcurso del problema: la dirección que va desde la pregunta por la determinación de la idea de filosofía, hasta la asunción de la «vida» como objeto temático de la filosofía. Finalmente se intenta abordar el modo en que Heidegger asume el concepto de «vida», y cómo esto permite aclarar el camino en la determinación de la idea de filosofía.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía / Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades / El objetivo de este trabajo es comprender lo que constituye el sí-mismo o pormor- de-sí, fundamentalmente dentro del marco del pensamiento que Heidegger promulga en Ser y Tiempo y en Introducción a la filosofía.Para la dilucidación de este objetivo, optamos por un camino que se sumerge en otros momentos fundamentales del ser-en-el-mundo, alcanzando un entramado conceptual apropiado para la comprensión del sí-mismo al que se apunta. Dentro de estos momentos podemos mencionar a la significatividad del mundo, y a la comprensión del ser, entre otros. El logro fundamental de este trabajo radica en haber situado ciertos conceptos fundamentales de Ser y Tiempo y en ofrecer a grandes rasgos la comprensión que Heidegger alcanzó del sí mismo hacia finales de los años veinte.

Thesis advisor: Christopher L. Constas / This work presents the post-modern problem in philosophy. It first presents knowledge as subjective or perspectival through the work of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time. Part Two aims to show, how, in the midst of post-modern relativism, meaningful truths may be constructed in society. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2005. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation investigates the importance of the imagination in the thought of F.W. J. Schelling and Martin Heidegger, and argues that Heidegger's later philosophy cannot be understood properly without appreciating Schelling's central importance for him. It is increasingly recognized today that Schelling, who had long been overlooked, is an important figure in post-Kantian German Idealism. However, his significance for Heidegger's concentration on the creative character of thought remains undervalued. I argue that, by tracing the theme of imagination in these thinkers, the milieu of Schelling's absolute idealism and that of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenlogy may be understood as distinct discourses that nevertheless share in a profound impulse to overcome sensible-intelligible and subject-object dualisms and retrieve and refine the productive and projective character of reason. This impulse is first evident in both thinkers' attention to the role of imagination in Kant's critical project (for Schelling, cir. 1800; for Heidegger, cir. 1929). It then proves inseparable from Schelling's treatments of intuition, identity, ground, and freedom; and it becomes still more evident in Heidegger's 1936 lecture course on Schelling and his affiliated inquiries into the essence of art and poetry. Even as Heidegger labors to deconstruct the alleged visual and subjectivist bias of metaphysics, he remains preoccupied with Schelling's ontological treatment of the law of identity and intent on translating Schelling's aesthetic emphasis into a poetic paradigm for philosophical inquiry. By focusing on how, alongside his engagement with Schelling, Heidegger endeavors to recover the imagination as a poetic (as opposed to reductive and willful) basis for reason, we attain a decisive rubric for understanding his later thought / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.