This thesis considers how Martin Heidegger treats “wonder” (thaumazein) in Plato and Aristotle versus how it appears to be treated by them. The introduction outlines how the problem of wonder arises when Heidegger mentions particular instances from Plato’s Theaetetus and Aristotle’s Metaphysics as the basis for his claim that philosophy originates in wonder. In chapter one, I analyze each of the twenty-four occurrences of wonder in Plato’s Theaetetus, beginning with a preliminary discussion of Heidegger’s delimitation of wonder from the wondrous. In chapter two, I examine the relation between philosophy and wonder in chapters one and two of Book Alpha of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In chapter three, I begin by considering Heidegger’s later lecture, What is that—Philosophy?, before turning to his earlier writing, The Need and Necessity of the First Beginning and the Need and Necessity of an Other Way to Question and to Begin. I end by reflecting on Heidegger’s account of pre-Socratic versus Socratic philosophy in these writings and consider how Leo Strauss seems to provide an alternative to Heidegger’s analysis. Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the relation between wonder and Eros in Plato and Aristotle. / 1 / Ryan Patrick Crowley

Doctor of Philosophy / This thesis begins from the belief that it is currently essential for us to relearn the essence of learning. To commence this task, this thesis works with the assumption that the essence of learning lies in the way learning can be ontological, changing the essence of what is, and instituting a new ‘what is’. This thesis is thus an attempt to take account of the radical constructivism that is the unavoidable anthropocentrism of such essential learning. The philosophical teachings of Martin Heidegger are brought to bear on this question concerning learning. This thesis suggests that on the one hand, the way in which Heidegger teaches, teaches us that learning is a process of instituting, a formative projection of necessities that metaleptically installs what is essential; on the other hand, what is thereby learned with and from Heidegger clarifies that this process of learning is a reflexively finitudinal praxis, a thingly effort that must be performed anew every time and can never be taken-as-finished. This means that the ‘freedom’ to change the essence of ‘what is’ by learning is never merely available to us because essential learning involves making-necessary in a sustained manner over-and-against what currently has been learnt-as-necessary, that is, ‘what presently is’. This thesis therefore learns that learning is an avowed act of willing, but one which cannot and must not be represented as a technical economy under the control of a humanist subject. The latter misrepresentations can in fact be understood as manifestations of the current withdrawal of essential learning. In the end, to try to capture what is being learned in this thesis, the process of essential learning is called ‘design’ as understood in relation to the current concern for sustainability

The argument of this thesis is that Heideggerian individuation does not constitute another form of solipsism and is not incongruent with Heidegger???s account of Mitsein (beingwith). By demonstrating how individuation is bound up with Mitsein I will also argue that this concept of individuation contains an ethics, conceived here as responsibility for one???s Being/existence that nevertheless implicates others. By tracing the trajectory of Heidegger???s thinking from Being and Time to the later text, Time and Being, I want to suggest that the meditation on Being and its relation to Dasein as an individual contains an ethical moment. Ethics, not conceived of as a series of proscriptions, in terms of the Kantian Categorical Imperative for example. Nor ethics conceived in terms of an obligation to and responsibility for another, as in Levinasian ethics, but an ethics in terms of responsibility for existence, and more specifically, for one???s own existence. The ethical moment in Heidegger, I argue, is not one as ambitious as changing the world or assuming infinite and numerous obligations on behalf of others. It is, rather, a question of changing oneself. It is a question of assuming responsibility in response to the call of Being. I will show how, given that Dasein is always Mitsein, others are situated in such an ethics. Central to the thesis is an examination of the relation between indivduation and Mitsein. While Heidegger is always careful to distinguish his form of individuation from other accounts of individuation or solipsism, such as those of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant or Edmund Husserl???s, Heidegger???s conception of solipsism and its relation to his account of Mitsein remains somewhat obscure. As a consequence, there are several problems that this concept raises, all of which have been the subject of much debate. At the centre of this debate is the apparent tension between the concept of individuation and the notion that ontologically, Dasein is also a Mitsein. This tension has led to a number of interpretations, which either argue that the concept of individuation is inconsistent with the notion of Mitsein, or that it constitutes yet another instance of Cartesian subjectivity and that as a consequence, it is inherently unethical. This thesis contributes to this debate by submitting that the concept of individuation, while primary or central to Heidegger???s ontology, is not in tension with his account of Mitsein. I use Jean-Luc Nancy???s paradoxical logic of the singular to argue for this claim. I suggest that it is precisely this concept of individuation that can inform an ethics and theory of political action on account of the emphasis on individual responsibility. The second part of my argument, also made with the aid of Nancy, is that this can inform an ethics and a theory of political action, not at level of making moral judgements, or yielding standards of right and wrong, but at the level of individual and by implication, collective responsibility for one???s own existence. Given that there is no real separation between the ontic and ontological levels in Heidegger???s work, a taking responsibility at the level of one???s own Being will invariably play itself out ontically in factical life in terms of moral responsibility and judgement. I explore the concrete political implications of this through an examination of Heidegger???s account of freedom. I argue that Heidegger???s removal of freedom from the ontology of self-presence and his alternative conception of it provides us with a way of thinking freedom not in terms of a specific set of rights, but as a mode of being-in-theworld and as the basis for collective political action. I use the work of Hannah Arendt to develop a theory of political action, freedom and judgment from this revisionary conception of freedom.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2007. / Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Addressing the meaning of Martin Heidegger's much-discussed concept of 'authenticity',this study challenges the view, put forward by Charles Guignon and others, that that concept chiefly concerns the significance that an individual life can acquire. Emphasizing the crucial distinction between relational and transcendant meaning, the study sees that distinction as critical to Heidegger's treatment of authenticity, and, more broadly, to the manner in which authenticity figures in the situating of Being and Time in the general context of nihilism and belief Drawing on arguments put forward by Hubert Dreyfus, and especially attuned to Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger, the study repositions the concept at the point where Heidegger's existential analytic and the all too human desire for deeper meaning meet. The result serves at once to clarify the concept and refine understanding of its place in larger histories.

While remaining rooted in a comparison of some of the primary texts of the thinkers under scrutiny, my thesis also discusses several issues which arise in the mutual consideration of Heidegger and Strauss, specifically the questions of the ontological and political status of nature, the problem of ‘first philosophy,’ and the method by which to interpret philosophical texts, as well as a continuous analysis of Strauss’s appellation of ‘modern,’ as opposed to ‘ancient,’ and ‘religious,’ as opposed to ‘philosophical,’ to Heidegger’s thought. I first consider every moment in Strauss’s corpus where he discusses Heidegger’s thought. From this discussion, I identify four main lines of critique which may be extracted from Strauss’s writings on Heidegger. Then, I turn to Heidegger’s texts themselves in order to determine if Strauss’s critique indeed finds purchase there, addressing each of the lines of critique in turn. Finally, I consider Strauss and Heidegger in tandem, in light of the three questions identified above. I show that many of what Strauss determines to be Heidegger’s errors arose as a result of the way that Heidegger read ancient philosophical texts, and I suggest that Strauss’s approach, i.e., to consider the possible esoteric meaning of a text, in fact permits the reader to access an interpretation that is truer to the textual phenomena. This claim, however, is not intended to obscure the remarkable similarities between each thinker’s respective interpretive methods. I conclude that Strauss’s critique of Heidegger, vehement as it is, also indicates Strauss’s dependence on Heidegger’s thought for the inspiration of Strauss’s own philosophical project. The relation between Strauss and Heidegger, then, remains profoundly ambiguous.

The primary task of this work is a comparative analysis of the understanding of ‘freedom’ as presented in the works of Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault. I argue that, taken together, Heidegger and Foucault represent the most systematic and coherent articulation since Marx of the notion that our primary experience of the world is not mediated by consciousness but is, instead, a practical relation. This position permits Heidegger and Foucault to cast freedom not as a property, status or standing to be achieved by the subject, nor as an end-state to be achieved through a developmental anthropology, but rather as an ethical relationship to a field of possibilities—an ethos— and the practices that sustain this relationship. I use this discussion on freedom as a means of also contributing to two other debates, one regarding the general possibility of combining ontological and historical forms of critical analysis and the second, more specific question of Foucault’s relationship to Heidegger.

The primary task of this work is a comparative analysis of the understanding of ‘freedom’ as presented in the works of Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault. I argue that, taken together, Heidegger and Foucault represent the most systematic and coherent articulation since Marx of the notion that our primary experience of the world is not mediated by consciousness but is, instead, a practical relation. This position permits Heidegger and Foucault to cast freedom not as a property, status or standing to be achieved by the subject, nor as an end-state to be achieved through a developmental anthropology, but rather as an ethical relationship to a field of possibilities—an ethos— and the practices that sustain this relationship. I use this discussion on freedom as a means of also contributing to two other debates, one regarding the general possibility of combining ontological and historical forms of critical analysis and the second, more specific question of Foucault’s relationship to Heidegger.

While remaining rooted in a comparison of some of the primary texts of the thinkers under scrutiny, my thesis also discusses several issues which arise in the mutual consideration of Heidegger and Strauss, specifically the questions of the ontological and political status of nature, the problem of ‘first philosophy,’ and the method by which to interpret philosophical texts, as well as a continuous analysis of Strauss’s appellation of ‘modern,’ as opposed to ‘ancient,’ and ‘religious,’ as opposed to ‘philosophical,’ to Heidegger’s thought. I first consider every moment in Strauss’s corpus where he discusses Heidegger’s thought. From this discussion, I identify four main lines of critique which may be extracted from Strauss’s writings on Heidegger. Then, I turn to Heidegger’s texts themselves in order to determine if Strauss’s critique indeed finds purchase there, addressing each of the lines of critique in turn. Finally, I consider Strauss and Heidegger in tandem, in light of the three questions identified above. I show that many of what Strauss determines to be Heidegger’s errors arose as a result of the way that Heidegger read ancient philosophical texts, and I suggest that Strauss’s approach, i.e., to consider the possible esoteric meaning of a text, in fact permits the reader to access an interpretation that is truer to the textual phenomena. This claim, however, is not intended to obscure the remarkable similarities between each thinker’s respective interpretive methods. I conclude that Strauss’s critique of Heidegger, vehement as it is, also indicates Strauss’s dependence on Heidegger’s thought for the inspiration of Strauss’s own philosophical project. The relation between Strauss and Heidegger, then, remains profoundly ambiguous.