The argument of this thesis is that Heideggerian individuation does not constitute another form of solipsism and is not incongruent with Heidegger???s account of Mitsein (beingwith). By demonstrating how individuation is bound up with Mitsein I will also argue that this concept of individuation contains an ethics, conceived here as responsibility for one???s Being/existence that nevertheless implicates others. By tracing the trajectory of Heidegger???s thinking from Being and Time to the later text, Time and Being, I want to suggest that the meditation on Being and its relation to Dasein as an individual contains an ethical moment. Ethics, not conceived of as a series of proscriptions, in terms of the Kantian Categorical Imperative for example. Nor ethics conceived in terms of an obligation to and responsibility for another, as in Levinasian ethics, but an ethics in terms of responsibility for existence, and more specifically, for one???s own existence. The ethical moment in Heidegger, I argue, is not one as ambitious as changing the world or assuming infinite and numerous obligations on behalf of others. It is, rather, a question of changing oneself. It is a question of assuming responsibility in response to the call of Being. I will show how, given that Dasein is always Mitsein, others are situated in such an ethics. Central to the thesis is an examination of the relation between indivduation and Mitsein. While Heidegger is always careful to distinguish his form of individuation from other accounts of individuation or solipsism, such as those of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant or Edmund Husserl???s, Heidegger???s conception of solipsism and its relation to his account of Mitsein remains somewhat obscure. As a consequence, there are several problems that this concept raises, all of which have been the subject of much debate. At the centre of this debate is the apparent tension between the concept of individuation and the notion that ontologically, Dasein is also a Mitsein. This tension has led to a number of interpretations, which either argue that the concept of individuation is inconsistent with the notion of Mitsein, or that it constitutes yet another instance of Cartesian subjectivity and that as a consequence, it is inherently unethical. This thesis contributes to this debate by submitting that the concept of individuation, while primary or central to Heidegger???s ontology, is not in tension with his account of Mitsein. I use Jean-Luc Nancy???s paradoxical logic of the singular to argue for this claim. I suggest that it is precisely this concept of individuation that can inform an ethics and theory of political action on account of the emphasis on individual responsibility. The second part of my argument, also made with the aid of Nancy, is that this can inform an ethics and a theory of political action, not at level of making moral judgements, or yielding standards of right and wrong, but at the level of individual and by implication, collective responsibility for one???s own existence. Given that there is no real separation between the ontic and ontological levels in Heidegger???s work, a taking responsibility at the level of one???s own Being will invariably play itself out ontically in factical life in terms of moral responsibility and judgement. I explore the concrete political implications of this through an examination of Heidegger???s account of freedom. I argue that Heidegger???s removal of freedom from the ontology of self-presence and his alternative conception of it provides us with a way of thinking freedom not in terms of a specific set of rights, but as a mode of being-in-theworld and as the basis for collective political action. I use the work of Hannah Arendt to develop a theory of political action, freedom and judgment from this revisionary conception of freedom.

The argument of this thesis is that Heideggerian individuation does not constitute another form of solipsism and is not incongruent with Heidegger???s account of Mitsein (beingwith). By demonstrating how individuation is bound up with Mitsein I will also argue that this concept of individuation contains an ethics, conceived here as responsibility for one???s Being/existence that nevertheless implicates others. By tracing the trajectory of Heidegger???s thinking from Being and Time to the later text, Time and Being, I want to suggest that the meditation on Being and its relation to Dasein as an individual contains an ethical moment. Ethics, not conceived of as a series of proscriptions, in terms of the Kantian Categorical Imperative for example. Nor ethics conceived in terms of an obligation to and responsibility for another, as in Levinasian ethics, but an ethics in terms of responsibility for existence, and more specifically, for one???s own existence. The ethical moment in Heidegger, I argue, is not one as ambitious as changing the world or assuming infinite and numerous obligations on behalf of others. It is, rather, a question of changing oneself. It is a question of assuming responsibility in response to the call of Being. I will show how, given that Dasein is always Mitsein, others are situated in such an ethics. Central to the thesis is an examination of the relation between indivduation and Mitsein. While Heidegger is always careful to distinguish his form of individuation from other accounts of individuation or solipsism, such as those of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant or Edmund Husserl???s, Heidegger???s conception of solipsism and its relation to his account of Mitsein remains somewhat obscure. As a consequence, there are several problems that this concept raises, all of which have been the subject of much debate. At the centre of this debate is the apparent tension between the concept of individuation and the notion that ontologically, Dasein is also a Mitsein. This tension has led to a number of interpretations, which either argue that the concept of individuation is inconsistent with the notion of Mitsein, or that it constitutes yet another instance of Cartesian subjectivity and that as a consequence, it is inherently unethical. This thesis contributes to this debate by submitting that the concept of individuation, while primary or central to Heidegger???s ontology, is not in tension with his account of Mitsein. I use Jean-Luc Nancy???s paradoxical logic of the singular to argue for this claim. I suggest that it is precisely this concept of individuation that can inform an ethics and theory of political action on account of the emphasis on individual responsibility. The second part of my argument, also made with the aid of Nancy, is that this can inform an ethics and a theory of political action, not at level of making moral judgements, or yielding standards of right and wrong, but at the level of individual and by implication, collective responsibility for one???s own existence. Given that there is no real separation between the ontic and ontological levels in Heidegger???s work, a taking responsibility at the level of one???s own Being will invariably play itself out ontically in factical life in terms of moral responsibility and judgement. I explore the concrete political implications of this through an examination of Heidegger???s account of freedom. I argue that Heidegger???s removal of freedom from the ontology of self-presence and his alternative conception of it provides us with a way of thinking freedom not in terms of a specific set of rights, but as a mode of being-in-theworld and as the basis for collective political action. I use the work of Hannah Arendt to develop a theory of political action, freedom and judgment from this revisionary conception of freedom.

This dissertation reports a phenomenological investigation of human activity called "innovation", the process by which new technology is created. The dissertation’s central, interlocking, themes are authenticity and different worlds. Its conceptual foundation is Martin Heidegger’s account of being human. It explores the ironic possibility that innovation as it is don’t today (as integrated craft work) can encourage "authentic" human existence. The dissertation synthesises original research on innovators working in a commercial innovation consultancy with Heidegger’s thinking on authenticity, science and technology, and with contemporary innovation scholarship and social studies of science and technology. It uses a Heideggerian phenomenological method and includes two chapters written in an unusual fragmentary style to signify the momentary nature of understanding. Original aspects of the dissertation include (1) an interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of fore-structure as self-understanding in the sense of understanding ones role in how the world is understood and (2) the ironic suggestion that pressure for commercial success has transformed innovation from a scientific process to a techne process and has encouraged authenticity. I suggest the self-understanding of scientists is different from the self-understanding of innovators. I suggest innovators, at least some of the time (in their magic moments), understand themselves as "partners with Being," as modest but important witnesses to what being grants rather than as masters of the "reality" with which they work.

Doctor of Philosophy / This thesis begins from the belief that it is currently essential for us to relearn the essence of learning. To commence this task, this thesis works with the assumption that the essence of learning lies in the way learning can be ontological, changing the essence of what is, and instituting a new ‘what is’. This thesis is thus an attempt to take account of the radical constructivism that is the unavoidable anthropocentrism of such essential learning. The philosophical teachings of Martin Heidegger are brought to bear on this question concerning learning. This thesis suggests that on the one hand, the way in which Heidegger teaches, teaches us that learning is a process of instituting, a formative projection of necessities that metaleptically installs what is essential; on the other hand, what is thereby learned with and from Heidegger clarifies that this process of learning is a reflexively finitudinal praxis, a thingly effort that must be performed anew every time and can never be taken-as-finished. This means that the ‘freedom’ to change the essence of ‘what is’ by learning is never merely available to us because essential learning involves making-necessary in a sustained manner over-and-against what currently has been learnt-as-necessary, that is, ‘what presently is’. This thesis therefore learns that learning is an avowed act of willing, but one which cannot and must not be represented as a technical economy under the control of a humanist subject. The latter misrepresentations can in fact be understood as manifestations of the current withdrawal of essential learning. In the end, to try to capture what is being learned in this thesis, the process of essential learning is called ‘design’ as understood in relation to the current concern for sustainability

Thesis (M. Div.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 1976. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 65-67).

Zugl.: Lüneburg, University, Diss., 2004.

Thesis (MHSc--Health Science)--Auckland University of Technology, 2002. / Also held in print (ix, 168 leaves, 30 cm.) in Akoranga Theses Collection. (T 616.9940019 LOT)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2000. / Title from title screen (viewed 28 March 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Arts. Degree awarded 2000; thesis submitted 1999. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

Thesis--Cologne. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 84-89).

Thèse (Ph.D.) - Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2000. / Bibliogr.: f. 288-297.