Esta tese investiga, basicamente, o ensaio Que philosopher cest apprendre a mourir, do filósofo francês Michel de Montaigne. Trata-se de um texto que é um bom exemplo da forma como o filósofo rejeita a tradição metafísica na qual o problema da morte sempre foi pensado (dos pensadores gregos aos teólogos medievais). Mostramos que a originalidade deste ensaio reside no fato de Montaigne nos aconselhar a seguir a natureza (a qual, em seu pensamento, se confunde com o costume), e, com isso, ele se distancia não só da dogmática cristã, mas também dos ensinamentos morais helenísticos. / This thesis investigates, basically, the essay Que philosopher cest apprendre a mourir, by the French philosopher Michel de Montaigne. This is a text which is a good example of how the philosopher rejects the metaphysical tradition in which the problem of death has always been thought (from the Greek thinkers to Medieval theologians). We show that the originality of this essay lies in the fact of Montaigne in advising us to follow the nature (which, in his thoughts, it confuses with the usual), and thus, it gets away not only from the Christian Dogmatics, but also from the Hellenistic moral teachings.

Ancient Greek philosophical schools are said to share a common structure in their ethical theories which is characterized by a eudaimonistic teleology based in an understanding of human nature. At first glance, the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus as described in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism seems to fit into this model insofar as he describes the end of the skeptic as ataraxia, a common account of the expression of human happiness. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of Sextus’s philosophy for several reasons. “The end of skepticism” cannot be eudaimonistic or teleological in the way that other ancient ethical theories are typically understood; moreover, ataraxia is not an end derived from a theory about human nature. For these reasons, the skeptical way of life is radically different than the ethical theories proposed by other schools. I argue that this difference is a result of the character of the skeptical enterprise which involves the implicit rejection of norms in both the epistemological and the ethical spheres.

Although the Epicurean ethical system is fundamentally egoistic and hedonistic, it attributes a surprisingly significant role to friendship. Even so, I argue that traditional discussions of Epicurean friendship fail to adequately account for the value (or pleasure) of individual friends. In this thesis I present an amended notion of Epicurean friendship that better accounts for all of the pleasure friends afford. However, the success of my project requires rejecting an Epicurean ethical principle. Because of this, I explore textual evidence both in favor and against the amended notion I propose and the problematic ethical principle. After arguing against the problematic ethical principle and dispelling additional objections to my project, I conclude that Epicureans should endorse the amended notion of friendship I have developed.

Esta tese investiga, basicamente, o ensaio Que philosopher cest apprendre a mourir, do filósofo francês Michel de Montaigne. Trata-se de um texto que é um bom exemplo da forma como o filósofo rejeita a tradição metafísica na qual o problema da morte sempre foi pensado (dos pensadores gregos aos teólogos medievais). Mostramos que a originalidade deste ensaio reside no fato de Montaigne nos aconselhar a seguir a natureza (a qual, em seu pensamento, se confunde com o costume), e, com isso, ele se distancia não só da dogmática cristã, mas também dos ensinamentos morais helenísticos. / This thesis investigates, basically, the essay Que philosopher cest apprendre a mourir, by the French philosopher Michel de Montaigne. This is a text which is a good example of how the philosopher rejects the metaphysical tradition in which the problem of death has always been thought (from the Greek thinkers to Medieval theologians). We show that the originality of this essay lies in the fact of Montaigne in advising us to follow the nature (which, in his thoughts, it confuses with the usual), and thus, it gets away not only from the Christian Dogmatics, but also from the Hellenistic moral teachings.