Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / James E. Sherow / This project examines ecological change in Lake Huron during the nineteenth and twentieth century and investigates the causative role of the commercial fisheries in that change. The repeated failures of various regional and international efforts designed to improve management of the lake’s fisheries are also examined. The fundamental argument is that economic considerations were the primary motivations for policy development related to the Great Lakes fisheries. Historically management programs and legislation were shaped by local and regional economic interests. The central focus of this project is Lake Huron. Anthropogenic changes in that lake’s environment dramatically affected the lives and relationships of its non-human inhabitants. The same changes also transformed relationships among human beings who relied on the lake’s resources. Commercial fishermen who operated in the waters of both the United States and Canada relied on the lake for their livelihood, but as the twentieth century commenced the supply of marketable fishes decreased. Competition accelerated and fishermen introduced new technologies and increased their quantity of fishing gear in an effort to maximize their catches in response to fluctuating returns. Economic considerations were of primary concern to both fishermen and government bureaucrats. Lake Huron’s status as an international borderland further complicated the situation. Analysts in both the United States and Canada recognized the dramatically changing conditions of the lakes as reflected through the woes of the commercial fishery. Nonetheless, the germane state, provincial and national governments repeatedly failed in their attempts to develop a cooperative management plan. By the second half of the twentieth century Lake Huron’s embattled biome stood in stark contrast to the once seemingly endless numbers of fishes and flora that sustained the lake’s web of life for hundreds of years.

Master of Arts / Department of History / David R. Stone / This paper examines the influence of Hannibal of Carthage on the art of war over time. Hannibal’s war with Rome provides a complex example of strategic and tactical successes and failures that have been modeled and studied throughout military history in one fashion or another. The method of research was a literature review organized into chapters with relevant examples from ancient through modern history. The primary finding was that Hannibal’s examples have been interpreted according to the needs of each observer. There was no uniform conclusion of lessons drawn from Hannibal’s campaigns. Perceptions were drawn by each author based on time and particular circumstances. For instance, Machiavelli pillories Hannibal’s use of mercenaries as the antithesis of a virtuous society. Alfred von Schlieffen studied the tactical battle of Cannae and attempted to construct a strategic level plan for war in Europe based on lessons drawn from his study. Victor Hanson cites Hannibal’s war with Rome as a metaphor for the West’s current conflict with Islam, implying that the West will be ultimately victorious in this latest confrontation owing to the superiority of its institutions. The main conclusion that can be drawn is that Hannibal’s successes and failures are still relevant for study by historians and practitioners of the military arts even though there is no one set of definitive lessons learned.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / On 16 January 1991, a coalition of nations led by the United States launched a series of air strikes against Iraq to force that country to withdraw from Kuwait. What followed was an intense aerial bombardment of Iraqi military and civilian infrastructure which lasted until 24 February when the coalition began a ground offensive. After four days of ground fighting Iraq withdrew from Kuwait. American pictorial print media created a historical interpretation of the 1991 Persian Gulf War in the sense that selected images were immediately published to a broad audience and these images provided an acceptable story of the war. Perceptions of an Air Campaign examines the cultural meanings of the air war and how these meanings took shape in the narrative pictorial print media produced. The narrative is intricately related to the legacy of the Vietnam War. For generations, Americans viewed contemporary war, politics, foreign affairs, and culture through their memories of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. President George H.W. Bush guaranteed the U.S. public that the Gulf War was consciously being constructed to avoid a conflict similar to Vietnam. According to the president, the United States was going to war with enough resources for a swift and decisive victory, thereby avoiding the Vietnam pitfall of an open-ended conflict. Pictorial print media articulated a narrative displaying U.S. military strength and dominance that fulfilled Bush’s promise.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / On March 30, 1972 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) launched a conventional offensive, dubbed the Easter Offensive, against South Vietnam. In response to this act President Richard Nixon ordered the United States Air Force (USAF) and Navy (USN) to resume bombing North Vietnam. For the next nine months, USAF conducted offensive operations against the whole of the DRV in an attempt to accomplish four major objectives. First, USAF units sought to interdict sufficiently the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA's) supply lines to preclude continued conventional operations in South Vietnam. Second, President Nixon had directed the Air Force to inflict sufficient punishment on North Vietnam in order to deter further aggression against its southern neighbor. Third, as implied by the Nixon Doctrine, USAF was to establish convincingly its ability to conduct conventional operations in support of an allied nation during a major conflict. Finally, with the introduction of B-52 bombers in December 1972, the Air Force was to maintain the credibility of manned strategic aircraft as part of American nuclear deterrence policy. Historically, the United States Air Force and many civilian observers have maintained that the United States Air Force succeeded in all four tasks. However, the evidence strongly indicates that the United States Air Force not only failed to achieve all but the interdiction objective during the course of operations against North Vietnam, but that this defeat stemmed from the decision not to develop a comprehensive Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) doctrine from 1968 through 1972. In choosing this course of action, USAF's military and civilian leaders guaranteed that American forces would be unable to bring sufficient force to bear to achieve President Nixon's goals. Furthermore, by choosing this course of action and, in addition, refocusing the Air Force on nuclear delivery rather than enhancing USAF's capability to penetrate an integrated air defense (IADS), these same leaders ignored the results of Operation Rolling Thunder. The consequence of this choice, as will be shown in the following pages, was an outcome that had serious implications for the United States' Cold War conventional and nuclear military policy.