This thesis examines the nature and the extent of American economic power and influence in the 1960s in the context of the Anglo-American economic relationship. It also seeks to provide an insight into the workings of 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States in the economic realm. Finally, this examination attempts to establish the veracity of new more positive historical interpretations of the foreign policy of President Lyndon Johnson. The study argues that American economic power was not waning, as was previously suggested by some historians. It reveals that the Johnson Administration was able to use its financial assistance for sterling to extract significant concessions from the British government in its domestic economic policies. Indeed, the thesis demonstrates that the United States played a significant role in the formulation of British economic policy. The existence of transgovernmental networks between actors and agencies were instrumental in enabling the Johnson Administration to influence the policies of the British government. Moreover, this study contends that many of the most important decisions of the Labour government relating to monetary policy and the sterling exchange rate were influenced by considerations for the views of the United States. It concludes that the 'special relationship' was determined not by sentiment or shared culture, but largely by community of interest. Finally, the thesis concurs in and further develops the emerging positive revisionist interpretation of the European policy of President Johnson.

Thesis advisor: Seth Jacobs / The vice presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson and Humphrey H. Humphrey were momentous stages in both of their political careers. After leaving the position of Senate majority leader to become John F. Kennedy’s vice president, Johnson underwent a swift, total decrease in political efficacy. Those dark years impacted how he tackled the presidency, particularly in the handling of his own vice president. As Johnson’s vice president, Humphrey also watched the political power he had accrued as Senate majority whip evaporate. In an attempt to impress Johnson, Humphrey overcompensated and became a disciple for the Johnson administration’s unpopular war in Vietnam, destroying any chance Humphrey had to further his political career past the vice presidency. I argue that while their terms as vice presidents—Johnson’s was less than three years long and Humphrey’s was four years—were short periods of time in the grand scheme of their long careers, they were highly consequential for both men and severely damaging for Humphrey. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2017. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: History.

This dissertation provides a detailed examination of the influence of Thomas Clifton Mann on the Latin American policy of the United States of America. A Foreign Service Officer from 1942, Mann eventually rose to the position of Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, and was President Lyndon Johnson’s most valued adviser on inter-American policy until his retirement from government service in May 1966. Commonly portrayed as highly conservative, insensitive to Latin American needs, and opposed to U.S. aid programs, Mann was a far more complex character than his critics have allowed. During the Eisenhower administration Mann’s influence was vital in reorienting policy priorities in Washington, emphasising the need for price stabilisation measures and limited development aid. During the Kennedy administration he opposed the Bay of Pigs invasion, before serving as Ambassador to Mexico where he successfully resolved the nation’s longest running border dispute. Most influential under Lyndon Johnson, Mann sought to place U.S. policy on a stable and sustainable path, reining in unrealistic expectations while fending off attacks from fiscal conservatives opposed to aid measures of any kind. In studying Mann’s career, much is revealed regarding the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations during a crucial period of history. While U.S. goals remained largely consistent, the nature of the challenges faced and the tactics used to counter them did not. Mann’s career saw the Cold War come to Latin America, and was met with both aid and military intervention, often in the form of counterinsurgency training and operations. Mann’s role in developing those polices reveals the contrasts and, more often, consistencies between the administrations he served, and undermines claims that the transition from Kennedy to Johnson witnessed a radical policy overhaul. Studying Mann’s career also illuminates divisive internal debates over the nature and meaning of inter-American relations, and the role and influence of an individual within Washington’s policymaking bureaucracy.

The United States Information Agency (USIA) was the official propaganda agency of the American government. During the period of the Johnson administration, its programme in Italy was the second largest in Western Europe, right after West Germany and immediately before France. This dissertation examines the USIA programme, and places it within the larger context of American policy towards Italy at this crucial juncture in the history of both countries. Beginning in the 1950s, following the traumatic experience of World War II and the unthinkable implications of nuclear warfare, the bipolar conflict was progressively channelled into non-military means of combat. In addition to the better known methods of traditional diplomacy, the threat of force, and economic aid, the United States deployed new instruments to win the ‘battle for hearts and minds’ against the Soviet Union. These new instruments included public diplomacy, cultural and educational exchanges, and ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ propaganda operations. This exercise of soft power became one of the main instruments used to stop the expansion of communism and to unite NATO countries behind American leadership. Yet this task was particularly demanding during the Johnson years, when the image of the Unites States abroad was tarnished as never before by the civil rights struggle and the escalation of the Vietnam War. Italy is a particularly interesting and important case study of American psychological warfare in Western Europe. Not only did the country host the largest Communist Party in the West, the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), for the entire duration of the cold war, –– but Italy also had more than twenty governments in the first two decades of the post-war era. At a deeper level, the country oscillated between two different political formulas, centrismo and a centre-left coalition. As a result it proved impossible to carry out the structural reforms needed to ensure the country’s stability. The government’s inability to ‘keep Italy on track’ and to effectively oppose the communist threat led to the deployment of an extensive USIA programme in Italy. Surprisingly, this topic has not been studied intensively. Although there is a rich literature on American influence in the Italian election of 1948, and there has been some discussion of American psychological warfare in Italy during the fifties, no scholar has carried out an in-depth study on the role of US public diplomacy in Italy during the sixties, particularly the Johnson era. The dissertation is based on detailed research in the Johnson and Nixon libraries as well as at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland where the official documents of the USIA (RG 306) are located. On the Italian side, I have analyzed the major Italian newspapers, radio and TV shows targeted by the agency.

Lyndon Johnson's opponents used the outcome of his 1948 senatorial bid to demonstrate his dishonesty. This win by eighty-seven disputed votes gave him the derogatory title, "Landslide Lyndon." Johnson's initial senate campaigns in 1941 and 1948 are examined for Texas Politics as usual. Upon Senator Sheppard's death in 1937, a special election precipitated with Martin Dies, Gerald Mann, Lyndon Johnson, and W. Lee O'Daniel as the candidates. Although this election has not received the notoriety of 1948, it exemplifies Texas Politics as usual where thousands of manipulated votes resulted in O'Daniel's late victory. Johnson's next race for the senate came in 1948. He ran against George Peddy and Coke Stevenson. This expensive campaign rested upon two hundred two invalid votes from Jim Wells County. In reality, tens of thousands of manipulated votes on both sides resulted in litigation making its way to the United States Supreme Court.

In this comparative policy development analysis, I utilize path-dependence theory and presidential records to analyze President Lyndon Johnson's success in passing Medicare and Medicaid and President Bill Clinton's failure to pass national health care reform. Findings support four major themes from the Johnson administration: 1) President Johnson had a keen understanding of the importance of language in framing debate; 2) He placed control of the legislative process in the hands of a small, select group of seasoned political operatives and career policymaking professionals; 3) He paid considerable attention to the details of negotiations and the policy consequences; and 4) He had a highly developed sense of the political and legislative processes involved in passing major legislation. The case study of the Clinton administration reveals five major themes: 1) There is a lack of evidence that President Clinton remained actively engaged throughout the policy development and legislative processes, instead choosing to delegate the process to the First Lady; 2) There was a naiveté on the part of the Clintons and many administration staff members with regard to the legal and political ramifications of their decisions; 3) The Clintons tried to make the plan fully their own, sharing little credit for its development with Congress; 4) Their attempts to incorporate existing corporate health care delivery structures with their vision for universal coverage proved unworkable; and 5) The extended time from task force launch to bill delivery gave opponents ample time to marshal their opposition forces. I conclude that in developing health care legislation, Johnson had the advantages of: 1) a small group of key policymakers; 2) multiple, simultaneous legislative initiatives which diffused the attention of a more limited media; and, 3) national crises which promoted an environment conducive to sweeping policy change. I suggest that major, national health care reform will not occur until: 1) an economic or geopolitical crisis sets the stage for change; 2) business interests and progressive interests find common ground; and, 3) Americans achieve a new cultural understanding of universal health care as both economically just and economically necessary. / text

Master of Arts / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / On March 30, 1972 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) launched a conventional offensive, dubbed the Easter Offensive, against South Vietnam. In response to this act President Richard Nixon ordered the United States Air Force (USAF) and Navy (USN) to resume bombing North Vietnam. For the next nine months, USAF conducted offensive operations against the whole of the DRV in an attempt to accomplish four major objectives. First, USAF units sought to interdict sufficiently the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA's) supply lines to preclude continued conventional operations in South Vietnam. Second, President Nixon had directed the Air Force to inflict sufficient punishment on North Vietnam in order to deter further aggression against its southern neighbor. Third, as implied by the Nixon Doctrine, USAF was to establish convincingly its ability to conduct conventional operations in support of an allied nation during a major conflict. Finally, with the introduction of B-52 bombers in December 1972, the Air Force was to maintain the credibility of manned strategic aircraft as part of American nuclear deterrence policy. Historically, the United States Air Force and many civilian observers have maintained that the United States Air Force succeeded in all four tasks. However, the evidence strongly indicates that the United States Air Force not only failed to achieve all but the interdiction objective during the course of operations against North Vietnam, but that this defeat stemmed from the decision not to develop a comprehensive Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) doctrine from 1968 through 1972. In choosing this course of action, USAF's military and civilian leaders guaranteed that American forces would be unable to bring sufficient force to bear to achieve President Nixon's goals. Furthermore, by choosing this course of action and, in addition, refocusing the Air Force on nuclear delivery rather than enhancing USAF's capability to penetrate an integrated air defense (IADS), these same leaders ignored the results of Operation Rolling Thunder. The consequence of this choice, as will be shown in the following pages, was an outcome that had serious implications for the United States' Cold War conventional and nuclear military policy.

The presented thesis is an analysis of American foreign policy thinking applying comprehensive analysis of three presidential administrations. The analysis is embedded in the historical context of the Suez Crisis, and provides a picture of the change in US foreign policy after the Suez Crisis comparing the three foreign policy doctrines related to this particular period of history - D. D. Eisenhower, J. F. Kennedy and L. John Johnson. The foreign policy doctrine represents a particular expression, image of foreign policy of a given state. The American political system is known by several historically and politically significant foreign policy doctrines. The thesis describes how the US foreign policy is created and what leads to the process of formulation of the presedential doctrines. An important element in the background of the analysis is the Cold War itself. Besides the theoretical definition, the work also provides the complex features of the administrations of the three presidents submited to analysis. Part of the characteristic is the analysis of individual foreign policy doctrines that points out the difference among administrations derived from the historical moment of the Suez crisis. The results of the comparison will draw conclusions on the similarity as well as possible differences...

This thesis is a work that focuses on how significant the press was to the success and failure of President Lyndon Baines Johnson. In the thesis, three aspects of the Johnson years are analyzed. The first chapter discusses the media's portrayal of Lyndon Johnson during the presidential campaign of 1964. The second chapter is an analysis of how the press reported on President Johnson concerning the issue of civil rights. The third chapter dissects the media's perception of Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam conflict. The primary research used in the thesis is a culmination of polls, editorials, personal letters, and memos from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library. Through use of these sources and a number of secondary materials, one is able to witness the period in which the popularity of the Johnson Administration began to experience a downturn.

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