In the 40 years since the end of World War II, the most critical strategic problem for the US was containment of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, scholars and experts focused on building deterrence theories on how to confront communist aggression. In comparison, the theory of diplomatic coercion, which tries to use threats or a limited amount of force to influence the behaviour of another by making it choose to comply, was popular neither among decision-makers nor scholars. Since a favourable international environment for applying coercive diplomacy began after the Cold War finished in the 1990s, coercive diplomacy and the coercion literature have proved to be less rich and less cumulative than that of other political theories. However, regardless of this weak enthusiasm for it, the concept of coercion was adopted as state foreign policy and diplomatic coercion was executed as a strategy. The US administrations after the fall of the Soviet Union have implemented coercive diplomacy to influence their adversaries. The non-proliferation policy of the US was no exception. Regardless of the differences in the doctrines and policies of each administration, Clinton, Bush and Obama had a consistent policy on nuclear non-proliferation. Having become the hegemonic state of unipolar system with the ability to conduct a war in any place in the world, the execution of coercion was the most convenient policy strategy for the US among the other alternatives. From a basis of dominant military strength and economic power, the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations attempted to dismantle the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea by every conceivable means, utilizing hard power, soft power and smart power. The coercive, non-coercive and persuasive inducements of coercive diplomacy were applied to stop these nuclear programmes. None of the administrations allowed the full fledge nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Instead, they labelled Iran and North Korea rogue states or ‘axis of evil’ during the span of the three presidents. Admittedly, the Obama administration showed differences in terms of rhetoric, but the ‘strategic patience’ which it applied to Iran and North Korea during its first term was not much different from the policy of its predecessors. Moreover, Obama applied the most severe economic sanctions, which even prohibited the Iranian oil trade. However, the coercive diplomacy of the US administrations did not have tangible success in disarming these states of their nuclear programmes; instead, they increased their nuclear capabilities. Although a nuclear deal has recently been reached in the Iranian case, it will take a process lasting 15 years to complete the settlement. It seems that US coercive diplomacy is most likely to be maintained during this period. This study focuses on the non-proliferation coercive diplomacy of the US against the ‘axis of evil’ of Iran and North Korea and their counterstrategies in order to examine the dispute process as a whole and to provide more efficient policy proposals regarding the subject.

The thesis of this research is that anticommunism in the Cold War was centrally a hegemonic project which, through defining a largely conservative and exclusionary form of Americanism, secured, for most of the period covered, the unity of a broad ‘historical bloc’ including fractions of capital with diverse modalities of surplus extraction, trade unions and state apparatuses. In so doing, it cemented the role of the Jim Crow South within American nationhood, provided its dominant classes with techniques of violence and consent through which to suppresses challenges to segregation, and supplied an invaluable element of a complex ideological nexus in which Southern white supremacy could be understood and valued. The breakdown of the anticommunist consensus exposed great strategic and ideological fractures over the necessity and merits of Jim Crow, both within the dominant and dominated classes, and facilitated its overthrow.

This dissertation provides a detailed examination of the influence of Thomas Clifton Mann on the Latin American policy of the United States of America. A Foreign Service Officer from 1942, Mann eventually rose to the position of Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, and was President Lyndon Johnson’s most valued adviser on inter-American policy until his retirement from government service in May 1966. Commonly portrayed as highly conservative, insensitive to Latin American needs, and opposed to U.S. aid programs, Mann was a far more complex character than his critics have allowed. During the Eisenhower administration Mann’s influence was vital in reorienting policy priorities in Washington, emphasising the need for price stabilisation measures and limited development aid. During the Kennedy administration he opposed the Bay of Pigs invasion, before serving as Ambassador to Mexico where he successfully resolved the nation’s longest running border dispute. Most influential under Lyndon Johnson, Mann sought to place U.S. policy on a stable and sustainable path, reining in unrealistic expectations while fending off attacks from fiscal conservatives opposed to aid measures of any kind. In studying Mann’s career, much is revealed regarding the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations during a crucial period of history. While U.S. goals remained largely consistent, the nature of the challenges faced and the tactics used to counter them did not. Mann’s career saw the Cold War come to Latin America, and was met with both aid and military intervention, often in the form of counterinsurgency training and operations. Mann’s role in developing those polices reveals the contrasts and, more often, consistencies between the administrations he served, and undermines claims that the transition from Kennedy to Johnson witnessed a radical policy overhaul. Studying Mann’s career also illuminates divisive internal debates over the nature and meaning of inter-American relations, and the role and influence of an individual within Washington’s policymaking bureaucracy.

This thesis seeks to demonstrate that, during the post war and early Cold War years, the US Federal government, and in particular the Executive branch, was inspired to increase the role which it played in the US Education system. It also seeks to chart the methods it utilised in order to do so. One inspiration was the desire to direct the US education system towards a curriculum which better benefitted the nation’s Cold War effort, including placing a greater emphasis upon scientific education and training, more tightly regulating the discussion over democratic vs. communist ideologies in the classroom and the pursuit of a greater equalisation in opportunity for African American students. Further inspiration was provided by both the widespread expansion of centralised government programs and the increased importance of education to social progress witnessed across the world after the Second World War, and both President Truman’s own personal commitment to the equalisation of education opportunity, and the Democratic Party’s pursuit of black votes during the Truman Administration. This thesis charts the Executive and Judicial branches’ innovative and unorthodox usage of the powers available to them in order to garner greater influence over the education system, and assesses the varying rates of success of these programmes in order to demonstrate the significant and irrevocable shift in the relationship between the US Federal government and the US education system which occurred during the early Cold War.

This thesis develops a candidate-centred conception of American presidential nominations. Candidates' choices in nomination politics remain under-theorised. The literature on nominations has tended either to downplay the role of candidates' independent influence or to suggest that the impact of their choices is too idiosyncratic to theorize about. I reject both of these positions; and instead develop the basic elements of a theory in which candidates are the principal agents of change in nomination contests. I argue that candidates make distinct identity, tactical, and management choices, and I show that this simple frame can be used to connect aspirants' varying goals to their choices and actions. In my theory, candidates' prospects remain relatively stable unless a shift occurs in their competitive setting in response to an unexpected event - for instance, a surprising election result. These shifts, or critical junctures, define a candidate's path to his party's presidential nomination. I argue that the rival candidates' choices dominate the development of these critical junctures and, therefore, that candidates' choices are crucial to nomination outcomes. Structural factors, the actions of non-candidates and the effects of exogenous events, account for a minority of critical junctures. In the empirical chapters of this study, I examine the Democratic and Republican nomination contests in selected years before the McGovern-Fraser reforms (1912, 1924, 1932) and in post-reform cases (1972, 1976, 1980) to demonstrate the pervasive influence of candidates' choices in contrasting institutional settings. These cases confirm my basic claim about the centrality of candidates' choices and also suggest significant ways in which candidates' choices have changed between 1912 and 1980.

Il est assez difficile pour la jeune génération d’électeurs démocrates qui ont contribué à porter Barack Obama au pouvoir en 2008 et 2012 d’imaginer l’état de déroute dans lequel se trouvait le parti démocrate après les victoires électorales de Ronald Reagan en 1980 et 1984. Obama doit sa double élection à la fois à l’efficacité de ses campagnes et aux changements qui ont affecté le parti démocrate depuis les années 1980. Certes, les élus démocrates n'avaient pas attendu l'échec humiliant de Jimmy Carter en 1980 pour engager un travail de réflexion mais c'est pendant les années Reagan que certains démocrates influents commencèrent à se mettre concrètement au travail. Le Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) fut la pièce maîtresse d'une sorte d'aggiornamento politique et idéologique qui permit au parti démocrate de reconstituer ses forces en moins de dix ans et de reconquérir la présidence en 1992 avec l’élection de Bill Clinton. Depuis le début des années 1980 jusqu’à sa disparition en 2011, le DLC se consacra à la modernisation idéologique du parti démocrate. / It is quite difficult for the young generation of Democratic voters who contributed to bring Barack Obama into power in 2008 and 2012 to imagine the electoral losing streak the Democratic Party endured after Ronald Reagan’s electoral victories in 1980 and 1984. Obama owes credit to both his efficient campaigns and the changes which have affected the Democratic Party since the 1980s for winning the executive office twice. The Democratic elected officials certainly had not waited for Jimmy Carter’s humiliating defeat in 1980 to reflect upon the situation but it is during the Reagan years that some Democratic influential members started taking action. The Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) became a key part of a sort of political and ideological aggiornamento which allowed the Democratic Party to rebuild its forces in less than ten years and to win back the executive office in 1992 with Bill Clinton’s election. From the early 1980s to its dissolution in 2011, the DLC devoted itself to the ideological modernization of the Democratic Party.

L'environnementalisme américain est un mouvement dont la première vague surgit à la fin du 19e siècle face à l'exploitation excessive des ressources naturelles. Théodore Roosevelt a mis en place des mesures pour assurer la gestion avisée de la nature au bénéfice des générations présentes et futures. A côté de la conservation du gouvernement, un autre courant appelé préservation mit l'accent sur les valeurs esthétiques et spirituelles de la nature. Les deux conceptions de la relation de l'homme à la nature suscitèrent des conflits à propos de la façon dont on devait utiliser et protéger le patrimoine naturel. Le fort développement économique après 1945 puisa dans les ressources et généra de la pollution ainsi que des dangers posés par les industries atomiques et chimiques. "Printemps Silencieux" de Rachel Carson, paru en 1962, démontra que ces risques pesaient sur l'humanité elle-même et lança le mouvement environnemental moderne. Désormais, l'aspect éthique de la protection environnementale rivalise avec l'intérêt économique. Le succès du mouvement, canonisé par une série de lois environnementales, en fit la cible du contre-mouvement conservateur qui se développe depuis les années 1980. Les valeurs écologiques représentent une menace au credo américain, ainsi créant des tensions qui caractérisent le débat depuis le début du mouvement aux États-Unis. / American environmentalism is a movement that grew out of concerns over wilderness and wildlife depletion evident in the late 19th century. Theodore Roosevelt initiated conservation measures designed to manage natural resources wisely to ensure their sustainability for the benefit of present and future generations. Preservation, another current of American ideas that stressed the esthetic and spiritual values of nature, existed concurrently. The two visions of humans' relationship to nature gave rise to conflicts over how the nation's natural resources should be used. By the 1960s rapid development had led to heightened resource use and pollution, as well as new threats posed by the chemical and atomic industries. Rachel Carson's "Silent Spring" published in 1962, demonstrated that humans themselves were in peril and launched the modern environmental movement. The ethical dimension of preserving nature and human health came to rival economic concerns. The success of the movement, canonized in a series of major environmental protection laws, made it the target of the conservative countermovement from the 1980s onward. Ecological values threaten the dominant values of the American creed, causing tensions that have characterized the debate since the advent of environmental protection in the United States.

S’inscrivant dans l’histoire des relations culturelles internationales, cette thèse porte sur la seconde vague d’américanisation culturelle du Brésil (1946-1978). Elle s’interroge sur la notion d’américanisation, sur ses acteurs et décideurs et sur leurs moyens d’action, ainsi que sur les lieux de rencontres culturels entre le Brésil et les États-Unis. Dans un contexte politique international bipolaire, la seconde américanisation culturelle du Brésil s’insère dans une Guerre froide« périphérique », celle qui dépasse l’axe États-Unis - Union Soviétique : elle est conduite par un réseau complexe de décideurs artistiques, convaincus de l’importance du renforcement de l’amitié continentale américaine. Pour cela, la culture, sous toutes ses formes, s’avère un outil de politique étrangère relevant du soft power, mais aussi un instrument privilégié, voire une « arme » actionnée par des décideurs privés. Cette thèse s’intéresse aux acteurs et médiateurs individuels ou collectifs, à titre étatique ou privé, ainsi qu’à leurs actions culturelles contribuant à la diffusion de l’American Way of Life dans l’axe Rio de Janeiro - São Paulo. Les Brésiliens eux-mêmes, individus comme autorités politiques ou institutions privées, occupent une place déterminante dans cette démarche d’alignement culturel : les Brésiliens invitent ainsi volontiers des artistes états-uniens et organisent ou reçoivent avec sympathie des manifestations culturelles en provenance du « grand frère ». Cette participation brésilienne volontariste conduit l’approche de cette étude : celle d’une américanisation largement « invitée » dans les musées, galeries, théâtres ou instituts culturels brésiliens. Ces lieux de rencontres et domaines culturels ont jusqu’alors été peu analysés par l’historiographie ; mais ils s’avèrent fondamentaux pour la compréhension tout aussi bien de la place attribuée au Brésil dans les circuits internationaux artistiques dans le contexte bipolaire, que de la présence culturelle états-unienne au Brésil ou de la nature des relations internationales des deux géants américains lors de la Guerre froide culturelle. / As a part of the history of the international cultural relations, this thesis focuses on the second wave of the cultural americanisation of Brazil (1946-1978). It questions the notion of americanisation, its actors, its decision makers and their means of action, as well as the cultural meeting places between Brazil and the United States. In a bipolar international political context, the second cultural americanisation of Brazil takes place in a « peripheral » Cold War which oversteps the axis United- States - Soviet-Union. It is realized by a complex network of decision makers who believe in the importance of the strenghtening of the American continental friendship. For that purpose, culture in all its different forms proves to be useful for the « soft power » foreign politic and to be an ideal tool, a true « weapon », in the hands of the private decision makers.This thesis focuses on the actors and the individual or collective mediators, private ones or public ones, as well as on their cultural actions which help to spread the American Way of Life over the axis Rio de Janeiro - Sao Paulo. The Brazilians, individuals, political authorities or private institutions occupy a key place in this cultural alignement process: they invite artists from the United-States willingly and organise or receive cultural events from the « big brother » with sympathy. This voluntary Brazilian participation leads the process approach of this work: a widely « invited » americanisation in the museums, galleries, theaters or Brazilian cultural instituts. These meeting places and cultural areas have not yet been much analysed by the historiography; but they are fundamental for the comprehension of the place given to Brazil in the international art circuits in the bipolar context, for the comprehension of the cultural presence of the United States in Brazil and for the nature of the international relations of the two giants during the cultural Cold War.

De nos jours, le motif de la « crise de l’éducation » est récurrent dans les discussions publiques sur le système éducatif, et ce des deux côtés de l’Atlantique. Aux Etats-Unis, c’est au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale qu’il prend une tournure nouvelle. Jusqu’alors on avait parlé de « crise » pour désigner les difficultés matérielles et financières du système, mais l’expression prend une autre signification après 1945, tandis que s’installe un débat entre les partisans de l’éducation moderne, modèle inspiré par les principes de l’éducation progressiste, et les défenseurs d’une éducation humaniste, qui dénoncent une dégradation des exigences intellectuelles et des résultats de l’enseignement public. Cette étude se propose de restituer les termes de ce débat et d’analyser ses répercussions sur les dynamiques du système éducatif américain. La confrontation entre deux philosophies de l’éducation ne se limite pas à la sphère des professionnels et on en retrouve les échos dans la presse de grande diffusion comme dans certains films hollywoodiens. Alors que les États-Unis font face à une crise de confiance après le lancement réussi du satellite Spoutnik, le gouvernement américain désigne le système éducatif comme maillon faible en s’appuyant sur les critiques formulées tout au long des années 1950 par les adversaires de l’éducation moderne. Le télescopage du débat sur l’éducation et des logiques de Guerre froide ouvre alors la voie à une intervention fédérale inédite dans le domaine de l’éducation, avec l’adoption du National Defense Education Act de 1958. / The “crisis in education” has been a recurrent theme in discussions about the American school system. In the United States, it was after WWII that the notion gained momentum and a new meaning. Until then, the term “crisis” had been merely used to evoke the dire material and financial state of education. The expression took another turn with the emergence of a debate between proponents of modern education (a model derived from the principles of progressive education) and partisans of liberal education who denounced an intellectual degradation in the school system. This dissertation analyzes this debate and its consequences on the dynamics of education in the United States. This strife between two conceptions of education is set apart by its significant influence and pervasion of society. Indeed, not only did it involve the circle of professional educators but it also touched lay men, so much so that it was integrated by popular culture. Confronted with a confidence crisis in the aftermath of the successful launch of satellite Sputnik, the U.S. government pinpointed the school system as the weak link of the American nation, taking advantage of the wave of criticisms against modern education that had dominated the 1950s. The combination of the debate on education with the logics of the Cold War paved the way for an unprecedented federal intervention in the field of education with the 1958 National Defense Education Act.

Notre thèse se donne pour objectif d’examiner la projection culturelle de la présence militaire américaine en France entre 1944 et 1967. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, alors que le monde bascule dans la Guerre froide, nul ne sait déterminer l’issue de la confrontation politique et idéologique qui se déroule entre les États-Unis et l’Union Soviétique. En 1949, la France fait partie des pays fondateurs de l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique nord (OTAN). Sa participation à l’organisation internationale entraîne le « grand retour » des soldats américains, les GI, sur le territoire français. Celui-ci s’accompagne d’une politique culturelle inédite, qui se traduit par de nombreuses actions menées tant au niveau institutionnel que sur le terrain des bases militaires. Comment et pourquoi les autorités diplomatiques et militaires s’appliquent-elles à développer une stratégie de promotion de la présence militaire américaine en France ? Quelles formes prennent les campagnes de publicité organisées par les services d’information américains en France (USIS-France), pour développer les rapports entre civiles et militaires ? Quelle image les Français et les Américains se font-ils de cette présence militaire en territoire étranger ? À la lumière d’études journalistiques, archivistiques et de terrain, nous montrons que Washington s’emploie à conduire une politique culturelle « parabelliciste » très maîtrisée. Cette notion, adaptée de la pensée de l’intellectuel français Jacques Ayencourt en 1946, caractérise avec à-propos la politique culturelle américaine conduite de l’arrivée des premiers GI en 1944 jusqu’au départ des derniers bataillons en 1967. / Our thesis aims to examine the promotion of the American military presence in France from 1944 to 1967. After World War II, as the world was slowly drifting into the Cold War, the outcome of the political and ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was still uncertain. In 1949, France took part in the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its participation in NATO led to the return of US soldiers, the GIs, to French territory. Their return was accompanied by an unprecedented cultural policy, implemented both at the institutional level and in the day-to-day lives of French citizens. How and why did the diplomatic circles and the military establishment feel the need to develop a strategy to promote the US military presence in France? How were the advertisement campaigns conceived by the US information services in France (USIS-France) in order to develop a relationship between civilians and the military? What image did the French and the Americans have of this military presence on French soil? Based on journalistic, archival and field studies, our work shows that Washington’s cultural policy was “parabellicist,” aiming deliberately to keep both the French and the Americans on a war footing. This notion, derived from Jacques Ayencourt’s work in 1946, appropriately characterizes American cultural policy conduct from the arrival of the first GIs in 1944 until the last battalions departed in 1967.