<p>Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the Marine Corps plodded along, a small military institution little known to the public. Moreover, the institution faced a host of problems ranging from recruiting difficulties and desertion to resisting absorption by the Army, or even elimination altogether. It also had to deal with a negative public image as promulgated by some naval officers and the press since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Marine officers were depicted as lazy and superfluous aboard ship, while enlisted Marines were portrayed as gullible fools who did not participate fully in running and maintaining the ship. By the end of World War I, however, the institution had transformed itself into a well-respected entity. Many Marines even viewed themselves as superior to sailors. Whatever problems the Corps would face throughout the twentieth century, public ignorance would not be one of them. The institution successfully had articulated an image of itself as an elite military institution of fighters.</p><p> Existing historiography on the Marine Corps tends to emphasize the institution's existential and finally successful quest for a mission. In contrast, Marines represented themselves as multidextrous, capable of all missions and responsibilities. They could not lay claim convincingly to a single mission because of their odd position between the land-based missions of the Army and the sea-based missions of the Navy. In response, the Corps promoted the notion of Marines as elite troops, suggesting it could fill any role and do it more effectively than other military branches. The institution created a flexible image that could be deployed in various forms to the public while simultaneously strengthening the institution's group identity. </p><p> This self-image required years of construction. Some aspects of this new representation grew out of the Corps' past experiences, but others had to be invented out of whole cloth. Individual officers composed a canonical history for the Corps and stressed traditions as the foundation of the Corps' corporate identity. By 1910 these foundation myths coalesced into coherent narrative. The Corps stressed it was an elite institution composed of picked men who prided themselves, albeit incorrectly, on being the nation's oldest military service and the best fighters. The Corps' Recruiting Publicity Bureau, established in 1911, adeptly fostered and even exaggerated this image. The Marine was a larger than life he-man, capable of anything and daunted by nothing. </p><p> This image was integral to the Corps' preparation for World War I. By the time the United States declared war against Germany in 1917, the Corps had positioned itself to obtain the types of recruits it wanted, train them, and assure their presence overseas in a land war that was atypical of the Corps' previous experience. The Bureau simultaneously sought to ensure the recruits it had attracted with an image would embrace the institution's identity. To this end the Bureau worked to instill the Corps' group identity into recruits during training and to reinforce this identity to fully-fledged Marines. The Corps' attention to wartime publicity reaped post-war dividends. By 1918, the word "Marine" was virtually a household name. Rather than being associated with any particular duty, it conjured up visions of indomitable, elite fighters. By the 1920s, fiction and myth became more important than history in maintaining and perpetuating this image. Between 1861 and 1918, then, the Corps successfully made it mean something significant to be a Marine.</p> / Dissertation

Abstract not available.

ABSTRACT The acquisition and transportation of supplies for the U.S. Army proved to be the most intractable military problem of the War of 1812. Logistics became the bane of successive secretaries of war and field commanders, and of the soldiers who fought the British and Canadian troops, and their native allies. Historians have correctly ascribed the failure of American arms to achieve its principal war aim, the conquest of Canada, to the dysfunctional logistical and supply system. The suffering of soldiers who received subpar food and clothing, and experienced a shortage of weapons, ammunition, and fuel, moreover, are a staple of the historical literature on the war. Although this dissertation analyzes the causes and consequences of the breakdown in logistics, it also focuses on the lesser-known story of how the Corps of Quartermasters made logistics work under difficult conditions. It investigates how the military professionals within the officer corps drew lessons from their wartime travails and made common cause with reform-minded civilians in the hope of creating a better logistical system. Their combined efforts led to the postwar reform drive that gave the U.S. Army permanent supply departments, a comprehensive set of regulations, effective measures to enforce accountability, a new system for distributing food to the army, and a construction boom in military roads. Reformers also transformed the Quartermaster Corps to a greater degree than previously thought. Historians have long argued that the U.S. Army did not have a professionalized officer corps until the end of the nineteenth century. Recently, historians have considered the professional aspects of the antebellum officer corps. This dissertation argues that the origins of military professionalism can be traced back to the War of 1812. Army quartermasters, in particular, stood in the vanguard of military progress. Quartermaster General Thomas Sidney Jesup emphasized military expertise, education, and training far more than had his predecessors, and quartermasters typified the growing commitment of army officers to a lifetime of service to the nation. Jesup envisioned that his department would become an elite staff of military logisticians. He also wanted that peacetime staff to be large enough to support an army at war. He opposed the practice of appointing businessmen to fill quartermaster vacancies during a war, believing that these men did not have the basic competencies to perform their tasks well. In fact, the performance of civil appointees and career officers improved over the course of the war and a few even proposed logistical reforms that the army would later adopt. The War of 1812 not only provided the catalyst for the postwar reform of logistics and the onset of a professional ethic among quartermasters, but the process of professionalizing logistics actually began during the war. This study’s main findings draw on the private and official correspondence of army officers and secretaries of war, which reside in published government documents and manuscript collections housed in the National Archives, Library of Congress, and various universities and historical societies. Army registers, college registers, local histories, genealogies, and officers’ letters facilitated the reconstruction of quartermasters’ careers. / History

Between 1865 and 1898, the United States Navy underwent an unprecedented technological and professional modernization. This modernization involved the use of advanced technology in ship construction, propulsion, and armament. Steel replaced wood as the primary building material in ship construction, steam propulsion replaced sail propulsion, and rifled guns and automobile torpedoes replaced smoothbore and muzzle loading guns. The naval officer corps also moved towards professionalization with the creation of advanced training schools, such as the Naval War College. Utilizing the academic works of naval officers found in the Papers and Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, it is possible to track the intellectual processes that facilitated naval modernization. Through decades of development and lobbying Congress for appropriations, naval officers influenced the modernization of the U.S. Fleet that decisively defeated the Spanish Navy during the battles of Manila Bay and Santiago de Cuba. / History

The Canadian Militia, since its beginning, has been underfunded and under-supported by the government, no matter which political party was in power. This trend continued throughout the interwar years of 1919 to 1939. During these years, the Militia's members had to improvise a great deal of the time in their efforts to attain military effectiveness. This included much of their training, which they often funded with their own pay. They created their own training apparatuses, such as mock tanks, so that their preparations had a hint of realism. Officers designed interesting and unique exercises to challenge their personnel. All these actions helped create esprit de corps in the Militia, particularly the half composed of citizen soldiers, the Non-Permanent Active Militia. The regulars, the Permanent Active Militia (or Permanent Force), also relied on their own efforts to improve themselves as soldiers. They found intellectual nourishment in an excellent service journal, the Canadian Defence Quarterly, and British schools. The Militia learned to endure in these years because of all the trials its members faced. The interwar years are important for their impact on how the Canadian Army (as it was known after 1940) would fight the Second World War. To put it simply, the interwar years forced the Militia to focus on officer, NCO, and specialist development, creating a highly trained and effective nucleus of key personnel. This leadership core led Canada's land-based contribution to the war effort. Another important factor in the Canadian Army's performance was the Militia's interwar interest in mechanization, which revealed a remarkably progressive strain in this neglected organization. / History

鄧國亮. / "2007年8月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2007. / 參考文獻(leaves 166-172). / "2007 nian 8 yue". / Abstract also in English. / Deng Guoliang. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 166-172). / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2007. / Chapter 第一章、 --- 緖論 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二章、 --- 成化元年藤峽之役 --- p.16 / Chapter 第三章、 --- 嘉靖七年藤峽之役 --- p.73 / Chapter 第四章、 --- 嘉靖十八年藤峽之役 --- p.130 / 結語 --- p.156 / Chapter 附錄一： --- 王守仁嘉靖六年致廷臣信件 --- p.159 / 徵引書目 --- p.165

何廣榮. / "2005年6月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2005. / 參考文獻(leaves 77-85). / "2005 nian 6 yue". / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / He Guangrong. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2005. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 77-85). / 題目：從唐宋時期大戰略的轉向考察定州義武軍 / 提要 --- p.i / Abstract --- p.ii / 目錄 --- p.iii-iv / Chapter 第一章： --- 緒論 --- p.1-13 / Chapter 1.1 --- 課題的意義與基本視角 / Chapter 1.2 --- 名詞與槪念 / Chapter 1.3 --- 課題的硏究回顧 / Chapter 第二章： --- 靖內重鎭：唐代的定州義武軍 --- p.14-44 / Chapter 2.1 --- 唐初的大戰略格局 / Chapter 2.2 --- 安史之亂後的大戰略格局 / Chapter 2.3 --- 義武軍戰略價値(牽制角色） / Chapter a. --- 地理價値 / Chapter b. --- 鎭帥與鎭兵 / Chapter 2.4 --- 小結 / Chapter 第三章： --- 禦外要地：五代宋初的義武軍 --- p.45-74 / Chapter 3.1 --- 南北向大戰略的形成 / Chapter a. --- 契丹的興起 / Chapter b. --- 北宋開國的大戰略 / Chapter 3.2 --- 義武軍的戰略價値(禦外角色） / Chapter a. --- 地理價値 / Chapter b. --- 鎭帥與鎭兵 / Chapter c. --- 義武軍的延續：定武軍 / Chapter 3.3 --- 小結 / Chapter 第四章： --- 結語 --- p.75-76 / Chapter 4.1 --- 藩鎭的個案硏究方法 / Chapter 4.2 --- 北宋以後定州的發展 / 參考書目 --- p.77-85 / 後記 --- p.86 / Chapter 附件I: --- 地圖 / Chapter 圖一： --- 唐代太行山地區交通圖 --- p.20 / Chapter 圖二： --- 唐代河北地區一覽圖 --- p.25 / Chapter 圖三： --- 宋代河北地區一覽圖 --- p.54 / Chapter 附件II： --- 簡表 / Chapter 表一： --- 定州義武軍沿革簡表 --- p.5 / Chapter 表二： --- 唐代義武軍節度使一覽表 --- p.36-38 / Chapter 表三： --- 義武軍節度使具體才能一覽表 --- p.39-40 / Chapter 表四： --- 五代至北宋初義武軍節度使一覽表 --- p.60-61 / Chapter 表五： --- 宋代定武軍節度使(景德元年前)一覽表 --- p.71-71

<p> This dissertation explores U.S.-Brazilian relations through the prism of naval diplomacy between 1893 and 1930. Broadly, this dissertation explains the growth of U.S. naval involvement in Brazil, emphasizing the motives of Brazilian and American policymakers, and the role of naval officers in strengthening bilateral relations. This study begins by examining the Brazilian Navy Revolt of 1893-94, contextualizing it within the formative years of the Brazilian Republic, while discussing U.S. naval intervention in the conflict. It then explores U.S.-Brazilian naval relations in the early twentieth century, explaining the growing association between the two countries&rsquo; navies after the turn of the century. That collaboration culminated in cooperation during World War I, and with the establishment of an American Navy Commission to teach at the Brazilian Naval War College. Finally, this dissertation explores the dynamics of the U.S. Navy Mission in Brazil during the first formative years after its establishment in 1922. Introducing naval diplomacy to the historiography of U.S.-South American relations illuminates the origins of American influence in Brazil, including the crucial role of Brazilians in pursuing closer ties, as well as the development of a U.S. policy focused on reducing European influence, promoting regional security, and increasing U.S. commercial power in the region.</p>

<p>When addressed with military strategy the first thought is to drift towards the big name battlefields: Shiloh, Perryville, Stones River, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga. Our obsession with tactics and outcomes clouds our minds to the social, cultural, and political factors that took place away from the front lines. Less appealing, but no less important to understanding the war as a whole, this study incorporates non-military factors to explain the shift of Confederate military strategy in the Western Theater. Southern citizens experienced a growth of military awareness, which greatly influenced the military policies of Richmond, and altered how Confederate generals waged war against Union armies. The geography of Mississippi and Tennessee, and the proximity of these states to Virginia, also forced Western generals to pursue aggressive military campaigns with less than ideal military resources. Finally, the emotions and personal aspirations of general officers in the Army of Tennessee, and the Western Theater as a whole, produced a culture of failure, which created disunion and instability in the Western command structure. Confederate generals pursued aggressive military campaigns due to a combination of social, cultural, political, and military factors.

No description available.