<p> What explains why and how America fought the civil war? This thesis argues that industrial modernization can be a useful analytical tool for understanding the causes of the American Civil War. The argument is developed by analyzing the social, political, and military events of the era through the lens of industrialization. This study will show that the American Industrial Revolution lay at the core of the social, political, and military events that shaped this great conflict. Understanding the causes of human events is as critical as understanding their effects. By grasping the root causes of the war, we can better understand how and why it was fought. This analysis of American society, American politics, and the country's military establishment will provide the rich context needed to apprehend the reasons for the American Civil war beyond the dichotomy of slavery and economics.</p>

<p> This thesis examines the role of women geographers and cartographers during World War II and their post-war careers. Like the celebrated Rosie the Riveters, who worked in the heavy defense industry during the war, the largely unknown women mapmakers, or Millie the Mappers, were also indispensable to the war effort. In my research, I attempt to dispel the widely held belief and argument that almost all of the women who worked during World War II were forced to forfeit their positions to the returning veterans at the end of the war, as experienced by the Rosie the Riveters. This study will also refute the claims that the employment gains made by women in the workforce during the war were not permanent and it will illustrate that the women mapmakers thrived as a result of their wartime work experiences and, in fact, advanced in their careers. </p><p> By researching, identifying, analyzing, and developing seven case studies of women cartographers and geographers, this thesis will bring to light via primary sources the roles these women played during the war and their many and significant accomplishments to the war effort. In addition to having very successful careers during the war, these women retained their jobs or found new positions at the same or higher levels in the post-war era. They did not have to take other jobs at reduced pay or status as experienced by most of the women who worked in the defense industries. </p><p> My research shows that a large factor in the women mapmakers being able to retain their jobs was a result of their high level of education; professionalism; relevant work experience; technical skills; foreign language proficiency; and the nature of the jobs in the mapmaking profession. In addition, the fields of geography and cartography were transformed during the war with new processes and technologies for map production. Furthermore, intelligence and information gathering, which are part of the research and mapmaking process, assumed a critical role during World War II and the post-war years when the United States was thrust into the Cold War. There continued to be a need for maps and intelligence information, as well as mapmaking personnel, by the expanding Federal Government to plan strategy in foreign and geopolitical matters.</p>

British estimates of Soviet seapower from 1930 to 1950 covered three main phases. These were primarily characterised by pre-war suspicion of Communism and the Soviet Union, enforced wartime naval cooperation from June 1941 until the end of the Second World War and, finally, a shift towards Cold War antagonism.It is argued that the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division was able to collect sufficient data to maintain a credible intelligence picture of the Soviet Navy's order of battle and war-fighting capabilities, thereby allowing informed decision-making in London. In general, the United Kingdom considered that the Red Navy was poorly equipped and trained, and that it posed little threat to British interests. This was borne out by the Soviet Union's poor employment of seapower during the war.Knowledge of the Soviet Navy was always difficult to obtain. However, a major finding of this thesis is that the wartime Anglo-Soviet alliance allowed British naval representativesin the USSR unprecedented access to Russian warships, facilities and commanders. Though the basing of a naval mission in Russia was principally intended to assist in the common fight against Nazi Germany and to promote liaison between the Royal and Soviet Navies, especially with regard to the Arctic convoys, the British also took the opportunity to examine the maritime forces of their long-standing Communist rival at close quarters. It is contended, therefore, that improved intelligence on the Soviet Navy was made possible by wartime naval collaboration. To examine this assertion, relevant naval aspects of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 are covered in detail in the thesis.After 1945, the Red fleets required some time for consolidation before expansion was possible. The Soviet Navy remained an intelligence target, but British wartime assessments largely held good to the end of the decade.

It is often asserted that British army casualties in the Great War were carelessly incurred and that this influenced the way Britain fought in the Second World War. Manpower was a prime resource in the mobilisation for total war but its scarcity only fully realised by end of 1917 when the army was cautioned about casualties. The government, however, had feared an early popular reaction against mounting casualties. It did not materialise: the incidence of casualties was diffused over time, and households had no mass media spreading intimate awareness of battlefield conditions. The army itself never mutinied over casualties or refused to fight. The country considered the casualties grievous but not inordinate or unnecessary. Between the wars unemployment and 'consumerism' mattered more to people than memories of the Great War., kept ritually alive by annual Armistice Day services. Welfare benefits increased, more children went to secondary school but social and political change was tardy. Many intellectuals turned pacifist but Nazi Germany made an anti-war-stance difficult. Air raids rather than memories of Great War casualties preoccupied the nation as it armed for war. In the Second World War army casualty lists were not regularly lengthy until the beginning of 1944 and did not have an adverse impact on civilian morale. The manpower shortage became acute earlier, in 1942, and army commanders were alerted to replacement problems. Politically, Churchill desired a strong, victorious British army but lack of men induced caution about casualties, particularly in relation to the invasion of Normandy, involving frontal amphibious attack on the German army. This caution communicated itself to the citizen armies in the field, which showed little natural bent for soldiering. These circumstances governed the way the army fought in the Second World War, not memories of Great War casualties - which were more numerous because of the extent over time and scale of the fighting.

<p> The paper focuses on the Battle of Peleliu and how it was interpret throughout the decades following World War 2. While doing so the paper will answer the question on why the Battle was overshadowed and forgotten through history.</p><p>

Abstract not available.

Abstract not available.

Abstract not available.

La société canadienne s'enflamme en 1910 à la suite de l'introduction, par le premier ministre Sir Wilfrid Laurier, d'un projet de loi voulant l'organisation d'un service naval canadien. Que ce soit à la Chambre des communes, en assemblées populaires, en famille ou dans les médias, la défense maritime du Canada retient dorénavant l'attention des Canadiens. Présente au Canada sporadiquement depuis la Confédération, cette question, devenue fondamentale suite à l'émergence de nouvelles puissances militaires remettant en cause la domination de l'Empire britannique, force le Dominion à agir. Après des années de tentatives évitées ou avortées, la question se pause directement : autonomie nationale ou participation impériale? Le débat qui en découle, la crise navale de 1910, divise profondément la société canadienne. Limitée trop souvent à un antagonisme entre Canadiens français et Canadiens anglais par l'historiographie, cette crise traverse aisément les frontières ethniques traditionnelles du pays. En effet, elle résulte principalement d'un affrontement entre autonomistes et impérialistes, chacun avançant un programme spécifique quant à l'avenir souhaité du Dominion. Grandement intéressée par la question, la population s' active et intervient au sien du débat via diverses organisations populaires, en écrivant à ses représentants politiques et en participant à des assemblées publiques. Les médias sont eux aussi captivés, les journaux du pays abordant abondamment le sujet pendant la crise. Ainsi, cette dernière s'avère une véritable crise nationale, les tendances autonomistes et impérialistes s'étalant sur l'ensemble du territoire tout en divisant presque également le peuple canadien.

This thesis evaluates the "human dimension" of military history and focuses primarily on soldiers from the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division during the first half of the Normandy campaign, 6 June to early July 1944. This study concerns itself with the subject of morale and the individual's experience in war. Therefore, it couples an exploration of the challenging physical and psychological conditions that the infantry confronted in battle, with a discussion of how they coped with, and persevered through, the awful bloodbath beyond D-Day. Five critical and related themes are addressed 1) anticipation versus reality; 2) privation and hardship; 3) improvisation and adaption; 4) coping, culture, and comradeship; and 5) administration and morale. By placing the common soldier at the centre of attention, this thesis reveals an interesting and innovative perspective into a variety of important subjects that are virtually unknown in the relevant historiography.