Thèse (M.A.)--Université de Sherbrooke (Canada), 2008. / Titre de l'écran-titre (visionné le 1 février 2007). In ProQuest dissertations and theses. Publié aussi en version papier.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Lehigh University, 2010. / Adviser: Monica Najar.

This thesis seeks to show how heroes are created, the role hero-making plays in the creation of national identity and how the mythology constructed around heroes affects historical memory, by examining the heroic narrative constructed around Commodore Stephen Decatur, United States Navy. Stephen Decatur became a hero during the first Barbary War in 1805, his abrupt rise to heroism was occasioned by a mix of luck, drama, partisan politics and nationalism. After his death, Decatur received very complimentary attention from nineteenth century biographers anxious to present Americans with national heroes. In the twentieth and twenty-first century Decatur remained popular, especially with American reengagement in the Middle East and the "War on Terror." Recent biographies of Decatur are of interest as they reveal the continuities and changes in the American heroic ideal over time, and how the momentum of a narrative can deeply shape our understanding of the past.

<p> The American Expeditionary Force, sent to Siberia in 1918, conducted operations other than war. The rationale for sending the American Expeditionary Force to Siberia was vague, but Wilson&rsquo;s instructions were to be as neutral as possible. The AEF&rsquo;s objectives were relatively ambiguous and therefore the chances for success were minimal. Nevertheless, the AEF proved to be surprisingly adept at the diplomacy required to maintain neutrality. The commanders of the AEF demonstrated the tact and skill necessary to prevent dangerous situations from escalating out of control. The success of the AEF offers a unique opportunity to learn what ground forces can accomplish without actively engaging in war. The overall failure of the intervention also shows the importance of detailed objectives and exit strategy prior to the start of any military operations.</p><p>

This research project attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to design a system wherein the rights of current possessors and the rights of original owners or their descendants of art that may have been looted during the Nazi era in Germany can be fairly balanced to achieve results that would be both fair and economical to the parties involved. While it could be said that twenty years ago this issue was hardly noticed, and very few lawsuits or claims were made, in recent years a large number of lawsuits have been filed against museums and private individuals claiming that the defendants own art that was stolen from the original owners or were taken from them in forced sales designed to give a patina of legitimacy to what were thefts by other means. Museums and others have defended themselves, first claiming that not all sales of that era were fraudulent, and second, claiming that the claimants’ claims should be denied as they were dilatory in making the claims and that the statutes of limitations have expired. While it is true that in many cases decades passed before such claims were filed, the reasons for this are also explored. Two lawsuits have been chosen to serve as exemplars. One suit was brought against a private owner and the other against a museum. This was done to show the differences in the techniques and strategies used. The hypothesis was that there is no practical solution available to bring about the fair and just result most would seek. Complicating matters is that with the federal government and the fifty states, there are too many sources of law to easily bring together in a unified solution. While there are many plausible solutions, the most plausible is for the federal government to step in and set up a national system. At this time, the government lacks the will to act, leaving the parties with no solution.

Abstract not available.

This work examines morale in the Canadian Army overseas from 1939 to 1943. Canadian soldiers began arriving in the United Kingdom in December 1939 and were not committed to battle, with the exception of the one-day raid on Dieppe, until July 1943. Throughout most of their time in the British Isles, Canadian soldiers were kept out of combat, which presented difficult and unprecedented problems of morale and discipline. Their long-term presence in Britain, separated from their loved ones and peaceful civilian lives in Canada, exacerbated these problems. Around 500,000 Canadian soldiers spent time in Britain during the war, which represented approximately 4% of the overall Canadian population in 1939. Therefore, the experience of this large microcosm of Canada's population also serves as an indicator of the mentality of Canadians generally on the eve of the war and during the early war years. Nevertheless, historians have paid little attention to this representative cross-section of the Canadian population. The present work examines the manner in which the army tried to ameliorate morale problems, and finds that a highly developed sense of Canadian identity in the soldiers overseas necessitated the provision of specifically Canadian measures to maintain their morale. The maintenance of strong institutional and familial ties with Canada also facilitated improved morale overseas. This study examines various themes related to Canadian nationalism, identity, and citizenship in a demographically small portion of the population. It draws conclusions based on their experiences that have national pertinence and therefore provides new insight into the overall Canadian experience of the Second World War.

This thesis deals with the development of the militia of British Columbia during the period 1871-1914 and takes into account the various economic, political, and social factors within British Columbia which affected its growth This includes an examination of the causes, both internal and external, which induced certain individuals or groups of people in the province to agitate for the establishment of militia units, and the Dominion policy towards this agitation. In this latter respect it takes into account the strength and weaknesses of the militia system both in the Dominion as a whole and within the province of British Columbia. It deals briefly with Imperial defence policy in general, and Canadian-Imperial relations concerning the defence of British Columbia, in particular Esquimalt. The various British proposals for the joint defence of the naval station, the Dominion policy concerning such proposals and the negotiations which led to joint defence agreements are considered. The author concludes that policy concerning the defence of British Columbia originated not with the Dominion Government, but with the Imperial authorities. Some examination is made of the effect of a permanent regular garrison upon a volunteer militia in the way of instruction, example, etc., and of Canadian policy towards the establishment of a permanent garrison at Esquimalt. The historical significance of the work lies in the fact that, with the exception of Mr. R.H. Roy’s article, The Early Militia and Defence of British Columbia, 1871- 1885, there has been no examination of the early military history of this province. Canadian military history, including that of the various provinces, has as yet been but slightly examined by historians. It offers a wide field for research. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

In 1868, the Meiji government decided to establish a military system that would improve not only the fighting capacity but also the military discipline of Japan's army. On the one hand the Meiji leaders rebuilt Japan's army with inspiration from Western models, initially the French. On the other hand they adopted from Western countries modern military justice system, that helped to shape gradually the Japanese navy and army in the 19th century.;This thesis delves deep into the introduction and evolution of the military justice system in the Meiji era, in an effort to explain how it helped reshape military discipline within the Imperial Japanese Army. Utilizing a range of primary sources, it studies the creation and enforcement of the military justice system from a military history rather than legal history perspective. It is hoped that this thesis reveals the crucial role that the military justice system played in Japan's military modernization during this period. The findings also explain why military discipline of the Imperial Japanese Army began to decline again after the Russo-Japanese War.

D-Day is an event that has seated itself in collective memory, particularly America, as a seminal moment of the Second World War, and of the 20th century. Often the Allied landings in Upper Normandy are conceptualized as a watershed moment of the Second World War, signaling the eventual, unavoidable defeat of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich. Yet, the reality of the situation was far more complicated, as the success of OVERLORD was followed by months of grueling fighting in the Norman bocage. Weeks after the successful landings, the war began to resemble the slow, attritional warfare that had defined the First World War. While the Allies possessed a monumental advantage both in terms of manpower and material, the Germans managed to contain them to a small geographic area, preventing the Allies from bring this advantage to bear. As such, D-Day—though certainly the most well-known aspect of the Normandy campaign—was not the only vitally important operation. In fact, Operation COBRA, the Allied breakout operation, proved to be an inflection point of operations in Normandy. Though it is largely overshadowed by OVERLORD, COBRA proved to be one of the most important military operations in western Europe, allowing the Allies to exploit their massive advantages in material and manpower through a war of maneuver. Operation COBRA is the focus of this analysis, but not in a traditional sense. While COBRA has been largely marginalized, receiving scant attention in general histories of the Second World War, a small but comprehensive historiography on the subject does exists. This body of historical work constitutes a discourse, detailing a changing understanding of COBRA within the Second World War. The focus of this analysis seeks to shift the current paradigm about Operation COBRA, analyzing its legacy in military thought following the Second World War—namely COBRA’s legacy and role in the development of the U.S. Army’s Cold War-era AirLand Battle doctrine. The primary objective of this study is to develop a link between Operation COBRA’s legacy and the development of AirLand Battle doctrine, demonstrating its place in modern military thought. The analysis is developed through four major components. The first section provides a brief overview of Operation COBRA, itself, and seeks to impart readers with a sense of why COBRA was, at the time, mostly unprecedented. The second section, a historiography of COBRA, provides insight to historians’ changing understanding and framing of Operation COBRA. The third section provides a broad overview of AirLand Battle doctrine while also analogizing Operation COBRA and the U.S. Army’s Cold War doctrine. In this way the third section proposes a link between COBRA and AirLand Battle doctrine. Finally, the fourth section attempts to solidify this link by analyzing several decades of papers written at the Army Command and General Staff College, demonstrating a reoccurring discourse that continually linked COBRA to AirLand Battle doctrine. Ultimately, this analysis seeks to bridge the discursive space that exists between historical and modern military thought, as both are necessary for the formation of innovative military doctrine.