En 1668, après avoir conquis une partie des territoires des Pays-Bas espagnols, Louis XIV établit à Tournai un conseil souverain chargé d’administrer la justice à ses nouveaux sujets. Cette cour est érigée en parlement en 1686 et son ressort évolue au fil des guerres menées par le Roi Soleil.Malgré les promesses du maintien des particularismes locaux formulées dans les actes de capitulation des villes, le monarque tente insidieusement de rapprocher la pratique judiciaire du ressort du parlement de Flandre de celle du reste du royaume. Sont ainsi envoyés à la cour l’ordonnance criminelle de 1670 qui modifie les règles de la procédure pénale et de nombreux textes de droit dictant les politiques répressives à appliquer.L’objet de cette étude est de mesurer l’impact de l’enregistrement de la législation royale sur la jurisprudence criminelle de la cour entre 1668 et 1720. Les magistrats, tiraillés entre la tradition des Pays-Bas et la modernité française, ont-ils respecté la volonté du roi ou lui ont-ils, au contraire, résisté ? L’expression de la conscience du juge, la survivance des anciens usages et les intérêts avant tout financiers des parlementaires sont autant d’obstacles au projet d’acculturation entrepris par Louis XIV. / After he gained an important part of the Southern Netherlands in 1668, Louis XIV created a sovereign court to administer justice in the newly conquered territories. The court obtained the title of parliament in 1686 and its jurisdiction evolved as a consequence of the numerous wars and treaties in the late 17th and early 18th centuries.Although the monarch had solemnly promised to maintain the local particularities in the capitulation acts of the main cities, he insidiously attempted to introduce the French legal rules into the judicial practice of the northern territories of the kingdom. Thus the criminal ordinance of 1670 was sent to the court in order to amend the rules of criminal procedure and other statutes imposed the repressive policies to be followed.This study focuses on the registration of royal edicts and ordinances and on their consequences on the court’s jurisprudence in criminal cases between 1668 and 1720. The councilors were torn between the traditions of the Netherlands and French modernity. Therefore we can wonder whether they did respect the king’s will. The expression of the judge’s conscience, the survival of ancient customs and the parliamentarians’ foremost financial interests were indeed obstacles to the Louis XIV’s acculturation project.

This thesis compares criminal defences of insanity and idiocy between 1660 and 1830 in northern England and southern Scotland, regions which have been neglected by the historiographies of British crime and "insanity defences". It is explained how and why English and Scottish theoretical principles differed or converged. In practice, however, courtroom participants could obtain to alternative conceptions of accountability and mental distraction. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are employed to reveal contemporary conceptions of mental afflictions and criminal responsibility, which provide inverse reflections of "normal" behaviour, speech and appearance. It is argued that the judiciary did not dictate the evaluation of prisoners' mental capacities at the circuit courts, as some historians have contended. Legal processes were determined by subtle, yet complex, interactions between "decision-makers". Jurors could reach conclusions independent from judicial coercion. Before 1830, verdicts of insanity could represent discord between bench and jury, rather than the concord emphasised by some scholars. The activities of counsel, testifiers and prisoners also impinged upon the assessment of a prisoner's mental condition and restricted the bench's dominance. Despite important evidentiary evolutions, the courtroom authentication of insanity and idiocy was not dominated by Britain's evolving medical professions (including "psychiatrists") before 1830. Lay, communal understandings of mental afflictions and criminal responsibility continued to inform and underpin the assessment of a prisoner's mental condition. Such decisions were affected by social dynamics, such as the social and economic status, gender, age and legal experience of key courtroom participants. Verdicts of insanity and the development of Britain's legal practices could both be shaped by micro- and macro-political considerations. This thesis opens new avenues of research for British "insanity defences", whilst offering comparisons to contemporary Continental legal procedures.

Adoptée au lendemain de la Libération par le Gouvernement provisoire de la République française, l’ordonnance du 2 février 1945 établit toute une série de principes qui, encore aujourd’hui, forment le socle du droit pénal des mineurs. Ainsi, la responsabilité progressive par paliers calquée sur l’évolution du discernement, la primauté de l’éducation sur la répression, la mitigation des peines ou encore l’adaptation des procédures, sont autant de règles dérogatoires qui structurent et orientent le traitement juridique de l’enfance coupable. Cet ensemble forme, selon l’expression consacrée, les « principes directeurs » du droit pénal des mineurs. Le recours à une étude historique permet de mieux comprendre la construction progressive du droit pénal des mineurs contemporain. / The order of February 2nd 1945 which was adopted in the aftermath of the Liberation by the Provisional Government of the French Republic establishes a series of principles which shape the base of juvenal criminal law. Thus the progressive liability in stages modelled on the development of discernment, the superiority of education on repression, the mitigation of sentences, but also the procedure adjustment, are as many derogating rules structuring and guiding the legal treatment of guilty childhood. To use the hallowed phrase, this combination constitutes the « guiding principles » of juvenal criminal law. The submission to a historical study allows a better understanding of the contemporary gradual building up of juvenal criminal law.