Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000402094-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 304633 bytes, checksum: 9e557ae0c8e15b5dbf5407edfabd35c0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Para Thomas Hobbes, a única função do Estado é manter a paz entre os cidadãos. Cada homem, ao querer possuir o que entende ser necessário para si mesmo, pode entrar em conflito com outro que poderá querer a mesma coisa. Se não houver quem regule, quem organize a convivência humana, o que impera é a lei do mais forte, ou mais astuto. Sempre haverá alguém que poderá colocar em risco minha sobrevivência se eu não tiver como me proteger. O Estado surge como necessidade de construção da paz. Abrimos mão de nossas capacidades de autoconservação, de autodefesa e as delegamos ao Estado, constituído através de um contrato, para que cuide de nossa segurança, para que possamos viver civilizadamente, para que não vivamos em eterna guerra de todos contra todos. O Estado hobbesiano é soberano. Depois de constituído, de formalizado, tem poderes ilimitados de organizar a sociedade como melhor lhe aprouver. Sem Estado não há civilização, não há cidadania, não há paz.

Orientador: Roberto Romano da Silva / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-28T22:21:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Queiroz_MarianaAmaral_M.pdf: 13366046 bytes, checksum: 5b858e1e46c28a8cd057dba1903b20e8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001 / Resumo: A filosofia política de Thomas Hobbes é nosso ponto de partida para uma análise do conceito de soberania. Da forma como se encontra descrita nas obras políticas do autor, como o poder supremo e absoluto, a soberania tomou-se o cerne da concepção moderna de Estado. Por outro lado, a teoria da soberania de Hobbes continua, nos dias de hoje, a suscitar considerações de grande relevância política, e. g., reflexões sobre democracia, sobre legitimidade, e outros ternas. Buscamos neste trabalho, em primeiro lugar, assinalar alguns aspectos originais da teoria política de Hobbes e descrever, brevemente, o seu lugar na história do pensamento político. Em seguida, tendo por referência o De Cive, procuramos reconstituir os argumentos que o levaram a postular a necessidade de um poder absoluto como condição formal para a existência da própria comunidade política. Para tanto, retomamos os fundamentos de sua civil science, observando, também, como nela é engendrado o conceito de soberania. Os princípios da teoria política de Hobbes, de acordo com ele próprio, devem ser extraídos da natureza do homem. Pretendemos mostrar nesta dissertação, que esses fundamentos são, para o autor, a razão e o interesse próprio, e que o entendimento do significado desses fundamentos é essencial para a compreensão do conceito de Commonwealth. Outra questão que pretendemos abordar em profundidade concerne à noção de pacto, urna vez que a idéia de soberania está intimamente ligada em Hobbes à uma concepção peculiar dessa noção teórica. Em virtude disso, foi possível tecer algumas considerações sobre as presumidas tendências autoritárias do autor, e sobre a sua concepção secular da política. Tais questões são inevitáveis quando se examina em profundidade os fundamentos sobre os quais Hobbes edifica a sua teoria soberania / Abstract: Thomas Hobbes's Philosophy of Politics is our prior concern here since we intend to analyze the concept of sovereignty. Described in his political system as the absolute and supreme power within civil society, that concept became the core of the Modern State Theory. From another standpoint, Hobbes's view on sovereignty also contributes nowadays to discuss great issues on Politics such as democracy and legitimacy of power. Our aim here is, first, to present some considerations about Hobbes's remarkable political enterprise, showing some of its oddities to the politics of his own day and briefly describing its place in the History of Political Thought. Second, based on the theory presented in De Cive, we try to exhibit the arguments that lead the author to state an absolute power as a formal condition to any political community. Two things must be considered in order to accomplish our account of the theory: its basis, and how it begets the abstract idea of a sovereign power. According to Hobbes, the tenets of his political theory are to befound in man 's nature. As we try to show here, they are defined as reason and self-interest. lt is a fundamental task to comprehend the meaning of those principies, since we wish to understand what kind of Commonwealth Hobbes establishes in his political science. Another point to be stressed is Hobbes's notion of covenant. For his idea of Sovereignty strongly depends on this theoretic device. Furthermore, we draw from his particular conception of sovereignty some conc/usions about Hobbes's vigorously authoritarian position, and issues concern the secularism of his political theory, among several other topics / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Hobbes' argument in Leviathan can be viewed as a response to the question of why rational human beings should choose to organize themselves into a state. In Hobbes' words, the argument, in large part, attempts to establish the 'causes' of a 'commonwealth'. However, the fact of the matter is that human beings do not organize themselves into a. state; rather, they organize themselves into a plurality of states. The question then becomes one of determining — again in Hobbes' words — the 'causes' of a plurality of 'commonwealths'. In other words, why do rational human beings choose to organize themselves into separate states? It is not clear to me that Hobbes' answered this question; nor is it clear to me that Hobbes' arguments can be extended in order to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. Since international theory is concerned with the plurality of states, it seems reasonable to suppose that an 'Hobbesian' tradition in international thought would have provided at least some insight into the question of the 'causes' of such a plurality. In other words, an 'Hobbesian' tradition in international thought must have at least considered why it is that several Leviathans would emerge from the state of nature. However, having examined the current conception of the 'Hobbesian' tradition, I found that it was simply the 'realist' tradition under a different label; a tradition to which Hobbes' name had been appropriated. Furthermore, I found that the appropriation of Hobbes' name was justified on the basis of his chapter 13 analogy which compared— albeit in a limited way — his theoretical inference of the state of nature with his observations of relations among sovereigns. I argue that the analogy, being neither a definition nor an inference, has no theoretical relationship with Hobbes' main argument; in which case it cannot form the basis of a genuine Hobbesian tradition. Having established that the current Hobbesian tradition is not a genuine one, I propose that a genuine tradition should a least render an account of the emergence of several Levaithans from the state of nature and conclude that this cannot be done without compromising Hobbes' account of the state. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Zugl.: Osnabrück, Universiẗat, Diss.

Contemporary Hobbesian contractarianism began in the wake of John Rawls' revitalization of contractarianism in A Theory of Justice and the subsequent body of critical literature which has grown up around it. Philosophers have been impressed with Rawls' powerful application of a contractarian framework to traditional issues in moral and political philosophy but dismayed at the extensive normative precommitments of his particular contractarian theory. They have thus sought an equally powerful contractarian approach unwed to strong normative precommitments. Of all extant contractarian theories, Thomas Hobbes' theory in Leviathan uniquely constitutes such an approach. Like all contractarians, Hobbes specifies a hypothetical choice problem consisting of a choice environment, a choice problem, and a method of resolution. But Hobbes' choice environment purports to make virtually no substantive normative precommitments. The strength of Hobbesian contractarianism is that it seeks to generate substantive normative conclusions from premises established in a normatively minimalistic theoretical framework, and thus promises not to beg any fundamental normative questions. This dissertation considers in detail three comprehensive and game-theoretically sophisticated books which are central to the current corpus of contemporary Hobbesian contractarianism. These are Jean Hampton's Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Gregory Kavka's Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, and David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. We explain the common denominators and points of divergence among these theories while undertaking an extensive critical investigation of each. Two fundamental themes emerge from these investigations. First, Hobbesian contractarianism tends to run afoul of collective action problems at various levels of its overall argument. Collective actions problems arise when the requirements of individual and collective rationality diverge. Second, the normative minimalism which is heralded as the primary virtue of Hobbesian contractarianism is also revealed as one of its fundamental problems. By minimalizing its normative precommitments, Hobbesian contractarianism undermines its ultimate goal of generating powerful normative conclusions.

Hobbes opera um arranjo argumentativo de forma a estruturar um novo esqueleto conceitual dos termos principais do seu original projeto politico-filosófico. O presente trabalho pretende dar conta de percorrer o labirinto argumentativo, que envolve a inclusao e a exclusao dos ambitos de validade entre lei natural e lei positiva. A trajetória intelectual hobbesiana é permeada por definições contrastantes entre termos e atua na direção de fazer com que uma possvel contenda sobre a extensao ou preeminencia entre os termos se dissipe, afrouxando a contraposição entre eles. Imagina-se ter um ganho de compreensao desse n6 com que amarra a lei natural e a lei civil, atendo-se a s suas articulaC6es. A exposição visa apontar alguns elementos-chaves da tessitura fina da relação entre lei natural e lei positiva, como, por exemplo, razão natural, razão soberana, ação e intenção, direito de resistência,"silencio da lei". Utiliza-se de partes da peça Antígona de Sófocles para ilustrar alguns dos seus pontos, somando a ela interpretações modernas que podem ser sugestivas do movimento teórico hobbesiano. Identifica-se, ao final, na literatura crtica, várias afirmações dos interpretes quanto a s reconciliações conceituais com que Hobbes opera e sugere-se que esse pode tambem ser o caso na relação entre lei natural e lei civil. Alem disso, propõe-se que esses elementos-chaves podem ser as pistas para percorrer esse labirinto argumentativo. / Hobbes makes a theoretical arrangement in order to structure a new skeleton of conception from main terms of his political and philosophical original project. The present text intends to search his theoretical labyrinth, which involves the spheres of inclusion and the exclusion between law of nature and civil law. The Hobbes~ way of argue is building with contrast definitions, but he pleads they are no antagonism. The author seeks understand how the links between right of nature and civil right are articulated. For this, he exposes key elements as natural right, reason of commonwealth, action and intention, right of self-defence, "silence of law". He lays hold of Antigone by Sofocles and modern interpretations hereof illustrate points of this presentation. In the end, it is showed opinions of specialists, who mention conceptual reconciliations in his system. It is suggested that conceptual reconciliation meet the case to describe the relationship between law of nature and civil law and also, the key elements are the traces to roam about his theoretical labyrinth.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Political Science, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

My thesis examines Thomas Hobbes's attempt to develop a mathematical account of nature. I argue that Hobbes's conception of how we should think quantitatively about the world was deeply indebted to the ideas of his ancient and medieval predecessors. These ideas were often amenable to Hobbes's vision of a demonstrative, geometrically-based science. However, he was forced to adapt the ancient and medieval models to the demands of his own thoroughgoing materialism. This hybrid resulted in a distinctive, if only partially successful, approach to the problems of the new mechanical philosophy.

Zugl.: Osnabrück, Univ., Diss., 2006

Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2004. / Bibliography: leaves 103-107.