Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1953. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [163]-179).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1955. / Typescript. Vita. Title from PDF title page (viewed Nov. 6, 2008). Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-288). Online version of the print original.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1955. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 275-288).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1953. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [382]-390).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University. / Using the two volumes of the Helmes-Laski Correspondence, published by Harvard and edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe, as one of its principal sources, this dissertation examines the circumstances leading up to the publication of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' essay, Natural Law in the Harvard Law Review in November, 1918, when Harold J. Laski was its editor. From this focus several lines of inquiry expand, developing from the two major questions of the dissertation: 1) What is Natural Law? and 2) How significant, profound and pertinent were Holmes' and Laski's contribution to the theory of Natural Law, the validity of which they denied? A last chapter examines the co-fusions in Laski's connecting together the plural sovereignty with the personality of associations theories -- ideas he apparently gathered from Otto Gierke. Gierke's position is analyzed directly from his writings, with the conclusion that he was unclear in his own formulations, and that Laski was even more unclear in what he thought Gierke said. Reasons for the vitiation of Laski's work are analyzed, and in summary his frustrations are stressed, while Holmes' great accomplishment within the framework of his own creative inconsistencies is forcefully stated. The conclusion of the whole is that no matter what they said they believed both Holmes and Laski lived and worked as though they believed in Natural Law.

Problem: Although Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. transformed American jurisprudence into critical self-awareness, there is no consensus on the nature of his legal theory. Holmes imperfectly represents each of several incompatible approaches. Commentators presume Holmes lacked any original or coherent theory of justice. Friedrich Nietzsche is likewise presumed a critical philosopher without a coherent theory of justice. Nietzsche wrote esoterically, but there is no consensus on the content of his esoteric agenda. Nietzsche's attitudes toward women appear misogynistic, but his philosophy paradoxically appeals to many feminists. Method: By re-conceptualizing Holmes and Nietzsche in terms of the principles of self-organized criticality, their understandings of causation and developmental dynamics become coherent. This thesis re-conceptualizes common-law legal reasoning as exploiting principles of self-organized criticality to build knowledge inductively. This reveals that Holmes and Nietzsche's genealogical critique of idealism rests on the computational implausibility of assuming there always exist microlevel rules to achieve desired macro-level goals. The legal-reasoning model shows that justice entails an inexhaustible open-system dynamic of applying limited resources to accommodate better an ever-broadening matrix of conflicting values. Nietzsche assesses psychological and social conditions that foster this collective creativity and decadent conditions that inhibit the growth of justice. Nietzsche identifies problems specific to institutions that require special safeguards that he esoterically conceals. Using Nietzsche's exoteric accounts of psychology and rhetoric based on principles of self-organized criticality, Nietzsche's esoteric techniques can be inferred, including his syncretism of pagan myths, which reveals his esoteric content. Conclusion: Holmes and Nietzsche applied a coherent theory of justice based on principles of causation and dynamics not widely accepted until the late twentieth century but having roots in ancient myths and isolated prior thinkers. Nietzsche defines justice as pursuing robust community growth without sacrificing the future for the present. Both Holmes and Nietzsche accord pursuit of justice with the good life whereby individuals promote their own development for greater sacrifice for the community. Nietzsche's esoteric solution to his problem of institutions was matriarchy. Nietzsche's matriarchy follows from his identification of the root of the institutional problem as male windfall opportunism, an evolved unconscious male tendency resulting from uncertainty over genetic parentage.

Problem: Although Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. transformed American jurisprudence into critical self-awareness, there is no consensus on the nature of his legal theory. Holmes imperfectly represents each of several incompatible approaches. Commentators presume Holmes lacked any original or coherent theory of justice. Friedrich Nietzsche is likewise presumed a critical philosopher without a coherent theory of justice. Nietzsche wrote esoterically, but there is no consensus on the content of his esoteric agenda. Nietzsche's attitudes toward women appear misogynistic, but his philosophy paradoxically appeals to many feminists. Method: By re-conceptualizing Holmes and Nietzsche in terms of the principles of self-organized criticality, their understandings of causation and developmental dynamics become coherent. This thesis re-conceptualizes common-law legal reasoning as exploiting principles of self-organized criticality to build knowledge inductively. This reveals that Holmes and Nietzsche's genealogical critique of idealism rests on the computational implausibility of assuming there always exist microlevel rules to achieve desired macro-level goals. The legal-reasoning model shows that justice entails an inexhaustible open-system dynamic of applying limited resources to accommodate better an ever-broadening matrix of conflicting values. Nietzsche assesses psychological and social conditions that foster this collective creativity and decadent conditions that inhibit the growth of justice. Nietzsche identifies problems specific to institutions that require special safeguards that he esoterically conceals. Using Nietzsche's exoteric accounts of psychology and rhetoric based on principles of self-organized criticality, Nietzsche's esoteric techniques can be inferred, including his syncretism of pagan myths, which reveals his esoteric content. Conclusion: Holmes and Nietzsche applied a coherent theory of justice based on principles of causation and dynamics not widely accepted until the late twentieth century but having roots in ancient myths and isolated prior thinkers. Nietzsche defines justice as pursuing robust community growth without sacrificing the future for the present. Both Holmes and Nietzsche accord pursuit of justice with the good life whereby individuals promote their own development for greater sacrifice for the community. Nietzsche's esoteric solution to his problem of institutions was matriarchy. Nietzsche's matriarchy follows from his identification of the root of the institutional problem as male windfall opportunism, an evolved unconscious male tendency resulting from uncertainty over genetic parentage. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

A pretensão do positivismo jurídico é o esclarecimento teórico para se realizar uma descrição correta do direito. A presente dissertação busca verificar qual a abordagem mais adequada para se alcançar a concretização da separação do direito da moral, sendo que o fio condutor é a obra de H.L.A. Hart, na qual se destaca o livro The Concept of Law. Dessa maneira, o problema a que se propõe o trabalho é evidenciar a complexidade da separação do direito da moral. Pretende-se demonstrar, principalmente através da teoria e obra de Herbert Hart, que Oliver Holmes e Hans Kelsen ao apresentarem seus projetos para separação do direito da moralidade, trataram o direito do ponto de vista descritivo, perdendo a caracterização do próprio direito. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado a apresentar e explicar o projeto positivista, já que condutas exigíveis por regras jurídicas não se confundem com as condutas exigidas por regras morais, ainda que conjuntamente possam existir. Ainda nesse capítulo apresentam-se algumas noções importantes para a compreensão e desenvolvimento do trabalho em relação à teoria de Hart, em especial no que tange ao ponto de vista interno e externo. No segundo capítulo é abordada a obra de Holmes, The Path of the Law, e as principais críticas construídas por Hart e discutidas por Stephen Perry e Scott Shapiro. Partindo-se da perspectiva do homem mau presente na teoria, pretende-se demonstrar que esta é insuficiente para compreender a teoria do direito, em especial nas razões pelas quais um cidadão segue o direito, já que nem todos estariam preocupados em qual é a sanção que receberão do Estado caso desobedeçam à regra. No terceiro e último capítulo demonstra-se quais os problemas da teoria de Kelsen apontadas por Hart. Especialmente no que se refere à ideia de Kelsen de que o direito é só forma, podendo ter qualquer conteúdo, enquanto que Hart acredita que o direito deve possuir conteúdo mínimo. Segundo Kelsen, a estrutura normativa é pressuposta, sendo que a regra funciona como esquema de interpretação e a principal função desta é a sanção. O objetivo final do trabalho é demonstrar que neste projeto de tentar salvar a autonomia do direito, Holmes e Kelsen descaracterizaram o fenômeno jurídico como uma prática social. / The claim of legal positivism is the theoretical clarification to perform a correct description of the law. This work aims to verify the most appropriate approach to achieving the implementation of the separation of law from morality, and the common thread is the work of H.L.A. Hart, which stresses the book The Concept of Law. Thus, the problem that is proposed work is to show the complexity of separating law from morals. We intend to show, especially through the theory and work of Herbert Hart, that Oliver Holmes and Hans Kelsen when presented their projects for separating the right of morality, they treated law of the descriptive point of view, losing the characterization of the law itself. The first chapter is dedicated to present and explain the positivist project, as required by legal conduct rules are not confused with the conduct required by moral rules, albeit jointly may exist. Although this chapter presents some important concepts for understanding and development work in relation to Hart's theory, especially with regard to internal and external point of view. The second chapter discussed the work of Holmes, The Path of the Law, and the main criticisms built by Hart and discussed by Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro. Starting from the bad man present perspective in theory, intended to demonstrate that this is insufficient to understand the theory of law, in particular the reasons why a citizen follows the law, since not everyone would be worried about what is the sanction which receive if they disobey the rule. In the third and last chapter shows is that the problems of Kelsen's theory pointed out by Hart. Especially with regard to the idea of Kelsen that law is shaped and can have any content, while Hart believes that law should have a minimum content. According to Kelsen, the regulatory framework is presupposed, and the rule works as interpretation scheme and the main function of this is the sanction. The ultimate goal of the work is to demonstrate that this project of trying to save the autonomy of law, Holmes and Kelsen misrepresent the legal phenomenon as a social practice.

A pretensão do positivismo jurídico é o esclarecimento teórico para se realizar uma descrição correta do direito. A presente dissertação busca verificar qual a abordagem mais adequada para se alcançar a concretização da separação do direito da moral, sendo que o fio condutor é a obra de H.L.A. Hart, na qual se destaca o livro The Concept of Law. Dessa maneira, o problema a que se propõe o trabalho é evidenciar a complexidade da separação do direito da moral. Pretende-se demonstrar, principalmente através da teoria e obra de Herbert Hart, que Oliver Holmes e Hans Kelsen ao apresentarem seus projetos para separação do direito da moralidade, trataram o direito do ponto de vista descritivo, perdendo a caracterização do próprio direito. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado a apresentar e explicar o projeto positivista, já que condutas exigíveis por regras jurídicas não se confundem com as condutas exigidas por regras morais, ainda que conjuntamente possam existir. Ainda nesse capítulo apresentam-se algumas noções importantes para a compreensão e desenvolvimento do trabalho em relação à teoria de Hart, em especial no que tange ao ponto de vista interno e externo. No segundo capítulo é abordada a obra de Holmes, The Path of the Law, e as principais críticas construídas por Hart e discutidas por Stephen Perry e Scott Shapiro. Partindo-se da perspectiva do homem mau presente na teoria, pretende-se demonstrar que esta é insuficiente para compreender a teoria do direito, em especial nas razões pelas quais um cidadão segue o direito, já que nem todos estariam preocupados em qual é a sanção que receberão do Estado caso desobedeçam à regra. No terceiro e último capítulo demonstra-se quais os problemas da teoria de Kelsen apontadas por Hart. Especialmente no que se refere à ideia de Kelsen de que o direito é só forma, podendo ter qualquer conteúdo, enquanto que Hart acredita que o direito deve possuir conteúdo mínimo. Segundo Kelsen, a estrutura normativa é pressuposta, sendo que a regra funciona como esquema de interpretação e a principal função desta é a sanção. O objetivo final do trabalho é demonstrar que neste projeto de tentar salvar a autonomia do direito, Holmes e Kelsen descaracterizaram o fenômeno jurídico como uma prática social. / The claim of legal positivism is the theoretical clarification to perform a correct description of the law. This work aims to verify the most appropriate approach to achieving the implementation of the separation of law from morality, and the common thread is the work of H.L.A. Hart, which stresses the book The Concept of Law. Thus, the problem that is proposed work is to show the complexity of separating law from morals. We intend to show, especially through the theory and work of Herbert Hart, that Oliver Holmes and Hans Kelsen when presented their projects for separating the right of morality, they treated law of the descriptive point of view, losing the characterization of the law itself. The first chapter is dedicated to present and explain the positivist project, as required by legal conduct rules are not confused with the conduct required by moral rules, albeit jointly may exist. Although this chapter presents some important concepts for understanding and development work in relation to Hart's theory, especially with regard to internal and external point of view. The second chapter discussed the work of Holmes, The Path of the Law, and the main criticisms built by Hart and discussed by Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro. Starting from the bad man present perspective in theory, intended to demonstrate that this is insufficient to understand the theory of law, in particular the reasons why a citizen follows the law, since not everyone would be worried about what is the sanction which receive if they disobey the rule. In the third and last chapter shows is that the problems of Kelsen's theory pointed out by Hart. Especially with regard to the idea of Kelsen that law is shaped and can have any content, while Hart believes that law should have a minimum content. According to Kelsen, the regulatory framework is presupposed, and the rule works as interpretation scheme and the main function of this is the sanction. The ultimate goal of the work is to demonstrate that this project of trying to save the autonomy of law, Holmes and Kelsen misrepresent the legal phenomenon as a social practice.

A pretensão do positivismo jurídico é o esclarecimento teórico para se realizar uma descrição correta do direito. A presente dissertação busca verificar qual a abordagem mais adequada para se alcançar a concretização da separação do direito da moral, sendo que o fio condutor é a obra de H.L.A. Hart, na qual se destaca o livro The Concept of Law. Dessa maneira, o problema a que se propõe o trabalho é evidenciar a complexidade da separação do direito da moral. Pretende-se demonstrar, principalmente através da teoria e obra de Herbert Hart, que Oliver Holmes e Hans Kelsen ao apresentarem seus projetos para separação do direito da moralidade, trataram o direito do ponto de vista descritivo, perdendo a caracterização do próprio direito. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado a apresentar e explicar o projeto positivista, já que condutas exigíveis por regras jurídicas não se confundem com as condutas exigidas por regras morais, ainda que conjuntamente possam existir. Ainda nesse capítulo apresentam-se algumas noções importantes para a compreensão e desenvolvimento do trabalho em relação à teoria de Hart, em especial no que tange ao ponto de vista interno e externo. No segundo capítulo é abordada a obra de Holmes, The Path of the Law, e as principais críticas construídas por Hart e discutidas por Stephen Perry e Scott Shapiro. Partindo-se da perspectiva do homem mau presente na teoria, pretende-se demonstrar que esta é insuficiente para compreender a teoria do direito, em especial nas razões pelas quais um cidadão segue o direito, já que nem todos estariam preocupados em qual é a sanção que receberão do Estado caso desobedeçam à regra. No terceiro e último capítulo demonstra-se quais os problemas da teoria de Kelsen apontadas por Hart. Especialmente no que se refere à ideia de Kelsen de que o direito é só forma, podendo ter qualquer conteúdo, enquanto que Hart acredita que o direito deve possuir conteúdo mínimo. Segundo Kelsen, a estrutura normativa é pressuposta, sendo que a regra funciona como esquema de interpretação e a principal função desta é a sanção. O objetivo final do trabalho é demonstrar que neste projeto de tentar salvar a autonomia do direito, Holmes e Kelsen descaracterizaram o fenômeno jurídico como uma prática social. / The claim of legal positivism is the theoretical clarification to perform a correct description of the law. This work aims to verify the most appropriate approach to achieving the implementation of the separation of law from morality, and the common thread is the work of H.L.A. Hart, which stresses the book The Concept of Law. Thus, the problem that is proposed work is to show the complexity of separating law from morals. We intend to show, especially through the theory and work of Herbert Hart, that Oliver Holmes and Hans Kelsen when presented their projects for separating the right of morality, they treated law of the descriptive point of view, losing the characterization of the law itself. The first chapter is dedicated to present and explain the positivist project, as required by legal conduct rules are not confused with the conduct required by moral rules, albeit jointly may exist. Although this chapter presents some important concepts for understanding and development work in relation to Hart's theory, especially with regard to internal and external point of view. The second chapter discussed the work of Holmes, The Path of the Law, and the main criticisms built by Hart and discussed by Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro. Starting from the bad man present perspective in theory, intended to demonstrate that this is insufficient to understand the theory of law, in particular the reasons why a citizen follows the law, since not everyone would be worried about what is the sanction which receive if they disobey the rule. In the third and last chapter shows is that the problems of Kelsen's theory pointed out by Hart. Especially with regard to the idea of Kelsen that law is shaped and can have any content, while Hart believes that law should have a minimum content. According to Kelsen, the regulatory framework is presupposed, and the rule works as interpretation scheme and the main function of this is the sanction. The ultimate goal of the work is to demonstrate that this project of trying to save the autonomy of law, Holmes and Kelsen misrepresent the legal phenomenon as a social practice.